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THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
“PROPERTY” IN THE CONSTITUTION 
PAUL J. LARKIN, JR.* 
Contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence treats “property” as far less 
deserving of judicial protection than “life” or “liberty.”  The Supreme Court, 
however, has misread American legal history.  Anglo-American traditions, 
customs, and law held that property was an essential ingredient of the liberty 
that the Colonists had come to enjoy and must be protected against arbitrary 
governmental interference.  The Framers’ generation believed that “proper-
ty” and “liberty” were equally important institutions and that neither one 
could exist without the other.  The Framers venerated property as a means of 
guaranteeing personal independence because (among other things) the con-
cept of “property” embraced the legal rights to which everyone was entitled, 
such as the right to governance under “the rule of law.”  Property was not 
immune from regulation, but that regulation had to be for the purpose of pro-
moting “the general Welfare,” not the interests of specific groups or people.  
It is time for the Supreme Court to revisit Anglo-American legal history and to 
re-examine its precedents in light of what that history teaches.   
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I. INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments both refer to “property.”1  The Due 
Process Clauses protect “life, liberty, and property” against government action 
inconsistent with “due process of law,” while the Takings Clause bars the ex-
propriation of “private property” without paying the owner “just compensa-
tion.”2  Despite the obvious importance of those terms, the constitutional text 
does not define them, perhaps because their meaning was well known at the 
time.3  The result, however, has been to leave the task of definition to the 
courts, particularly the Supreme Court of the United States.4 
 
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law. . . .”). 
2. The Fifth Amendment directly limits only the power of the federal government, see Barron 
v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), but the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of the 
states.  Over time the Supreme Court has applied most provisions of the Bill of Rights against state 
and local governments by incorporating them through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause.  See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
3. See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 10 (1985) (hereinafter MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM) (“At the time of in-
dependence a great many Americans believed . . . that liberty or freedom required no definition.”); 
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 37 
(1990) (the meaning of property at that time was “unproblematic”).  That does not mean the defini-
tions were simple.  See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra, at 13 (“The concepts of liber-
ty and private property carried with them a large body of assumptions, customs, attitudes, regulations 
both tacit and explicit, and rules of behavior.  Thus neither liberty nor property was a right, singular; 
each was a complex and subtle combination of many rights, powers, and duties, distributed among 
individuals, society, and the state.  Together, these constituted the historical ‘rights of Englishmen’ of 
which eighteenth century Americans were so proud—at least until 1776, when they abandoned their 
right to call themselves Englishmen.”). 
4. The courts’ interpretive role should never be underestimated.  See William Van Alstyne, 
Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL 
L. REV. 445, 467 (1977) (“[W]hoever hath an absolute Authority to interpret any written or spoken 
Laws, . . . it is He who is truly the Law-giver, to all Intents and Purposes, and not the Person who 
first spoke or wrote them.”) (quoting Benjamin Hoadly, Bishop of Bangor, Sermon Preached before 
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The courts have often found that Anglo-American legal history illumi-
nates the meaning of terms in the constitutional text.5  For example, the Su-
preme Court has found that the Due Process Clauses trace their lineage to the 
Magna Carta6 and that, in the Framers’ view, the terms “life, liberty and prop-
erty” referred to natural rights that every man possessed, not by positive law, 
but as a gift from the Almighty.7 
 
the King 12 (1717)).  
5. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012) (discussing the historical 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592–98 (2008) 
(same, the Second Amendment); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946–47 (1983) (same, the Article I 
Presentment Clause); Nixon v. Admin. Gen. Serv.’s, 433 U.S. 425, 473–74 (1977) (same, the Bill of 
Attainder Clause); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169–71 (1976) (lead opinion) (same, the Eighth 
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87–90 
(1970) (same, the Sixth Amendment Jury Trial Clause); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 
223–25 (1967) (same, the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 
52, 109–42 (1926) (same, the Article II Appointments Clause); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
299, 309 (1803) (same, the Article III original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the practice of 
individual justices “riding circuit”).  See generally Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (“We look to this [viz., 
“the historical background to the Second Amendment”] because it has always been widely under-
stood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing 
right.  The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right 
and declares only that it ‘shall not be infringed.’”). 
6. The term “due process of law” stems from Article 39 of Magna Carta of 1215, which provid-
ed that “[n]o free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way 
ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law 
of the land.”  J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA app. 6, at 461 (2d ed. 1992). The effect of Article 39 was to 
safeguard life, liberty, and property against arbitrary deprivation by the crown.  See, e.g., Murray’s 
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856) (“The words, ‘due 
process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, ‘by the law of 
the land,’ in Magna Charta. Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words, (2 Inst. 50,) says they 
mean due process of law.  The constitutions which had been adopted by the several States before the 
formation of the federal constitution, following the language of the great charter more closely, gener-
ally contained the words, ‘but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.’ The ordinance of 
congress of July 13, 1787, for the government of the territory of the United States northwest of the 
river Ohio, used the same words.”); see also, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347–48 
(1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 415–17 
(1897).  An act of Parliament later substituted “due process of law” for “law of the land” without 
changing the term’s substantive meaning.  See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of 
Foreign Law and the Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
337, 411–13 (2015). 
7. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *54 [hereinafter 1 BLACKSTONE]; 
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (3d ed. 2008) (“According to Locke, private property existed under natural 
law before the creation of political authority.  Indeed, the principal purpose of government was to 
protect these natural property rights, which Locke fused with liberty.”); PASCHAL LARKIN, 
PROPERTY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY v (1930) (Preface by Prof. J.L. Stocks) (“Property exists, 
like marriage and the family, antecedently to government, and belongs to the state of nature on which 
government is superimposed: it is natural in a sense in which government is not.”); cf. MICHAEL P. 
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The Framers’ generation also had a clear understanding of what each term 
meant.8  Not surprisingly, life meant then what it means today.  Indeed, given 
the fact that people died at home among family rather than in a hospital and 
the widespread use of capital punishment as the penalty for crime, that gen-
eration was quite familiar with issues of life and death.9  “Liberty” meant 
freedom from unauthorized government interference in one’s movement or 
locomotion, or, more specifically, freedom from arbitrary arrest by the 
Crown.10 
The Framers also knew something about the concept of “property.”11  In 
the eighteenth century, most Americans owned and lived off their own land—
agriculture was the principal industry12—so the best-known forms of property 
were material items such as personalty and realty, as well as incorporeal or 
 
ZUCKERT, LAUNCHING LIBERALISM, ON LOCKEAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 275–76 (2002) (early 
state constitutions gave a prominent place to protection of natural rights). 
8. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 4. 
9. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 28 (2002) 
(“Death itself was a common enough sight.”); Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal 
Law, in DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN 18TH CENTURY 
ENGLAND 18 (1975) (“[T]he number of capital statutes [in England] grew from about 50 to over 200 
between the years 1688 and 1820.”). 
10. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132–33 (2015) (plurality opinion); 1 BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 7, at *125, *130, *134; 2 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
46–48 (1797); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of Liberty and Property, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 411–12 
(1977) (“Prior to the Civil War, . . . there was little evidence that due process ‘liberty’ meant any-
thing more than freedom from personal restraint . . . .  The Blackstonian conception of liberty is both 
purely negative—i.e., freedom from governmental interference—and limited.  It is not the equivalent 
of an all encompassing ‘right to be let alone’; it is a right to be let alone only with respect to one’s 
bodily movement.  It is the kind of interest, roughly speaking, that common-law courts protected in 
habeas corpus and false imprisonment actions.”) (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., Charles Warren, 
The New “Liberty” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 440 (1926); Charles 
M. Hough, Due Process of Law—To-Day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218, 223–24 (1919); Charles E. Shat-
tuck, The True Meaning of the Term “Liberty” in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitu-
tions Which Protect “Life, Liberty, and Property”, 4 HARV. L. REV. 365, 369 (1891).  
11. ELY, supra note 7, at 43. 
12. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 7, at 16 (“By 1750 a largely middle-class society had emerged in 
colonial North America.  Most of the colonists owned land, and 80 percent of the population derived 
their living from agriculture.”); MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 93 (the vast 
majority of Americans held “a comfortable amount of land”); EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF 
THE REPUBLIC, 1763–89, at 8 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC] (“This 
widespread ownership of property is perhaps the most important single fact about the Americans of 
the Revolutionary period.”); SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
PEOPLE 236 (1965); EDWIN J. PERKINS, THE ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA 57 (2d ed. 1988) 
(“The size of the typical colonial farm was generous, often above 100 acres, and families consistently 
grew and harvested surpluses.”); ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN COLONIES 311 (2001) (“Most colonists 
lived on farm households that produced most of their own food, fuel, and homespun cloth.”).   
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future interests such as easements, remainders, and reversions.13  Property that 
someone owned—say, a farm, a home, a barn—were “vested” rights that the 
government could not simply give to someone else.14   
The Framers’ understanding of property, however, was not limited to 
those traditional forms.  Some Colonists worked as self-employed artisans or 
shop owners,15 writers or inventors,16 and merchants or financiers17 in a thriv-
 
13. See, e.g., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 396 (1856) (“Material objects, therefore, are 
property in the true sense, because they are impressed by the laws and usages of society with certain 
qualities, among which are, fundamentally, the right of the occupant or owner to use and enjoy them 
exclusively, and his absolute power to sell and dispose of them; and as property consists in the artifi-
cial impression of these qualities upon material things, so, whatever removes the impression destroys 
the notion of property, although the things themselves may remain physically untouched.”) (Opinion 
of Comstock, J.); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20–43 [hereinafter 2 BLACKSTONE]; 
Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 273, 333–34 (1991); Eric T. Freyfogle, Book Review, Land Use and the Study of Early Ameri-
can History, 94 YALE L.J. 717, 718–29 (1985) (describing the transition in sixteenth to seventeenth 
century New England from an almost communal understanding of property to an individual-
ownership, commodity theory). 
14. See, e.g., Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 398 (“When a law annihilates the value of property and 
strips it of its attributes, by which alone it is distinguished as property, the owner is deprived of it 
according to the plainest interpretation, and certainly within the spirit of a constitutional provision 
intended expressly to shield private rights from the exercise of arbitrary power.”) (Opinion of Com-
stock, J.); Hough, supra note 10, at 223. 
15. See WILLIAM B. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF 
PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 14 (1977) (“[I]n the large sea-
ports most men ran their own shops and owned their own homes.”). 
16. The Framers’ generation knew that value could be intellectual as well as corporeal.  See, 
e.g., STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN 24–
25 (2011) (“Patents and copyrights were established features of the English legal system long before 
the independence of the United States . . . .  After the Revolution all the states but Delaware enacted 
general copyright laws protecting all applicants who met certain minimal criteria . . . .  Patents re-
mained discretionary a bit longer . . . .  [S]tate legislatures granted or denied patents on a case-by-
case basis, to one applicant at a time.”); ELY, supra note 7, at 19 (“As early as 1648 the Massachu-
setts code permitted a monopoly grant for ‘such new inventions that are profitable for the Coun-
trie.’”); id. at 32 (“In response to a 1783 recommendation by the Continental Congress, every state 
enacted legislation granting copyright protection to authors who were [American] citizens.”); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 186 (3d ed. 2005) (describing a 1716 
South Carolina law granting a patent for the creation of a superior coating for ships).  The Framers’ 
desire to protect intellectual property lead to the Patent and Copyright Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries . . . .”); see RANDOLPH J. MAY & SETH L. COOPER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A NATURAL RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE (2015). 
17. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE NEW ENGLAND MERCHANTS IN THE SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY (1955); CARL BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN REVOLT: URBAN LIFE IN AMERICA, 1743–1776 
(1955); CARL BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS: THE FIRST CENTURY OF URBAN LIFE IN 
AMERICA, 1625–1742 (1938); T. H. BREEN, THE MARKETPLACE OF REVOLUTION: HOW CONSUMER 
POLITICS SHAPED AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004); JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD, 
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ing colonial economy.18  The shortage of hard currency in the Colonies forced 
merchants to rely on commercial paper to engage in trade.19  Early Americans 
understood the value of “book credit,” promissory notes, bills of exchange, 
mortgages, securities, loan certificates, maritime insurance, monetized public 
debt, and the lex mercatoria or “law merchant.”20  Accordingly, the Founder’s 
generation understood that “property” included the right to possess, use, en-
joy, and dispose of whatever land, commodities, and currency (or its equiva-
lent) a man owned.21 
The meaning of “life, liberty, and property” has grown over time.  Today, 
medicine and state law use the absence of respiration or brain function as the 
dividing line between life and death.22  “Liberty” still means freedom from an 
 
THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH AMERICA, 1607–1789 (1985); GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: 
THE NORTHERN SEAPORTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986); PERKINS, 
supra note 12, at 115.   
18. See PERKINS, supra note 12, at 118 Tbl. 5.1 (listing examples of trades); SCOTT, supra note 
15, at 1–2 (“By the middle of the eighteenth century British North Americans had already become 
the richest, freest, and most egalitarian people in the West.”).  By 1775, America had a population 
one-third the size of, and an economic output nearly equal to, England’s.  Although labor was scarce, 
land was plentiful.  The basic economic unit was the family farm, which often exceeded one hundred 
acres in size.  Three-quarters of population depended on agriculture for their livelihood.  See 
PERKINS, supra note 12, at xi, 2, 11, 43, 57, 85, 91, 213–14.  “[T]he real strength of the colonial 
economy was its prodigious agricultural production for local consumption and urban centers.”  Id. at 
43.  Moreover, despite the Colonists’ claims about being taxed unfairly by the Mother Country, taxes 
in America were only half of what was levied in England, and no one region in America was unduly 
burdened.  Id. at 187, 194. 
19. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 42; Alexander, supra note 13, at 333–34. 
20. See STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND 
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860 (2002); FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 41; KERMIT L. HALL & PETER 
KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 49 (2d ed. 2009); MCDONALD, 
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 110–19, 122. 
21. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 42, 171. 
22. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A) (2014).  For certain legal purposes, even a con-
demned prisoner may have a legally protected “life” interest until his sentence is carried out.  In Ohio 
Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998), a condemned prisoner challenged the state 
clemency procedures on the ground that they violated the procedural fairness guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause.  The Supreme Court noted that the threshold (and either esoteric or macabre, depend-
ing on your perspective) question was whether a prisoner lawfully condemned to die by execution 
has a “life” interest protected by due process until his sentence is carried out.  Id. at 279.  Remarka-
bly, there was no majority on that issue.  A plurality of four Justices acknowledged that even a con-
demned prisoner “maintains a residual life interest, e.g., in not being summarily executed by prison 
guards,” id. at 281 (plurality opinion), but ultimately did not resolve whether that residual interest 
was merely biological or also legal because the plurality found that the state clemency procedures 
were constitutionally adequate.  Id. at 279–85 (plurality opinion).  The remaining five Justices con-
cluded that “[a] prisoner under a death sentence remains a living person and consequently has an in-
terest in his life.” Id. at 288 (O’Connor, J., joined by Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, JJ., concurring in 
part and in the judgment); id. at 291–92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  But those Justices were on opposite 
sides of the outcome, so they did not constitute a majority. 
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arbitrary government seizure,23 but it now also includes a host of other guar-
antees, many of which refer to some aspect of sexual autonomy, such as the 
use of contraceptives or abortion.24  The concept of “property” originally em-
braced real, personal, and financial property,25 and those interests are still 
deemed property today.26  The breadth of that term, however, has grown 
mightily.27  It now includes some wholly modern-day creations such as driv-
 
23. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a person cannot be briefly detained 
unless there is “reasonable suspicion” to believe that he was involved in, was about to commit, or 
may know something about a crime). 
24. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that there is a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest in same-sex marriage); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (same, 
intercourse in the home with a partner of the same sex); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (same, 
abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (same, use of contraceptive devices); Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (ruling that release on parole creates a “liberty” interest pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (ruling that a state 
law prohibiting the teaching of German unconstitutionally interferes with parents’ right to instruct 
their children).  Some of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, however, have given due process pro-
tection to “liberty” interests that the Framers likely would have taken for granted.  See Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a municipal regulation prohibiting 
grandparents from living as a “family” with their children and grandchildren). 
25. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 7, at 19; supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
26. See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct.  2419, 2427–28 (2015) (holding that raisins 
are “property” for Takings Clause purposes); Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 511 (2012) (holding that government-induced temporary flooding of a landowner’s property 
can constitute a “taking” for Takings Clause purposes); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fl. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999) (“The assets of a business (including its good will) 
unquestionably are property . . . .”); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (ruling 
that interest on a client’s funds is property); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (holding un-
constitutional a state law authorizing the prejudgment attachment of real estate without a prior hear-
ing or proof of an emergency); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000–04 (1984) (hold-
ing that trade secrets are property); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160–65 
(1980) (same, principal and interest earned on an interpleader account); Almota Farmers Elevator & 
Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473–75 (1973) (same, a leasehold); United States v. 
Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 629 (1961) (same, an easement); Armstrong v. United States, 
364 U.S. 40, 44, 46 (1960) (same, a security interest in real property); Louisville Joint Stock Land 
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596–602 (1935) (same, real estate lien); Lynch v. United States, 292 
U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (same, valid contracts). 
27. That does not mean the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the subject has been clear and 
consistent.  See Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 130–31 (1990) 
(“In modern constitutional jurisprudence, the definition of property has played its most critical role in 
the context of the due process and takings clauses of the Fifth Amendment.  Both clauses have been 
loci for friction between the individual and government. Both clauses involve, at least ostensibly, the 
same concept: property.  Under both clauses, the existence of a cognizable property interest is the 
threshold and often determinative question.  Various tests—such as the ‘ordinary understanding’ ap-
proach, the ‘reasonable expectations’ approach, the ‘functional’ approach, the ‘bundle of rights’ ap-
proach, and others—have been used to determine whether a constitutionally cognizable property in-
terest exists.  The resulting incoherence is profound.  An easement, conceptually severed from the 
underlying land, is property and compensable if taken; twenty-seven million tons of coal are not.  
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er’s licenses, public utilities, university tenure, public school attendance, and 
disability welfare benefits, concepts the Founding generation could not have 
imagined.28 
Yet, there are two principal differences between what the Framers under-
stood as “property” and how that term is understood today.  The first one is 
that property now has different meanings for different purposes.  Under con-
temporary constitutional law, “property” can have one or more of three differ-
ent meanings depending on its relevance to one or more of three different le-
gal doctrines: procedural due process, substantive due process, and takings.29  
A party can raise a procedural due process claim by arguing that that the gov-
ernment has mistakenly deprived him of a property interest without first af-
fording him adequate procedural safeguards to ensure that the government’s 
reason for its action is correct.30  An example would be found if the govern-
ment sought to terminate welfare benefits on the ground that a recipient is no 
longer eligible for state assistance.31  Alternatively, a person could make a 
substantive due process argument by contending that the government cannot 
take a particular action toward him regardless of the number and quality of the 
hearings available to him.32  The Court’s decision last term in Obergefell fits 
into that category.33  The objection there was not that the plaintiff was entitled 
to a hearing before being denied a marriage license, but was that the govern-
ment could not deny that license simply because the plaintiffs were gay or 
lesbian.34  Finally, an individual can challenge government action as an un-
lawful taking by claiming that the government must pay him just compensa-
 
The right to occupy land, or to pass land to one’s heirs, is property, compensable if taken; the right to 
modify a building that one owns, or to prevent physical invasion, is not.”) (footnotes omitted). 
28. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1978) (ruling that 
public utility service is property); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–34 (1976) (same, disabil-
ity benefits); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573–74 (1975) (same, public school attendance); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972) (ruling that a state university professor may have a “property” 
interest in his job based on “an unwritten ‘common law’ in a particular university that certain em-
ployees shall have the equivalent of tenure”); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (same, a state-
issued driver’s license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (same, welfare benefits); Slochower 
v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (same, tenure at a state college).  For the seminal argument in 
favor of treating government benefits as “property,” see Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 
YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
29. An excellent discussion of the three types of claims can be found at Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 887–89 (2000). 
30. Id.  
31. See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
32. Merrill, supra note 29, at 887–89; see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing). 
33. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
34. See, e.g., id. at 2604–05. 
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tion for the property it has expropriated from him, rendered unusable, or pre-
vented his use of it.35  The differences among the claims are significant be-
cause not every protected interest qualifies as “property” for all three purpos-
es.  Welfare benefits are “property” for procedural due process purposes, but 
not for purposes of substantive due process or takings doctrine.36 Otherwise, 
the government could never reduce or eliminate statutory entitlements, at least 
not without compensating the recipient by purchasing an annuity for him.  
That is clearly not the law.  Legislatures are free to adjust or eliminate gov-
ernment welfare programs as they see fit.37  The need to distinguish among 
those understanding of “property” did not occur to the Framers, and they did 
not discuss whether “property” should have one, two, or three different inter-
pretations. 
A second difference between the Framers’ understanding of property and 
ours stems from the fact that liberty and property are no longer deemed to 
have a common origin.  The Framers believed that, like life and liberty, prop-
erty was a natural right that every man possessed not by virtue of positive law 
but as a gift from God.38  That understanding of property’s origin has now 
vanished.  Property is now merely a creation of positive law.39  That positive 
 
35. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012) (government 
flooding of private property). 
36. See generally Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).   
37. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch.’s, 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (rejecting claimed fun-
damental right to free public school transportation); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (ruling 
that there is no constitutional right to funding for any medical procedure, including an abortion, even 
though a woman has a right to choose that procedure); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (ruling that there is no a constitutional right to a minimum amount of funding for a 
public education); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81–84 (1971) (rejecting the argument that 
Congress cannot modify that Social Security benefits).  The same principle would allow the govern-
ment to withdraw the monopoly or oligopoly status that it has bestowed on certain groups as a matter 
of law, such as municipal ordinances limiting the number of taxi “medallions” authorized in a com-
munity.  See Illinois Transp. Trade Ass'n v. City of Chicago, No. 16-2009, 2016 WL 5859703, at *1–
3 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2016). 
38. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 7, at 17 (“According to Locke, private property existed under 
natural law before the creation of political authority.  Indeed, the principal purpose of government 
was to protect these natural property rights, which Locke fused with liberty.”); LARKIN, supra note 7, 
at vi (Preface by Prof. J.L. Stacks); MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 20; 
ZUCKERT, supra note 7, at 278.  Some commentators have continued to posit that there is a natural 
right to property like the one understood by the Founders.  See TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO 
EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW (2010).  Others have sought to ground the right 
to property in a notion of physical possession, from whence the legal principle of property arises.  
See Thomas W. Merrill, Possession as a Natural Right, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 345 (2015).  One 
group or the other may ultimately be proved right.  At present, the Supreme Court disagrees. 
39. Positive law is defined as “[a] system of law promulgated and implemented within a partic-
ular political community by political superiors, as distinct from moral law or law existing in an ideal 
community or in some nonpolitical community.  Positive law typically consists of enacted law—the 
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law, moreover, does not include the Constitution itself, even though that doc-
ument prominently uses the term “property.”  As the Supreme Court ex-
plained in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,40 “[p]roperty interests, 
of course, are not created by the Constitution.”41  Instead, the Constitution as-
sumes that property rights are “created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that sup-
port claims of entitlement to those benefits.”42  The result is that the state may 
redefine property interests.43  By contrast, at least some interests protected un-
der the rubric of “liberty” exist independently of positive law.44  For example, 
in Roe v. Wade45 and Obergefell v. Hodges46 the Supreme Court created a 
constitutional right to abortion and to same-sex marriage, respectively, as as-
pects of “liberty.”47  Obergefell, in fact, created that right despite an admitted 
lack of support in Anglo-American legal history for any such guaranty.48 
Those different contemporary understandings of property and liberty are 
 
codes, statutes, and regulations that are applied and enforced in the courts.” Positive Law, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
40. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
41. Id. at 577; see also, e.g., Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) 
(reiterating that principle); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) 
(same). 
42. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577; see also, e.g., Frank Michelman, Property as a Consti-
tutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1099–1102 (1981) (identifying four possible non-
constitutional sources of property rights: (1) positive law; (2) contemporary lay understandings; (3) 
the common law; and (4) reliance).  For the argument that there are some property rights that the 
constitutional term “property” itself generates, see id. at 1106–07 (discussing Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)). 
43. There is a limit regarding how far a state may redefine the term “property” to exclude tradi-
tionally understood features of that concept.  See, e.g., Phillips, 524 U.S. at 167 (“[A]t least as to 
confiscatory regulations (as opposed to those regulating the use of property), a State may not sidestep 
the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests long recognized under state law.”); 
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 164 (“[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private 
property into public property without compensation, even for the limited duration of the deposit in 
court.  This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to 
prevent.  That Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary use of governmental power.”). 
44. See generally infra notes 45, 46.  
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
46. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
47. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inher-
ent in the liberty of the person.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, 
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions 
upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s 
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not 
to terminate her pregnancy.”), modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
48. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–605. 
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of considerable importance to public policy because constitutional law now 
treats property and liberty in materially different ways.  The government may 
restrict the exercise of some liberty interests, at least to some extent and at 
least temporarily, as long as the government has a legitimate justification.49  
In other cases, the government is quite limited in the regulations that it can 
impose.  The government may restrict such a liberty interest only to serve 
goals of the highest order and, even then, only to a limited extent.50  By con-
trast, since the New Deal the Supreme Court has permitted the government to 
regulate private property for reasons and in ways that would have astonished 
the Framers.  The government can prohibit individual farmers from growing 
wheat for their own home consumption.51  The government can require a per-
son to have a license to engage in a host of occupations that do not threaten 
the public safety, health, or welfare.52  And the government can use its emi-
nent domain power to transfer land, including any home atop it, from one per-
son to another simply because the new owner might develop the land in a 
manner that allegedly would benefit the community.53  Because property 
rights trace their source only to some positive law, the government can regu-
late, and often nullify, those interests by a different positive law for almost 
whatever reason the government sees fit.54  The result has been to devalue the 
 
49. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“[T]his Court has often pointed out the 
crucial difference between the freedom to travel internationally and the right of interstate travel. The 
constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified . . . . By contrast the ‘right’ of interna-
tional travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As such this ‘right’, the Court has held, can be regulated 
within the bounds of due process.”) (citations omitted); compare, e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 
U.S. 968 (1997) (ruling that a state can require that abortions may only be performed by licensed 
physicians); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (same). 
50. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inher-
ent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”); Roe, 
410 U.S. at 155 (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that regulation 
limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest’ and that legislative enact-
ments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”) (citations 
omitted). 
51. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
52. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 209 (2016). 
53. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  For discussions of Kelo, see, e.g., 
JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF DEFIANCE AND COURAGE (2009); see also 
ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (2015). 
54. For a summary of the minimal restraint that the Constitution imposes on the government’s 
regulation of property, see, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993) (“In 
areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect 
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constitutional status of property and to construe the Due Process Clauses in a 
quite one-sided manner.55 
The text of the Constitution hardly compels that dichotomy.  If anything, 
the text places “property” on a par with “liberty” and assumes that govern-
ment officials, including judges, would afford them the same respect.56  That 
text has not changed since 1791.57  All that has changed is the value that Su-
preme Court and the academy have placed on property.  Their interpretations, 
however, have a relatively recent origin.  Property did not lose its original un-
derstanding until the New Deal,58 while liberty did not begin its ascent until 
the 1960s.59  Since then, the haut monde of American political, legal, and in-
tellectual society have often felt that the Founder’s concern with the protec-
tion of property was, to quote one American history scholar, “a rather shabby 
thing” and that the constitutional principles discussed from 1776 to 1787 
“were invented to hide it under a more attractive cloak.”60 
 
lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection chal-
lenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the 
classification.  Where there are ‘plausible reasons’ for Congress’ action, ‘our inquiry is at an end.’ 
This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. ‘The Constitution presumes that, absent 
some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the demo-
cratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may 
think a political branch has acted.’ On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute such as the 
Cable Act comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking the rationality of 
the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis which might sup-
port it[.]’  Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a 
statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the chal-
lenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.  Thus, the absence of ‘“legislative facts’” ex-
plaining the distinction ‘on the record’ has no significance in rational-basis analysis.  In other words, 
a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.  ‘Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of 
judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independ-
ence and its ability to function.’”) (citations omitted). 
55. See, e.g., BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT 
HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 207 (1998) (“It has been a perennial prob-
lem for left liberal political theorists over the past forty years . . . to explain why the Court is not 
merely engaged in that most dread of all pursuits, ‘Lochnerizing’ . . . when, for example, it overturns 
state anti-abortion laws or mandates school desegregation.”). 
56. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. at 392–93 (“Property is placed by the constitution in the 
same category with liberty and life.”) (Opinion of Comstock, J.). 
57. See generally U.S. CONST. 
58. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding milk price regulations); 
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage statute); United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding a ban on the interstate transporta-
tion of skim milk). 
59. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (ruling that married couples have a 
constitutional right to use contraceptive devices). 
60. EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55 (1976) [here-
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That belief, however, mistakenly seeks to impose twentieth century redis-
tributive economic policies on an eighteenth century document by denigrating 
any concern for property as little more than the desire to constitutionalize pro-
tection for greed.61  The Framers were classically educated men who knew 
that Western Civilization had highly valued property since Roman times.62  
 
inafter MORGAN, CHALLENGE].  For most scholars, the low status of property rights is a given.  See, 
e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113 (1976); 
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888–
1986, at 146 (1990); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14 (1980); KURT T. LASH, THE 
LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 15 (2009); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742 (2007); Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 
21 HARV. L. REV. 495 (1908); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 455 (1909); 
Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1992); David A. Strauss, Why Was 
Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (2003).  See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Leg-
acy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 n.14 (2003) (collecting contemporary authorities taking that posi-
tion). 
61. Ironically, at the same time that some scholars argued that the Supreme Court has properly 
belittled the constitutional value of private property rights, some members of the academy claimed 
that the Constitution required the federal and state governments to guarantee a minimum level of 
welfare benefits for the poor.  The best known advocates for that view were Professors Charles Reich 
and Frank Michelman. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 28; Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and So-
cial Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Frank I. Michelman, On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Frank I. Michel-
man, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 
207 (1970); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitu-
tional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659.  But they were not alone.  See, e.g., John E. Coons et 
al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 
CAL. L. REV. 307 (1969); Arthur J. Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
205 (1964); Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substan-
tive Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39 (1967); Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: 
Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).  Not every-
one, of course, drank that Kool-Aid.  For decidedly skeptical—and ultimately prescient—views on 
constitutional welfare rights, see Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the 
Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695; Philip B. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Lim-
its of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 583 (1968); and Ralph K. Winter, 
Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. CT. REV. 41. The Su-
preme Court has consistently rejected those claims.  See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch.’s, 487 
U.S. 450 (1988) (rejecting claimed fundamental right to free public school transportation); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (same, right to public funding of abortion); San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (same, right to “adequate” public educational funding); 
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (refusing to waive filing fees for indigents seeking to ap-
peal state administrative decisions reducing or terminating public assistance); United States v. Kras, 
409 U.S. 434 (1973) (rejecting challenge brought by an indigent party to bankruptcy court filing 
fees); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding over an equal protection challenge a state 
constitutional provisions requiring local voter referendum approval of low income housing); Dan-
dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484–87 (1970) (rejecting claimed constitutional right to public 
welfare). 
62. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
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The Supreme Court is not free to ignore the Framers’ interests in protecting 
property simply because the economy and society have materially changed 
over time.  We do not follow that approach elsewhere in the law.  We do not 
abandon the Copyright Clause’s protection for plagiarism of the written 
word63 just because the Clause also protects photographs and films.64  We do 
not abandon the Free Speech Clause’s concern with prior restraints65 just be-
cause that clause also reaches after-the-fact damages.66  Nor do we abandon 
that clause’s protection for political speech67 just because it also includes vio-
lent video games.68  We do not abandon the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against law enforcement officers rummaging through our homes without justi-
fication or restraint69 just because the Amendment now also protects against 
the government rummaging through our cell phones in the same manner.70  
And we do not abandon the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause’s protec-
tion against hideously painful criminal sanctions71 just because it also pre-
vents the government from imposing an otherwise lawful penalty on a particu-
lar category of offenders, such as juveniles.72  In other words, it is difficult to 
articulate a “neutral principle” of constitutional law73 that justifies disregard-
 
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 5–6 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (“We know that private prop-
erty was a central institution of the European civil law tradition that started with the Roman law of 
Justinian, and of the English common-law tradition that started with the Norman Conquest.  We 
know that the protection of private property from the Crown was a major purpose of the Magna Carta 
as early as 1215.  Centuries later, the key writers who set the intellectual framework for our Constitu-
tion—John Locke, David Hume, William Blackstone, Adam Smith, and James Madison—all treated 
private property as a bulwark of the individual against the arbitrary power of the state.”); David 
Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions of Property in the American Po-
litical Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 475 (1993) (“One understanding of property that came 
to America from Locke, Harrington, and Blackstone was [that] property was an important political 
concept crucial to the maintenance and defense of individual liberty and limited government.”). 
63. See, e.g., the Statute of Anne, 8 Ann. c. 21 (Copyright Act 1709); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 
U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834). 
64. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884). 
65. See, e.g., Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
66. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
67. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
68. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
69. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell St. 
Tr. 1029 (1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1153, 1167 (1763); Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 450–51 & n.168 (1974) (collecting 
sources discussing the Fourth Amendment’s history). 
70. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
71. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878). 
72. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
73. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1959). 
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ing the original understanding of some constitutional guarantees, but not all of 
them.74 
Contemporary legal scholarship, moreover, is no longer as one-sided as it 
has been for most of the last eighty years.75  Over the last three decades in par-
ticular, a growing number of scholars have argued that property was unde-
servedly dropped from the perch that the Framers had envisioned for it and 
that, even if Lochner may have gone too far,76 property is nonetheless entitled 
to greater constitutional protection that it has received since the New Deal.77  
Accordingly, the belief that “property” was placed adjacent to “life” and “lib-
erty” in the Due Process Clause to ensure that legislatures could not play Rob-
in Hood is no longer an apostasy in the academy.  The debate engendered by 
those scholars gives rise to the hope that society, and, in particular, the Su-
preme Court, will reconsider the dichotomy noted above. 
This Article attempts to contribute to that debate by analyzing the found-
 
74. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244 (1987) (“I know of no constitutional case in which the Su-
preme Court has held that, although the framers’ intent would require one result, another must be 
upheld on some other ground.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
353, 375 n.132 (1981) (“Reliance upon original intent occurs even in opinions whose actual holdings 
seem wholly at variance with original intent.”).  But see Fallon, supra, at 1255 n.256 (suggesting that 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which adopted the “one person, one vote” rule, might be an 
exception, but was unacknowledged as being one by the Supreme Court). 
75. See generally DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2011). 
76. The overwhelming majority of legal scholars, from across the political spectrum, have criti-
cized Lochner as an illegitimate example of gross judicial overreaching.  See Bernstein, supra note 
60, at 2 n.4, 4 n.14, 6 nn.17, 19 & 22 (collecting criticisms).  Not everyone, however, views Lochner 
as the Sauron of constitutional law.  See Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 5, 13–15 (1988); Bernstein, supra note 60, at 6 n.18 (collecting authorities defending Loch-
ner). 
77. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 7; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS]; MAYER, supra note 75 at 5–6; 
MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY (2001); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, 
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2006); Alexandra L. Klein, Note, The Free-
dom to Pursue a Common Calling: Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Occupational Licensing Stat-
utes, 73 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 411 (2016); Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice and the Legal Acad-
emy, 86 GEO. L.J. 1075, 1085 (1998) (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND 
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997)) (labeling as “deplorable” 
the courts’ current attitude toward judicial review of economic legislation); Wayne McCormack, 
Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. L.J. 397 (1993); Austin Ray-
nor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 VA. L. REV. 1065 (2013); 
Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1463 (1967); Christopher T. Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Com-
petition, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91 (1983); J.R.R. II, Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupa-
tional Licensing, 59 VA. L. REV. 1097 (1973).  See generally MAYER, supra note 75, at 5–6, 121–23 
nn.25–32 (collecting authorities). 
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ing generation’s understanding of “property.”  Section II will summarize the 
understanding that property had at common law, while Section III will delve 
into the Framers’ understanding of that concept during the period leading up 
to the Constitutional Convention of 1787.78  It turns out that, according to the 
scholars who have analyzed those periods, the Framers treated the concepts of 
“liberty” and “property” as equally important and inseparable aspects of the 
freedoms guaranteed Englishmen on either side of the Atlantic before July 4, 
1776.79  Finally, Section IV will address the issue whether the Framers saw 
property as an “absolute” right that trumped the state’s ability to regulate 
property in “the public interest.” 
II. THE STATUS OF PROPERTY IN ENGLAND AT COMMON LAW 
Critical to the emerging identity of England in the Middle Ages was the 
proposition that governance should be done according to law, not the diktat of 
the king.80  “The rule of law”—viz., the principle that the law should govern 
the conduct of everyone in the kingdom, including the crown—sought to pre-
vent arbitrary government and thereby guarantee liberty.81  Critical to the suc-
cess of that principle was the protection of private property.  “Long before the 
era of the revolutionary controversy, the centrality of property to the defini-
tion of liberty, to the rule of law, and to constitutionalism had become [bed-
rock] British legal dogma.”82  Property was valuable because it provided a 
source of wealth and power.83 
 
78. See discussion infra Parts II, III.  
79. See JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 7 
(2011) [hereinafter GREENE, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS] (“For Englishmen, liberty was . . . not just a 
condition enforced by law but the very essence of their emerging national identity.”). 
80. Id. at 5–6 
81. See, e.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE 
SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES (2004) [hereinafter REID, RULE OF LAW]; A.J. 
CARLYLE, POLITICAL LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPTION IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND 
MODERN TIMES 53 (1941) (“[T]he supreme authority in political society was not that of the ruler, but 
that of the law.”). 
82. See, e.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 29 (1986) [hereinafter REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS]; 
see also THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 23 (5th ed. 1956); 
Gordon S. Wood, The History of Rights in Early America, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 233, 233 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 2007) (“Englishmen valued 
their rights to their personal liberty and property—rights that were embedded in their medieval com-
mon law.  The common law had deeply held principles, including, for example, the notion that no 
one could be a judge in his own cause and that no one, not even the king, could legally take another’s 
property without that person’s consent.”). 
83. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 167 (“In medieval England, rights to real property meant 
more than ‘ownership’; such rights conferred jurisdiction.  The lord of the manor was a little sover-
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Common law protection for property begins at least with the Coronation 
Charter of Henry I.84  Issued by Henry II to satisfy a “campaign promise” to 
the barons for their support in a dispute over the crown, the Charter sought to 
resurrect English law from the time of Edward the Confessor, in part, to pro-
tect the barons’ feudal property rights.85  The Coronation Charter is significant 
here for several reasons.  It was “primarily concerned with the protection of 
property rights;86 it “consider[ed] such protection a prerequisite for the rule of 
law”;87 it demonstrated that “unwritten law periodically stands in need of be-
ing transmuted into written norms in order that the image of what is just may 
become a code of what shall be right,”88 and it “created awareness among sub-
jects that claims against the Crown were sanctioned by a constitutional docu-
ment which specifically spelt out their rights.”89 
A similar concern was a cause of the barons’ revolt that led to the adop-
tion of Magna Carta.90  “[W]hether or not the revolt of 1215 was prompted by 
a long chain of abuses or by the magnitude of John’s oppressions, there is not 
much doubt that in large measure the revolt occurred in defense of property 
rights.”91  Thirty-eight of the sixty-three articles in the Great Charter protected 
feudal property rights.92  Given the “overwhelming number” of articles pro-
tecting feudal property rights, one scholar has concluded that “the protection 
of property is probably the outstanding feature of Magna Carta”93 and could 
have been “the raison d’être for the establishment of the rule of law in the 
Great Charter.”94  If so, if “[t]he charter of ‘liberties’ is thus in large measure a 
 
eign in his domain, as well as the person who had title to houses, fields, and growing crops.  Only 
people with land or land rights really mattered: the gentry, the nobles, the upper clergy.  Land was 
the source of their wealth and the source and seat of their power.  Well into modern times, power and 
wealth were concentrated in the hands of great landlords.  The social system of the kingdom turned 
on rights in land.”). 
84. GOTTFRIED DIETZE, MAGNA CARTA AND PROPERTY 12, 14 (1965).  For a discussion of 
that protection, see Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6 CHAPMAN L. REV. 207, 209–17 
(2003). 
85. DIETZE, supra note 84, at 14. 
86. Id. at 25.  
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 12. 
89. Id. at 25–26.   
90. Id. at 24.  
91. Id. at 18; see id. at 24 (“John’s infringements upon property were the chief reasons for con-
sidering his conduct tantamount to a replacement of the rule of law by the arbitrar[iness] . . . of [one] 
man.”). 
92. Id. at 37.  
93. Id. at 33; see also id. at 33–38. 
94. Id. at 43. 
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charter of ‘properties,’”95 it could be argued that “property rights constitute 
the better part of freedom as an end of the rule of law.”96 
As English law progressed, it maintained the ancient respect for private 
property.  Blackstone deemed the invaluable right to property “that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the universe.”97  John Locke, whose work greatly influenced early Americans, 
wrote that the men created civil society to protect “property” along with the 
closely related concepts of life and liberty.98  “The seventeenth-century Eng-
lish constitutional maxim making liberty dependent on security in private 
rights to property may be the most familiar legal doctrine identified by histo-
rians of that period.”99  In the “pantheon of British liberty there was no right 
more changeless and tireless than the right to property.”100 
The term “right” acquired its modern understanding in the seventeenth 
century.101  Originally, that term referred only to a valid title of ownership, 
such as the title to real estate.102  The terms “liberty” or “privilege” were more 
commonly used than “right.” They referred either to the protections all en-
joyed against the arbitrary actions of the Crown or to a benefit bestowed on 
particular individuals by the king.103  Yet, the modern-day notion of a “right” 
 
95. Id. at 38. 
96. Id. at 43–44. 
97. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *2; see also REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 
82, at 33 (“The first and principal cause of making kings . . . was to maintain property and contracts, 
traffic and commerce among men.”) (quoting John Davies, Attorney General of Ireland).  
98. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 87, at 43–44 (3d J.W. Gough 
ed. 1966) (1689); Schultz, supra note 62, at 471 (“John Locke’s writings were perhaps the most in-
fluential upon early America and this influence has been noted by many scholars.”); id. at 472–73 
(summarizing Locke’s view of property); SCOTT, supra note 15, at 29 (“For [Locke] ‘property’ did 
not simply mean possessions.  It included life, liberty, and estate.  Self-possession or liberty comes 
close to Locke’s use of the term ‘property.’”). 
99. REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 82, at 31–32. 
100. Id. at 27; see id. at 33 (“The first and principal cause of making kings  . . . was to maintain 
property and contracts, traffic and commerce among men.”) (quoting John Davies, Attorney General 
of Ireland). 
101. See JACK R. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 19 
(1998) [hereinafter RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS]. 
102. Id.  
103. “Many liberties and privileges were regarded not as inherent qualities or attributes of indi-
viduals but rather as legal powers granted by the crown.  The liberty or privilege of doing something 
did not belong to individuals as a matter of course; it was a specific power allowed or permitted by 
the state—and as easily revocable by the same authority.”  Id.; see also, e.g., John Harrison, Recon-
structing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1396–97 (1992); Robert G. 
Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1121–22  
(2009). 
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as an enforceable legal guarantee arose during the great religious and political 
battles between the Crown and Parliament during the seventeenth century.104  
Parliament, for example, opposed the efforts of the Stuart kings to raise reve-
nue without authorization from Parliament by arguing that the king’s actions 
undercut the right of the people to be governed by their elected representa-
tives.105  Defenders of religious and political dissenters also argued that indi-
viduals have a fundamental right of freedom of conscience that disabled the 
government from coercing them to adopt a particular belief.106 
The understanding of a “right” therefore changed in two important ways 
during that period.  The first was that the concept of “right” had expanded “to 
embrace and even subsume the variety of claims and activities formerly clas-
sified as ‘liberties and privileges.’”107  The second change was that “the notion 
of ownership that lay at the core of the original meaning of right now de-
scribed just what it was that the holders of rights enjoyed.”108  Unlike a liberty 
or privilege that the state could withdraw, a right was something that its pos-
sessor owned, just as he owned land.109  Moreover, a right owned by English-
men was not the result of an exchange but was “a birthright to which the Eng-
lish people were entitled by virtue of living in a realm where monarchy was 
limited, not absolute; where Parliament and trial by jury provided effective 
checks on royal power; and where Protestant traditions of dissent and tolera-
tion had supplanted Roman Catholic demands for orthodoxy and uniformity 
of religious belief.”110 
The “liberty” and “property” so protected included the right to pursue a 
lawful occupation.111  Blackstone concluded that, under English law and cus-
tom, “every man might use what trade he pleased.”112  Locke argued that eve-
 
104. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS, supra note 101, at 19. 
105. Id. at 19–20. 
106. Id. at 20. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id.; J.R. POLE, PATHS TO THE AMERICAN PAST 84 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979) (“It was a 
standard item of Whig thought that property rights antedated those rights that were given by political 
society.”). 
111. See, e.g., Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 
HARV. L. REV. 943, 948 (1927) (noting the “common law right to carry on a business”); SANDEFUR, 
supra note 38, at 207–18.  The Colonists later felt the same way.  See, e.g., Samuel Adams, Massa-
chusetts Circular Letter, Feb. 11, 1768, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 66–67 
(Henry Steele Commager ed., 1973) (The Massachusetts circular letter of 1768 stated that “what a 
man has honestly acquired is absolutely his own, which he may freely give, but cannot be taken from 
him without his consent.”). 
112. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *3, *428; see also 
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ry man has a property right, not only in himself, but also in whatever he pro-
duced or acquired through his labor.113  Adam Smith believed that the right to 
pursue a lawful occupation was an essential element of the right to “proper-
ty,”114 a reason why English Law treated monopolies with disdain.115  Lord 
Edward Coke, whose opinions were well known by the Framers, was particu-
larly critical of monopolies for the same reason.116  “Coke did not attack mo-
nopolies because of the manner in which they deprived individuals of their 
right to practice a trade or calling, but rather for the deprivation itself. In lan-
guage foreshadowing the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, Coke em-
phasized that a man’s trade is his life, and ‘therefore the monopolist that 
 
JOHN LILBURNE ET AL., AN AGREEMENT OF THE FREE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND art. XVIII (1649) 
(“That it shall not be in their power to continue to make any Laws to abridge or hinder any person or 
persons, from trading or merchandising into any place beyond the Seas, where any of this Nation are 
free to Trade.”). 
113. See LOCKE, supra note 98, § 27, at 15 (“[E]very man has a property in his own person; 
this nobody has any right to but himself.  The labour of his body and the work of his hands we may 
say are properly his.  Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left 
it in, he hath mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it 
his property.”); see also LARKIN, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
114. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS bk. 1, ch. 10, pt. 2 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (1776) (“The patrimony of a . . . man lies in 
the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity 
of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks 
proper without injury to his neighbour is a plain violation of [his] most sacred property.”); see also 2 
CATO’S LETTERS: OR, ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT 
SUBJECTS 245 (1995) (1720) [hereinafter CATO’S LETTERS] (“By Liberty, I understand the Power 
which every Man has over his own Actions, and his Right to enjoy the Fruit of his Labour, Art, and 
Industry, as far as by it he hurts not the Society, or any Member of it, by taking from any Member, or 
by hindering him from enjoying what he himself enjoys.  The Fruits of a Man’s honest Industry are 
the just Rewards of it, ascertained to him by natural and eternal Equity, as is his Title to use them in 
the manner which he thinks fit: And thus, with the above Limitations, every Man is sole Lord and 
Arbiter of his own private Actions and Property.”); LILBURNE, supra note 112, at art. XVIII (“That it 
shall not be in their power to continue to make any Laws to abridge or hinder any person or persons, 
from trading or merchandising into any place beyond the Seas, where any of this Nation are free to 
trade.”). 
115. See Allen v. Tooley, 80 Eng. Rep. 1055 (K.B. 1614); Darcy v. Allen, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 
(The Case of Monopolies), (K.B. 1603); see also, e.g., Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-
Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 761 
(1884) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“I hold it to be an incontrovertible proposition of both English and 
American public law, that all mere monopolies are odious and against common right.”); JOHN 
FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE 143–45 (Francis Gregor trans., Robert & Clarke Co. 
1874) (1545); 4 EDWARD HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 344 & n.6  (3d ed. 1945); 
Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony 
Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 989–1008 (2013). 
116. Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 115, at 922, 1055; Allen v. Tooley, 80 Eng. Rep. 1055 
(K.B. 1614). 
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taketh away a man’s trade, taketh away his life.’”117  As Coke put it, “‘Gener-
ally all monopolies are against this great Charter’—viz., Magna Carta—
‘because they are against the liberty and freedome of the Subject, and against 
the Law of the Land.’”118 
III. THE STATUS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
A. The Colonists’ and Framers’ Understanding of Property 
1. The Role of Property in the American Revolution 
The Colonists’ decision to break from England was different in character 
from contemporary revolutions.  Seeing English customs and rights as an in-
valuable benefit, more valuable than even England’s military or commercial 
power,119 the Colonists brought their legal traditions with them to the New 
World.120  One of them was the “rule of law.”121  Americans in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries believed in the concept of “higher-law constitutional-
ism,” the principle that the Crown and Parliament alike were obligated to fol-
low the “natural and customary rights recognized at common law.”122  Belief 
that law traced its legitimacy to natural law, as well as to the unwritten cus-
toms of the people, along with the expectation that law could protect against 
 
117. Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Car-
ta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 608 (2009). 
118. Id. (quoting EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL 
CAUSES 181 (Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1644)).  
119. GREENE, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, supra note 79, at 8. 
120. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 294–95 (1996) [hereinafter RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS] (quoting Wil-
liam Penn); Wilcomb E. Washburn, “Law and Authority in Colonial Virginia,” in LAW AND 
AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 117 (George Athan Billias ed., 1965); Mark DeWolfe Howe, 
The Sources and Nature of Law in Colonial Massachusetts, in LAW AND AUTHORITY IN COLONIAL 
AMERICA 117 (George Athan Billias ed., 1965).  Colonial charters guaranteed settlers the benefits of 
the common law in the new land, see GREENE, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, supra note 79, at 8, and 
the common law served as the default rule until it was revised by statute. Eleven of the thirteen colo-
nies enacted so-called “receiving statutes,” which incorporated the English common law as state law; 
one state—New Jersey—adopted the common law through its state constitution; and the last state—
Connecticut—adopted the common law by judicial decision.  In 1720, the English Attorney General 
Richard West concluded that English common law applied in the Colonies.  See MORTON J. HORWITZ, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 6–8 (1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, 
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS 
SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 18–20 (1975). 
121. REID, RULE OF LAW, supra note 81, at 93. 
122. Gedicks, supra note 117, at 614, 619; see, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (1984) 
(1776).  
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government tyranny, had become part of the shared heritage of the English.123  
Like their countrymen across the Atlantic, the Colonists put their reliance on 
the law because they believed that only it could shield them from arbitrary 
government power.124 
Accordingly, the American Revolution was not an early version of the 
French or Russian Revolutions, one in which the “proletariat” sought to jetti-
son a privileged, class-based system in favor of a new legal, social, and eco-
nomic order.125  Nor was the Revolution “a capitalist junta” that sought to 
 
123. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (“The Constitution of the United 
States was ordained, it is true, by descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of the Eng-
lish law and history . . . .”); GREENE, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, supra note 79, at 141, 180–81; 
REID, RULE OF LAW, supra note 81, at 93 (“Rule-of-law belonged to the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  It was . . . the cornerstone of the jurisprudence of liberty . . . when liberty was struggling 
to survive.”); GERALD STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN 
GOVERNMENT 12 (1970) (“The theory of natural law served, as it were, as the connecting arch be-
tween the society the Americans broke away from and the new society, or societies, they formed.”). 
124. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 77 (enlarged ed. 1992) [hereinafter BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS] (“Liberty . . . was 
the capacity to exercise ‘natural rights’ within limits set not by the mere will or desire of men in 
power but by non-arbitrary law—law enacted by legislatures containing with them the proper balance 
of forces.”); HORWITZ, supra note 120, at 5 (“The persistent appeals to the common law in the consti-
tutional struggles leading up to the American Revolution ‘created a regard for its virtues that seems 
almost mythical.’”); MORISON, supra note 12, at 171–72 (“One principle upon which all Englishmen 
then agreed was the rule of law.  When in the late eighteenth century, they spoke of the ‘liberties of 
free-born Englishmen,’ the rule of law was in the back of their minds: resistance to Charles I in the 
name of law, vindication of law against James II.  Colonial leaders were familiar with the works of 
Algernon Sidney, [James] Harington, and [John] Locke, who urged every Englishman to resist every 
grasp for power; to stand firm on ancient principles of liberty, whether embalmed in acts of Parlia-
ment or adumbrated in the ‘Law of Nature.’”); NELSON, supra note 120, at 13 (“One of the most in-
tense concerns of Americans in the prerevolutionary period was to render individuals secure in their 
lives, liberties, and properties from abuses of governmental power.”). 
125. See BERNARD BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION: PERSONALITIES AND THEMES IN THE 
STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 81 (1990) [hereinafter BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION] 
(“The American Revolution was not the result of intolerable social or economic conditions.  The col-
onies were prosperous communities whose economic condition, recovering from the dislocations of 
the Seven Years’ War, improved during the years when the controversy with England rose in intensi-
ty.  Nor was the Revolution deliberately undertaken to recast the social order, to destroy the last rem-
nants of the ancient régime such as they were in America.”); FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 6 
(“[U]nlike the Russian Revolution, or the French Revolution, there was no total social upheaval, at 
the end of the war.”); ZUCKERT, supra note 7, at 288–89 (“[The] widely perceived congruence be-
tween established practice and the natural standards of right is one factor that made the American 
Revolution so much more successful than the French Revolution.  In the latter case, the new order to 
be brought in differed so radically from the old order that a massive demolition job had to be per-
formed before anything new could be built.  In America this was not the case; although the Ameri-
cans innovated in many and important ways, they were also free to maintain deep continuities with 
the precedent order at the level of both political structures and the legal system.”). 
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adopt “rule by a leisured patriciate.”126  And, unlike the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989, the Revolution did not signify the end of a long period in which the 
government had denied the public any opportunity to enjoy liberty and private 
property.  The Colonists had enjoyed both under English law and believed 
that English constitutional government was the freest in the world.127 
Familiar with William Blackstone’s postulate that security, liberty, and 
property were the three absolute rights of Englishmen,128 the Framers’ genera-
tion believed that the most remarkable feature of the unwritten English consti-
tution was its avowed purpose of protecting those guarantees.129  That concept 
included the ability to acquire and own property.  Indeed, the opportunity to 
own property was a principal attraction of the New World.  Colonists flocked 
to America because of the promise of finally owning their own land, rather 
than serving a landlord, or, in the case of artisans who settled in the cities, the 
hope of bettering their economic condition by becoming their own bosses.130 
 
126. BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION, supra note 125, at xii. 
127. See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN 
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 150 (Expanded ed., Rita & Robert 
Kimber trans, Rowman & Littlefield 2001) (1973). 
128. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *9, *11, *124–26, *134; Schultz, supra note 62, at 
475. 
129. See, e.g., BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION, supra note 125, at 69 (“[By 1776, English lib-
erties] had been achieved . . . over the centuries, and had been embedded in a constitution whose 
wonderfully contrived balance between the needs of the state and the rights of the individual was 
thought throughout the Western world to be one of the finest human achievements.  It was obvious 
too, of course, that something had gone wrong recently.  It was generally agreed in the colonies that 
the famous balance of the constitution, in Britain and America, has been thrown off by a gang of 
ministers greedy for power, and that their attention had been drawn to the colonies by the misrepre-
sentations of certain colonial officeholders who hoped to find an open route to influence and fortune 
in the enlargement of Crown power in the colonies.”); PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: 
MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 29 (1990) (“Americans took particular pride in be-
ing governed under Britain’s unwritten constitution, which they considered the most perfect form of 
government ever invented ‘by the wit of man’—a judgment with which, they often added, every ma-
jor writer on politics agreed.”) [hereinafter MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE]; RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS, supra note 120, at 3 (“The British constitution was not a fixed document, adopted at a 
particular moment in time, by special procedures that gave it an authority superior to all ordinary acts 
of government.  It was really the entire set of institutional arrangements, parliamentary statutes, judi-
cial precedents, and political understandings that together shaped the exercise of power.  The British 
constitution could not be found in any one document—not even in Magna Carta or in the parliamen-
tary Declaration of Rights of 1689—but rather in many texts or even none.  Moreover, none of those 
documents could prevent a sovereign parliament from adopting any law it chose, even if that law vio-
lated some fundamental right or dearly held tradition.  In a sense, the idea of parliamentary sover-
eignty was the ruling principle of the eighteenth-century British constitution.”). 
130. See ADAMS, supra note 127, at 189 (“The acquisition and cultivation or exploitation of 
land was the very raison d’être for the colonies.”); CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL 
BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 6–7 (Yale Univ. Press 1961) (1924) (people came to 
the New World to acquire property, to better their economic status, to obtain religious freedom, to 
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The Revolution was “an ideological, constitutional, political struggle and 
not primarily a controversy between social groups undertaken to force chang-
es in the organization of the society or the economy.”131  The Colonists em-
braced Locke’s views of property and sought to transplant it in America.132 
There was no economic class warfare in the Colonies.133  Land was plenti-
ful, and labor, especially in the form of skilled artisans, was scarce, allowing 
every free adult male an opportunity to succeed financially.134  Anyone who 
wanted his own land could find it in the western portions of the Colonies or in 
the unsettled territories across the Appalachian Mountains.135  Plus, everyone, 
whether landowners, merchants, or artisans, recognized the economic and so-
cial value, including independence, that property ownership bestowed. Indeed, 
property was “the one great unifying value” existing throughout the colo-
nies.136  Finally, the leaders of the Revolution did not impose their own radical 
 
start a new life, or to seek adventure); BERNARD BAILYN, THE PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH 
AMERICA, AN INTRODUCTION 30–32, 36–37, 42–43, 67 (1985) [hereinafter BAILYN, PEOPLING)]; 
TAYLOR, supra note 1012, at 192 (“Coming from a more crowded, competitive, and capitalist land 
where about half the population lacked sufficient, food, shelter, and clothing, the colonists marveled 
at the apparent abundance of nature, the vast numbers of fish, birds, trees, and deer.”); id. at 440–41 
(“Compared with Britain, the American colonies offered greater opportunity for free people to be-
come landowning farmers . . . .  [C]olonial conditions permitted most adult, free men to own suffi-
cient land to employ themselves and their families, a cherished condition called ‘independence,’ 
which starkly contrasted with the dependence of laborers and tenant farmers in Great Britain.”).  The 
opportunity to speculate in land was also attractive to immigrants after they became settled.  See 
BAILYN, PEOPLING, supra, at 67 (“Every farmer with an extra acre of land became a land specula-
tor . . . .  Within a single generation of the first settlements, the acquisition of land had taken on a 
new form; and a new purpose; speculation in land futures was fully launched as a universal business, 
and it developed quickly.”); FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 53 & n.1 (1973) [herein-
after BOSSELMAN] (noting that Crown owned all land in England and that the nobles merely “held” 
their property).   
131. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 124, at x, 67–68.  That is not to say that colo-
nists were not motivated by economic considerations.  Some surely were. See, e.g., Marc Egnal & 
Joseph A. Ernst, An Economic Interpretation of the American Revolution, in HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 42–68 (Robert Whaples & Dianne C. Betts eds., 1995) 
(discussing the political and economic causes of the American Revolution).  
132. See ADAMS, supra note 127, at 189. 
133. See id. 
134. Id. at 190–91 (“The strongest motive of the middle class, and of the upper and lower clas-
ses that shared its guiding values, was the pursuit of property in free competition, property as a guar-
antee of security and status.”). 
135. See ADAMS, supra note 127, at 189; BAILYN, PEOPLING, supra note 130, at 38 (“[T]here 
were millions of open acres east of the Mississippi, and the growing scale of [the American] enter-
prise, both in commerce and agriculture, and the multiplying and maturing towns created opportuni-
ties that had not existed when coastal property had been almost free for the taking.”). 
136. ADAMS, supra note 127, at 191; ELY, supra note 7, at 27 (“[T]he defense of property 
rights was a major force unifying the colonies in their struggle with England.”). 
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economic theories on an unwilling populace.137  “American political leaders 
did not develop new ideas about private property.  They merely demanded 
that the concept of property long since canonized by the English Whigs also 
apply in the colonies.”138 
America sought independence from England because the two polities fun-
damentally and irreconcilably disagreed over the nature of the “constitution” 
protecting English citizens in the Mother Country and in the New World.139  
Having suffered under the arbitrary rule of several tyrannical kings, the Eng-
land people believed that the “mixed constitution” established after the Glori-
ous Revolution of 1688140—a state organized with each of the three classes of 
English society represented by one branch of the government: the Crown for 
the monarchy, the House of Lords for the nobility, and the House of Com-
mons for the common man—would protect cherished English liberties by en-
suring that no one person or entity could threaten English freedoms.141  By 
contrast, by the time of the Revolution many Colonists had never directly suf-
fered under royal despotism,142 but they had lived under what they deemed its 
Parliamentary version.  Americans believed that only the law could protect 
their freedoms because a legislature could be as tyrannical as a king.143  Be-
 
137. See ELY, supra note 7, at 27. 
138. ADAMS, supra note 127, at 188; see ELY, supra note 7, at 17 (“Whig political thought pro-
foundly shaped public attitudes in colonial America . . . .”). 
139. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 124, at 67–68. 
140. See id. at 70–71. 
141. See id. at 70. 
142. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 124, at 203 (royal power “touched only 
the outer fringes of colonial life”); GREENE, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, supra note 80, at 179–80; 
MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 12, at 9 (“For Americans the great thing about this 
empire, apart from the sheer pride of belonging to it, was that it let you alone.  The average colonist 
might go through the year, might even go through a lifetime, without seeing an officer of the em-
pire.”). 
143. See GREENE, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, supra note 79, at 10–11, 59, 141–42; CHARLES 
H. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 2–3, 9–11, 16–17 (rev. ed., Cornell 
Univ. Press 1947); MORGAN, CHALLENGE, supra note 60, at 7, 54–56; 4 JOHN PHILLIP REID, 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3–5, 69–72 
(1993).  The Declaration of Independence used the phrase “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness,” rather than “property,” and Jefferson never explained why he changed Locke’s well-known 
phrase.  SCOTT, supra note 15, at 41–42. But it is unlikely that he intended to denigrate the im-
portance of property.  See ADAMS, supra note 127, at 192 (“[T]he acquisition of property and the 
pursuit of happiness were so closely connected with each other in the minds of the founding genera-
tion that naming only one of the two sufficed to evoke both.”); ELY, supra note 7, at 29 (“The right 
to obtain and possess property was at the heart of the pursuit of happiness.”); LEONARD W. LEVY, 
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 276 (1988) [hereinafter LEVY, ORIGINAL 
INTENT] (“The pursuit of happiness, a phrase used by Locke for a concept that underlay his political 
ethics, subsumed the great rights of liberty and property, which were inextricably related. . . .  The 
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cause both the Crown and Parliament had come under the rule of “irresponsi-
ble and self-seeking adventurers—what the twentieth century would call “po-
litical gangsters”  who “had gained the power of the British government and 
were turning first to the colonies”144—the Colonists found their freedoms 
threatened by the English government.  The American Revolution, according-
ly, was a rebellion fought to preserve the rule of law and the freedoms en-
joyed by the Framers’ generation as Englishmen, not to obtain them.145 
 
anti-American Tory, Dr. Samuel Johnson, had used the phrase, and Sir William Blackstone, also a 
Tory, employed a close equivalent in his Commentaries in 1765, when remarking ‘that man should 
pursue his own happiness.  This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law.’”) (emphasis 
added); id. at 277 (“liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness [were] deeply linked in the thought 
of the Framers”); ZUCKERT, supra note 7, at 220–24, 281; cf. infra text accompanying note 184 
(quoting Madison’s understanding of “property”).  Jefferson may have used “the pursuit of happi-
ness” rather than “property” for several reasons.  Natural rights, like “life” and “liberty,” were inal-
ienable, where “property” was alienable.  Some colonists sought to make a living through a trade, 
rather than agriculture.  See MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE, supra note 129, at 134, 270–72 n.79.  
Some of the Framers were deeply troubled by the inconsistency between their declaration that every 
man had an inalienable right to “liberty” and the prevalence of Black chattel slavery, principally in 
the southern colonies.  See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 124, at 232–46.  Perhaps, 
they feared that using the specific term “property” in America’s fundamental statement of its political 
and moral philosophy could be used to claim that the document endorsed that institution.  (State con-
stitutions, by contrast, generally used the term “property.”)  See MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE, su-
pra note 129, at 165–67.  Or perhaps Jefferson, who expected the Declaration to be read aloud, just 
liked the sound of his chosen phrase.  ZUCKERT, supra note 7, at 223. 
144. BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION, supra note 125, at xi; see id. at 207 (“The colonists—
habituated to respond vigorously to acts of arbitrary rule; convinced that the existence of liberty was 
precarious even in the loosely governed provinces of the British-American world; more uncertain 
than ever of what the intricate shufflings in the distant corridors of power in England portended; and 
ever fearful that England’s growing corruption would destroy its capacity to resist the aggressions of 
ruthless power seekers—saw behind the actions of the ministry not merely misgovernment and not 
merely insensitivity to the reality of life in the British overseas provinces but a deliberate design to 
destroy the constitutional safeguards of liberty.”). 
145. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 6 (“[I]n some ways, it was a war fought for continuity; 
for the right to trudge along familiar walkways.”); POLE, supra note 110, at 77 (“The American revo-
lutionaries never claimed to be fighting for new principles.  They asserted repeatedly that they were 
engaged in the defence of ancestral English rights and privileges; and when they fell back on the 
rights of man, they relied on rights which we must take to have been even older than those of Eng-
lishmen.”).  As Professor Bernard Bailyn has explained: “[T]he primary goal of the American Revo-
lution . . . was not the overthrow or even the alteration of the existing social order but the preserva-
tion of political liberty threatened by the apparent corruption of the constitution, and the 
establishment of the existing condition of liberty. . . .  What was essentially involved in the American 
Revolution was not the disruption of society with all the fear, despair, and hatred that that entails, but 
the realization, the comprehension and fulfillment, of the inheritance of liberty and of what was taken 
to be America’s destiny in the context of world history.”  BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra 
note 124, at 19; see also, e.g., BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION, supra note 125, at 69 (“[T]he liber-
ties Americans sought were British in their nature; they had been achieved by Britain over the centu-
ries and had been embedded in a constitution whose wonderfully contrived balance between the 
needs of the state and the rights of the individual was thought throughout the Western world to be 
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2. The Relationship Between Property and Liberty 
One of those freedoms was the ability to acquire and enjoy the use of pri-
vate property.146  The Framers’ generation held that “property” was a “natural 
right,” a right that is antecedent to and exists independently of government.147 
Such a right, in Coke’s words, was the “Lex aeterna, the law of nature . . . 
written with the finger of God in the heart of man.”148 
That generation saw the protection of property as vital to civil society.149  
 
one of the finest human achievements.  It was obvious too, of course, that something had gone wrong 
recently.  It was generally agreed in the colonies that the famous balance of the constitution, in Brit-
ain and America, had been thrown off by a gang of ministers greedy for power, and that their atten-
tion had been drawn to the colonies by the misrepresentations of certain colonial officeholders who 
hoped to find an open route to influence and fortune in the enlargement of Crown power in the colo-
nies.”); GREENE, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, supra note 79, at 59–66; ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 123–24 (1932) (“[T]he central principle of 
the American Revolution [was that] rebellion against an unlawful act [was] not rebellion but the 
maintenance of law.  This philosophy gave character to the Revolution.”); id. at 133 (“The colonists 
were demanding a constitutionally checked government; they claimed it was already theirs; and in 
course of time they proceeded not only to fight, but to create governments of exactly that charac-
ter.”); MORISON, supra note 12, at 180 (“There was no American nationalism or separatist feeling in 
the colonies prior to 1775. . . .  Americans were not only content but [also] proud to be part of the 
British imperium.  But they did feel very strongly that they were entitled to all constitutional rights 
that Englishmen possessed in England.”); id. at 182 (“[T]he Americans were a high-spirited people 
who claimed all the rights for which Englishmen had fought since Magna Carta, and would settle for 
nothing less. . . .  Make no mistake; the American Revolution was not fought to obtain freedom, but 
to preserve the liberties that Americans already had as colonials.  Independence was no conscious 
goal, secretly nurtured in cellar or jungle by bearded conspirators, but a reluctant last resort, to pre-
serve ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’”); NELSON, supra note 120, at 13 (“One of the most 
intense concerns of Americans in the prerevolutionary period was to render individuals secure in their lives, 
liberties, and properties from abuses of government power.”); Gedicks, supra note 117, at 621. 
146. See RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS, supra note 101, at 20. 
147. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 345 (1827) (“[T]he right to con-
tract, and the obligations created by contract, . . . exist anterior to, and independent of society . . . 
[They] are, like many other natural rights, brought with man into society; and, although they may be 
controlled, are not given by human legislation.”); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815) 
(referring in dicta to “the principles of natural justice, [and] the fundamental laws of every free gov-
ernment”); LARKIN, supra note 7, at v (Preface by Prof. J.L. Stocks) (“Property exists, like marriage 
and the family, antecedently to government, and belongs to the state of nature on which government 
is superimposed: it is natural in a sense in which government is not.”); BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, 
at 103 (“Natural law was the prevailing judicial philosophy.”); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR & CHRISTINA 
SANDEFUR, CORNERSTONE OF LIBERTY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 21ST-CENTURY AMERICA 54–56 
(2016) [hereinafter SANDEFUR & SANDEFUR]; Hadley Arkes, Who’s the Laissez-Fairest of Them All? 
The Tradition of Natural Rights in American Law, POLICY REV. 78 (Spring 1992). 
148. STOURZH, supra note 123, at 12; see also, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *41; 
BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN 
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (1931); MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, 
THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC (1996). 
149. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 7, at 10–27; EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 77, at 17 (“The clas-
sical liberal tradition of the founding generation prized the protection of liberty and private property 
 
LARKIN-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/16  2:19 PM 
28 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:1 
For example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George Mason a 
month before Thomas Jefferson penned the Declaration of Independence,150 
made that point clearly, providing that “all men . . . have certain inherent natu-
ral rights of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their poster-
ity; among which are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of ac-
quiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and 
safety.”151  The founding generation believed that Locke was correct to con-
clude that the primary purpose of government was to protect the natural rights 
of man, including the right to property.152 
 
under a system of limited government.”); ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTERESTS 
OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN, IN THE PRESENT DISPUTES WITH AMERICA 29 (1775) (“The 
right of property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to de-
prive them of their liberty.”); SCOTT, supra note 15, at 2 (“In time Americans came to believe that all 
men should own land, and that widespread ownership of land was characteristic of a virtuous socie-
ty.”); see generally Schultz, supra note 62, at 475–77 (“Property was clearly an important concept in 
America and was well discussed by many individuals. James Madison described property broadly to 
include even one’s opinions and beliefs.  He argued that property as well as personal rights are an 
‘essential object of the laws’ necessary to the promotion of free government. Alexander Hamilton 
stated that the preservation of private property was essential to liberty and republican government.  
Thomas Jefferson depicted property as a ‘natural right’ of mankind and linked ownership to public 
virtue and republic government. John Adams described a proper balance of property in society as 
important to maintaining republican government and connected property ownership to moral worth.  
Thomas Paine felt that the state was instituted to protect the natural right of property, and Daniel 
Webster would later link property to virtue, freedom, and power.  Numerous Anti-Federalists de-
scribed a society as free when it protected property rights or equalized property distributions.  For 
example, Samuel Bryan, in his ‘Letters of Centinel,’ argued that a ‘republican, or free government, 
can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divid-
ed.’ Hence, many colonial American readings of Locke’s theory of property also noted the connec-
tion between personal political liberty and property ownership, and agreed with Locke that property 
rights deserved a somewhat absolute protection against government regulation.  Additionally, others 
followed Harrington and articulated the importance of property divisions in preserving state Republi-
can governments.  Still others cited Blackstone to defend more absolutist conceptions of property. 
Clearly there were many early Americans who described property as the end of society, as absolute, 
as linked to other important political rights, or as natural.  Conversely, threats to property were con-
sidered destructive to freedom and republican government.”) (footnotes omitted).   
150. See ZUCKERT, supra note 7, at 220, 275. 
151. See, e.g., The Virginia Declaration of Rights, reprinted at 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3813 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) 
(“[A]ll men are [created] equally free and independent, and have certain inherent [natural] rights, of 
which, . . . they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; [among which are] the en-
joyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and 
obtaining happiness and safety.”) (emphasis added).  George Mason wrote the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights a month before Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence.  
152. See LARKIN, supra note 7, at vi (Preface by Prof. J.L. Stocks) (“According to Locke’s 
theory, when government is instituted, nature is abrogated only in its defects: for the rest it remains 
intact, a source of fundamental social rights and obligations.  Thus this account of natural property, 
except so far as it reveals defects in nature’s provision, is correctly taken as defining in principle the 
property which, in Locke’s view, it is the primary end of government to preserve.”). 
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One of the Colonists’ goals was to acquire their own property.  In Eng-
land, the crown was the ultimate landowner.153  Since William I, the crown 
had parceled out land to vassals and subvassals in the feudal system.154  By 
the eighteenth century feudalism was a matter of history, but hereditary es-
tates made available land scarce.155  “The colonies, on the other hand, were 
short of people, cattle, and hard money, but had land to burn.”156  For exam-
ple, Virginia adopted the “headright system,” in which each new male settler 
received fifty acres of land to encourage settlement.157 
Colonists also had the opportunity to own land “free, clear, and abso-
lute”158—that is, in fee simple, the broadest property right known to the com-
mon law—with none of the remnants of the feudal duties that accompanied a 
grant of land from the king.159  Individual feudal property holders owed the 
king a duty of military service or, as it later developed, an obligation to pay 
rent, known as “quitrent,” a rough form of property tax.160  The Virginia 
Company, the corporation chartered to develop that colony, owned the early 
settlements in Virginia, and the colonists bore the same duty to pay quit-
rents.161  But that state of affairs soon changed.  The Crown’s revocation of 
the Virginia Company’s charter in 1624, the death of King James I the follow-
ing year, the grant of private property to settlers in Virginia, and the adoption 
of the common law—those events (along with the Colonists’ general refusal 
 
153. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, at 53 & n.1. 
154. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 24. 
155. Under the English law of “primogeniture,” all of the deceased’s lands descended to his 
eldest son if the owner died intestate.  The law was designed to protect the landed gentry by helping 
them “keep their property within the bloodline,” because political power rested on land ownership.  
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 24, 29–30. 
156. Id. at 24.  
157. 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE 
AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607–1660 18 (2008) [hereinafter 1 NELSON]; PERKINS, supra note 12, at 57; 
ELY, supra note 7, at 11. 
158. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 171 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). 
159. BANNER, supra note 16, at 5.  In England, eighty percent of farm workers were tenants or 
itinerant workers, but in America a majority of colonial farmers owned their land outright.  American 
farmers who were tenants also remained in that status for only three or four years (for indentured 
servants, the period was four to seven years), just long enough to purchase their own property.  
PERKINS, supra note 12, at 57–59, 91–92. 
160. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793) (Cushing, J.); BANNER, supra 
note 16, at 5; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *44–518; ELY, supra note 7, at 11; FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 16, at 24–25; MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 19. 
161. See ELY, supra note 7, at 10–11; 1 NELSON, supra note 157, at 13–14; Julius Goebel, Jr., 
King’s Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 444–
47 (1931) (describing land tenure in the seventeenth century in the Plymouth Colony).  The duty to 
pay quitrents was common in the southern colonies (although they were poorly collected), but “novel 
and provocative” in New England. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 277. 
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to pay rent, and the royal governors inability to collect it) changed the nature 
of property ownership in America.162  Gone were the remnants of the feudal 
duties that landowners owed the crown. The difference, according to Profes-
sor Stuart Banner, was tremendous.163 
Americans also sought to protect the property they acquired.  “If there was 
one issue on which most of the American Founders agreed, it was the im-
portance of protecting private property rights.”164  Yet, it is important to rec-
ognize that the founding generation’s desire to safeguard private property was 
not simply a matter of a materialistic state of mind.165  During the period be-
fore and after 1776 “[t]he revolutionists’ coupling of property with life and 
liberty was not an attempt to lend respectability to property rights, nor was it 
an attempt to enlist the masses in a struggle for the special privilege of a small 
 
162. See ANDREWS, supra note 130, at 3–6, 8; ELY, supra note 7, at 12–13; LARKIN, supra 
note 7, at 140 (“[F]eudalism never got a real footing in America.  Most of the charters from 1606 to 
1732 granted lands in free and common soccage, that is, free tenure without military service.”); 1 
NELSON, supra note 157, at 24–41.   
163. BANNER, supra note 16, at 5. 
164. POLE, supra note 110, at 77 (“In all these rights, nothing was more fundamental than the 
laws of property, in which not only their fortunes but their liberty was at stake.”); SOMIN, supra note 
53, at 36; see also Fisher Ames, Dangerous Power of France, No. III, in 2 WORKS OF FISHER AMES 
309 (S. Ames ed., 1854) (“[T]he great duty of all governments . . . is to protect property.”); Stuart 
Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the Legal System of the Early 
American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1136 [hereinafter Bruchey] (“Perhaps the most im-
portant value of the Founding Fathers of the American constitutional period was their belief in the 
necessity of securing property rights.”); Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property 
in Revolutionary America, 19 J. L. & ECON. 467 (1976) [hereinafter Katz].  It is worth remembering 
that the criminal law was a useful device, not only for moral instruction and cleansing, but also for 
protecting private property.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 149–50 (“Law and order are them-
selves a kind of social insurance.  The criminal law tries to guard people’s property against thieves 
and robbers.”); Hay, supra note 9, at 17–18 (explaining that English law made numerous property 
crime capital offenses because there were no investigative agencies; the criminal law relied instead 
on the threat of a severe punishment to deter crime).  Colonial criminal law, while less bloodthirsty 
than the English common law, served economic purposes too. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 33, 
37–38. 
165. As Professor John Phillip Reid explained, we use the term “property” differently than the 
Founders’ generation did: “Today we think of [that generation’s] emphasis upon property as a de-
fense of the material and tend to forget how much the concept of liberty in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries depended upon property—upon the right to property and the right to security in prop-
erty.  We no longer think of property in the manner that people did in the revolutionary era, nor do 
we use the word ‘property’ as they did, and it is sometimes forgotten that liberty itself was spoken of 
and thought of as property.  Constitutional rights of individuals—the right to trial by jury, for exam-
ple, or the right to be taxed only by consent—were possessions that English citizens owned, that 
were vested in them by inheritance from their ancestors.”  JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO TAX 27 (1987) [hereinafter REID, 
AUTHORITY TO TAX]. 
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wealthy class.”166  Property was not one of “the special privileges of a small 
wealthy class” of Americans.167  Most Colonists owned property and saw 
“life, liberty, and property” as “the fundamental trinity of inalienable rights,” 
rights that “individuals could never renounce,” unlike “rights whose exercise 
was subject to the regulatory power of the state.”168  As Professor Edmund 
Morgan of Yale once put it: 
Americans were actually quite shameless about their concern 
for property and made no effort to hide it, because it did not 
at all seem shabby to them.  The colonial protests against tax-
ation frankly and openly, indeed, passionately, affirm the 
sanctity of property.  And the passion is not the simple and 
unlovely passion of greed.  For eighteenth-century Ameri-
cans, property and liberty were one and inseparable, because 
property was the only foundation yet conceived for security 
of life and liberty: without security for his property, it was 
thought, no man could live or be free except at the mercy of 
another. . . .  The Americans fought England because Parlia-
ment threatened the security of property.  They established 
state constitutions with property qualification for voting and 
officeholding in order to protect the security of property.  
And when state governments seemed inadequate to the task, 
they set up the federal government for the same purpose.  The 
economic motive was present in all these actions but it was 
present as the friend of universal liberty.  Devotion to security 
of property was not the attitude of a privileged few but the 
fundamental principle of the many, inseparable from every-
thing that went by the name of freedom and adhered to the 
more fervently precisely because it did affect most people so 
intimately.169 
Harvard Professor Bernard Bailyn agrees: 
The sanctity of private property and the benefits of commer-
cial expansion, within customary boundaries, were simply as-
sumed—the Revolution was fought in part to protect the indi-
 
166. MORGAN, CHALLENGE, supra note 60, at 55. 
167. Id. 
168. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 120, at 290; see also ELY, supra note 7, at 16 
(“By 1750 a largely middle-class society had emerged in colonial North America.  Most of the colo-
nists owned land, and 80 percent of the population derived their living from agriculture.”). 
169. MORGAN, CHALLENGE, supra note 60, at 55–56; see also BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS, supra note 124, at 77 (“Liberty . . . was the capacity to exercise ‘natural rights’ within lim-
its set not by the mere will or desire of men in power but by non-arbitrary law—law enacted by legis-
latures containing with them the proper balance of forces.”). 
LARKIN-22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/16  2:19 PM 
32 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [100:1 
vidual’s right to private property—nor were acquisitiveness, 
the preservation of private possessions, and reasonable eco-
nomic development believed to be in necessary conflict with 
the civil rectitude that free, republican governments required 
to survive.  Later, generations later, such a conflict might be 
seen to emerge in complex ways, but for the Revolutionary 
generation and its immediate successors these were harmoni-
ous values, implicit in a configuration of ideas that had 
evolved through the critical passages of Anglo-American his-
tory.170 
The Founders understood the term “property” to have an expansive mean-
ing, more than mere ownership of land or material goods.171  It included 
“property which men have in their persons as well as goods,”172 which includ-
ed the right to their fruits of their labors.173  The right to property even em-
 
170. BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION, supra note 125, at 206; see also MORGAN, CHALLENGE, 
supra note 60, at 56 (“[W]e should totally abandon the assumption that those who showed the great-
est concern for property rights were not devoted to human rights.”); MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE 
REPUBLIC, supra note 12, at 94 (“The Revolution had begun as a dispute over the security of proper-
ty, and had fed on the conviction that government existed for the protection of property.”); 
NEDELSKY, supra note 3, at 30 (“Madison did not . . . have a simple conception of property as land 
or even material goods.  The ‘faculties for acquiring property’ emphasized a subtle, nonmaterial di-
mension of property.  And the legislative injustice he feared was not straightforward confiscation, but 
the more indirect infringements inherent in paper money and debtor relief law.”).   
171. Contemporary scholars in law and economics treat “property” as more than “things,” real-
ty and personalty in particular, but do not go so far as including legal rights under that rubric.  See 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics, 111 
YALE L.J. 357, 358 (2001) (“Analysis of the law from an economic standpoint abounds with talk of 
‘property rights’ and ‘property rules.’  But upon closer inspection, all this property-talk among legal 
economists is not about any distinctive type of right.  To perhaps a greater extent than even the legal 
scholars, modern economists assume that property consists of an ad hoc collection of rights in re-
sources.  Indeed, there is a tendency among economists to use the term property ‘to describe virtually 
every device—public or private, common-law or regulatory, contractual or governmental, formal or 
informal—by which divergences between private and social costs or benefits are reduced.’ [¶] In oth-
er times and places, a very different conception of property has prevailed.  In this alternative concep-
tion, property is a distinctive type of right to a thing, good against the world.  This understanding of 
the in rem character of the right of property is a dominant theme of the civil law’s ‘law of things.’”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
172. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 252 (1999) [hereinafter LEVY, 
ORIGINS]; see also LARKIN, supra note 7, at 58–59. 
173. See, e.g., BREEN, supra note 17, at 190–91 (“[T]he Enjoyment of Property is the Aim of 
all Mankind; and the Foundation of their ent[e]ring into Societies. . . .  Every Man has a natural 
Right to enjoy the Fruit of his own Labour, both as to the Conveniences, and Comforts, as well as the 
Necessaries of life . . . .”) (quoting “Rusticus”, The Good of the Community Impartially Considered, 
in a Letter to a Merchant in Boston (1754)); see also Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: 
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
LIB. 334, 345 (2005) (“There is no doubt that the right to practice one’s occupation is so closely tied 
to entry into commerce, the pursuit of happiness, and the ownership of property that Justices Bradley 
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braced what Locke deemed as “a right to rights.”174  “[P]roperty, even the 
concept of property as material accumulation, was not limited to the physical 
in the eighteenth century.  It included constitutional rights that English people 
counted among the attributes of liberty.”175  The result was that “liberty itself 
was property possessed.”176 
Consider James Madison’s views.177  As he once explained, the term 
 
and Peckham may well have been right, and most certainly did not misbehave, when they collapsed 
their broad conception of occupational liberty into the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”). 
174. LEVY, ORIGINS, supra note 172, at 252; see also CASIMIR J. CZAJKOWSKI, THE THEORY 
OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 23 n.62 (1941) (“[Property] was 
generally meant to include the natural rights which appertain to man, the protection of which was the 
chief object of the State’s existence.”); LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 143, at 276 (“In the 
eighteenth century property did not mean merely the ownership of material things.  Locke himself 
had not used the word to denote merely a right to things; he meant a right to rights.  In his Second 
Treatise on Government, he remarked that people ‘united for the general preservation of their lives, 
liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name—property.’  And, he added, ‘by property I 
must be understood here as in other places to mean that property which men have in their persons as 
well as goods.’  At least four times in his Second Treatise, Locke used the word ‘property’ to mean 
all that belongs to a person, especially the rights he wished to preserve.  Americans of the founding 
generation understood property in this general Lockean sense, which we have lost.”); Schultz, supra 
note 62, at 472–73 (“Locke argues in both the First and Second Treatises that the protection of prop-
erty is the goal of civil society. Property is a natural and pre-political institution given to man by 
God, and a property interest gives the owner a singular and absolute control over something which no 
one, including the state, could violate.  Property ownership of a thing was based upon ownership of 
one’s body and labor such that anything that our labor mixed with became personal property.  But 
property included more than the possessions of individuals.  Property referred to one’s ‘Life, Liberty, 
and Estate.’ ‘Property’ was a general political term referring to all the personal and political rights of 
individuals with ownership of one’s body and talents premised upon the natural freedom of individu-
als.  These comments, along with the placing of property in a state of nature, indicate that property 
was meant to affirm the natural political rights and liberties of individuals against the state, and not 
necessarily be the only tool of economic development.”) (footnotes omitted). 
175. JOHN PHILIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 72 (1988) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter REID, CONCEPT OF LIBERTY]; see also 
LARKIN, supra note 7, at 52–53 (“The same words, ‘lives, liberties and estates,’ Locke designated 
‘by the general name’ of property, the protection of which was the chief object of the State’s exist-
ence.  Thus the word ‘property’ or ‘propriety’ had a rather wide connotation in the seventeenth centu-
ry.  It was frequently applied to constitutional liberties as well as to other matters.”) (footnote omit-
ted); LARKIN, supra note 7, at 58–59 (“[To Locke, property] includes the right[s] to life and liberty 
as well as the right to property, as we understand it today.”); MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, 
supra note 3, at 13, 36–37; Underkuffler, supra note 27, at 128–29 (“During the American Founding 
Era, property included not only external objects and people’s relationships to them, but also all of 
those human rights, liberties, powers, and immunities that are important for human well-being, in-
cluding: freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, freedom from bodily harm, and free and 
equal opportunities to use personal faculties.”). 
176. REID, CONCEPT OF LIBERTY, supra note 175, at 72. 
177. James Madison’s views on the Constitution are particularly important.  He was the Found-
er principally responsible for drafting the Constitution, and his fear of the tyranny of the majority 
reflected the Federalists’ belief that the principal threat to the new government was the tension be-
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“property” included more than realty and personalty, reaching anything of 
value to someone, including legal rights.178  “Conscience is the most sacred of 
all property,” he wrote, with “other property depending in part on positive 
law, the exercise of that, being a natural and inalienable right.”179  “That is not 
a just government, nor is property secure under it,” Madison explained, 
“where the property which a man has in his personal safety and personal liber-
ty, is violated by arbitrary seizures of one class of [persons] for the service of 
the rest.”180  He criticized a government that used “arbitrary restrictions, ex-
emptions, and monopolies” to “deny to part of its citizens that free use of their 
faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute their 
property in the general sense of the word; but are the means of acquiring 
property strictly so called.”181  Madison explained in detail his view that prop-
erty was “a human right.”182  He made that point in a 1792 essay published by 
the National Gazette.183  In his words: 
 This term [property] in its particular application means 
“that dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in exclusion of every other indi-
vidual.” 
 In its larger and juster meaning, [it] embraces every thing 
 
tween political egalitarianism and the economic inequality that would inevitably result from individ-
uals’ disparate abilities.  The difficulty in creating a new charter for the nation, therefore, was to de-
vise a structure that could promote democracy, perform effectively, and protect liberty and property. 
See Jennifer Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the Consti-
tution, 96 HARV. L. REV. 340, 347–50 (1982). 
178. See Underkuffler, supra note 27, at 136.  
179. JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 516 (1999) (quoting NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 143, at 276–77. 
183. See Underkuffler, supra note 27, at 136 (“Madison’s essay is curious and provocative.  He 
clearly saw property as having two distinct meanings.  Although it could, in its narrow sense, mean 
corporeal or incorporeal objects and our relationships to them, it could also mean more.  His broader 
understanding of property as including rights to freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, phys-
ical liberty, and the ability to use one’s intelligence and creative powers, is radically different from 
the ordinary understanding of property today.”) (footnote omitted).  Other contemporaries of Madi-
son’s shared that view.  See PAUL EIDELBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
257 (1968) (during the founding generation, property “encompass[ed] whatever is proper to oneself, 
including the enjoyment of one’s faculties, one’s rights and privileges”); MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO 
SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 13 (property was a “subtle combination of many rights, powers, and du-
ties, distributed among individuals, society, and the state”); Leonard W. Levy, Property as a Human 
Right, in 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 169, 174–77 (1988) (in the eighteenth century “property” encom-
passed constitutional rights and liberties); Underkuffler, supra note 27, at 136 (“Although few other 
American Founders explored the idea as extensively as Madison, the existence of a broader under-
standing of property during the Founding Era has been widely recognized.”). 
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to which a man may attach a value and have a right; and 
which leaves to every one else the like advantage. 
In the former sense, a man’s land, or merchandise, or 
money is called his property. 
In the latter sense, a man has property in his opinions and 
the free communication of them. 
He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opin-
ions and in the profession and practice dictated by them. 
He has a property very dear to him in the safety and liber-
ty of his person. 
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties 
and free choice of the objects on which to employ them. 
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, 
he may be equally said to have a property in his rights. 
. . . .  
If there be a government then which prides itself in main-
taining the inviolability of property; which provides that none 
shall be taken directly even for public use without indemnifi-
cation to the owner, and yet directly violates the property 
which individuals have in their opinions, their religion, their 
persons, and their faculties; nay more, which indirectly vio-
lates their property, in their actual possessions, in the labor 
that acquires their daily subsistence, and in the hallowed rem-
nant of time which ought to relieve their fatigues and soothe 
their cares, the influence will have been anticipated, that such 
a government is not a pattern for the United States.184 
The natural rights185 and social compact theories186 familiar to the Framers 
 
184. MADISON, supra note 179, at 515–17 (1999) (quoting NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 
1792); see James A. Dorn, Judicial Protection of Economic Liberties, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND 
THE JUDICIARY, 3–4 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987); see also, e.g., ADAMS, supra 
note 127, at 192 (the Founding fathers saw “the acquisition of property” and “the pursuit of happi-
ness” as synonyms); id. at 188 (“The twin theme of threatened liberty and property therefore recurred 
in hundreds of public statements made between 1764 and 1776.”); id. at 194 (“The first state consti-
tutions thus clearly emphasized the individual’s claim to legal protection of his property.  The self-
imposed limits on sovereign power that the constitutions articulated derived from a desire to guaran-
tee not only freedom of expression and of religious exercise but also the freedom to acquire proper-
ty.”); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1768) (“property” means, 
inter alia, “3. Right of possession. . . . 5. Thing possessed.”), LEVY, ORIGINS, supra note 172, at 252 
(describing Madison’s belief that property is “a human right”); Schultz, supra note 62, at 475 
(“James Madison described property broadly to include even one’s opinions and beliefs.”). 
185. See, e.g., BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 124, at 187–88 (discussing the 
views of Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, John Dickinson, and Philip Livingston). 
186. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); LOCKE, supra note 98; JEAN JACQUES 
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Penguin Classics 1968) (1762). 
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presumed that the right to life, liberty, and property existed independently of 
positive law.  Eighteenth century common law and political theory reflected 
that assumption.187 The Founders also believed that liberty and property were 
“inextricably related”188 and that each one was as valuable as the other.189  As 
Professor Gordon Wood has written: 
Eighteenth-century Whiggism had made no rigid distinction 
between people and property.  Property had been defined not 
simply as material possessions but, following Locke, as the 
attributes of a man’s personality that gave him a political 
character: “that estate or substance which a man has and pos-
sesses, exclusive of the right and power of all the world be-
sides.”  It had been thought of generally in political terms, as 
an individual dominion—a dominion possessed by all politi-
cally significant men, the “people” of society.  Property was 
not set in opposition to individual rights but was of a piece 
with them.190 
The Founders believed that property was “the guardian of every other 
right,” and that protection of property was both critical to the enjoyment of 
individual liberty191 and “central to the new American social and political or-
der.”192  As one scholar has noted, “Anyone who studies the Revolution must 
notice at once the attachment of all articulate Americans to property.  ‘Liber-
 
187. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *9, *11; J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN 
MOMENT, FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 507 
(1975) (discussing the Whig roots of the eighteenth-century civic humanist idea that “personality was 
founded in property, perfected in citizenship but perpetually threatened by corruption”). 
188. LEVY, ORIGINS, supra note 172, at 251; see also STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE 
UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE, LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 74–75 (1990) 
(“In Revolutionary political thought the term ‘property’ denoted a relationship between an individual 
and some object, not the object itself.  That is, X becomes my property—or, I have property in X—
only if I alone control the disposal of X.  This control over the disposal of X can be called my liberty 
(or right or power) to dispose of X as I please, and in this sense liberty itself is involved in the defini-
tion of property.  The right of disposal constitutes the defining condition of property and, indeed, the 
‘substance of liberty.’”); LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 143, at 276; POLE, supra note 110, at 
78–79. 
189. REID, AUTHORITY TO TAX, supra note 165, at 27. 
190. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 219 
(1998).   
191. ELY, supra note 7, at 26; LEE, supra note 149, at 29. 
192. ADAMS, supra note 127, at 215 n.103; see also, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY 
AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATION 15 (1997); Andrew 
S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis “Goes Too 
Far”, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 195–98 (1999); Schultz, supra note 62, at 475–78 (stating that Madi-
son, John Adams, Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and Gouverneur Morris held that view). 
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ty’ and ‘Property’ was their cry, not ‘Liberty’ and ‘Democracy.’”193  That 
point was heard throughout the colonies before the Revolution.  “The twin 
theme of threatened liberty and property therefore recurred in hundreds of 
public statements made between 1764 and 1776,”194 and “the cry ‘Liberty and 
Property’ became the motto of the revolutionary movement.”195  In the minds 
of the Framers, property rights were “indispensable” to the success of the new 
enterprise, given its close association with liberty,196 and liberty supplied the 
“means” to protect their property.197 
John Adams believed that “property must be secured or liberty cannot ex-
ist.”198  “Laws that threatened the security of property were for him ‘subver-
sive of the end for which men prefer society to the state of nature’ and ‘so 
subversive of society itself.’”199  James Madison was a particularly vocal ad-
vocate for the value of private property.200  Writing in The Federalist, Madi-
son stated that “[g]overnment is instituted no less for protection of the proper-
ty than the persons of individuals.”201  At the Constitutional Convention of 
1787, Madison said that “[t]he primary objects of civil society are the security 
of property and public safety.”202  Alexander Hamilton shared that view.203  
 
193. MORGAN, CHALLENGE, supra note 60, at 54–55; see also, e.g., ELY, supra note 7, at 25 
(“Significantly, the cry ‘Liberty and Property’ became the motto of the revolutionary movement.”); 
LEVY, ORIGINS, supra note 172, at 252. 
194. ADAMS, supra note 127, at 188. 
195. ELY, supra note 7, at 25. 
196. Id. at 43. 
197. TAYLOR, supra note 12, at 442 (“The free colonists intently defended their property rights 
because property alone made men truly independent and free.  In turn, the free colonists clung to 
their liberties as the means to protect the property that endowed their self-employed independence.  
Without property they would become ‘slaves,’ a state they knew all too well from local observation.  
Broadly defined, ‘slavery’ meant to labor for a master without reaping the rewards.”). 
198. 6 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 280 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851) 
[hereinafter THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS]; id. at 8–9 (“Property is surely a right of mankind as real 
as liberty . . . .  The moment the idea is admitted that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and 
that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.”). 
199. PAULINE MAIER, THE OLD REVOLUTIONARIES: POLITICAL LIVES IN THE AGE OF SAMUEL 
ADAMS 40 (1980) [hereinafter MAIER, OLD REVOLUTIONARIES] (quoting John Adams for the Mas-
sachusetts House of Representatives to Dennys DeBerdt (Jan. 12, 1768) and John Adams as “Can-
didus,” BOSTON GAZETTE (Jan. 20, 1772)). 
200. See NEDELSKY, supra note 3, at 18–66. 
201. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 336 (James Madison) (Clint Rossiter ed., 1961); see id. No. 
10, at 73 (James Madison) (“The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property 
originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests.  The protection of these fac-
ulties is the first object of government.”). 
202. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 147 (James Madison) (Max Far-
rand ed., 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND I]; see also MADISON, supra note 179, at 515 (1999) (“Gov-
ernment is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of 
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So, too, did Gouverneur Morris.  As he remarked during the Constitutional 
Convention: “Life and liberty [are] generally said to be of more value, than 
property.  An accurate view of the matter would nevertheless prove that prop-
erty [is] the main object of Society.”204  According to St. George Tucker, who 
published the first American analysis of Blackstone’s Commentaries, “[t]he 
rights of property must be sacred, and must be protected; otherwise there 
could be no exertion of either ingenuity or industry, and consequently nothing 
but extreme poverty, misery, and brutal ignorance.”205  As John Trenchard and 
Thomas Gordon argued in the popular Cato’s Letters, “without liberty com-
merce and manufacturing atroph[y],” because where the “‘perpetual Uncer-
tainties, or rather certain Oppressions’ of despotism” exist, ‘no Men will em-
bark large Stocks and extensive Talents for Business.’”206  Rather, 
“populations grew and cultures developed and prospered only in free states 
where men could enjoy the fruits of their labor, art, and initiative.”207 
The Federalists believed that property benefitted the individual and socie-
ty, economically and politically.208  According to Adam Smith, “freedom and 
prosperity were linked” and “served the welfare of society.”209  Noah Web-
 
individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses.  This being the end of government, that 
alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.”) (quoting 
NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792). 
203. FARRAND I, supra note 202, at 302 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[The] one great obj[ect] of 
Gov[ernment] is personal protection and the security of Property.”). 
204. FARRAND I, supra note 202, at 533 
205. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 41 (Liberty 
Fund, Inc. 1999) (1803) [hereinafter TUCKER]; see also Renée Lettow Lerner, Enlightenment Eco-
nomics and the Framing of the U.S. Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2012). 
206. MAIER, OLD REVOLUTIONARIES, supra note 199, at 98. 
207. Id.; see id. at 100 (“For [Isaac] Sears, for [Alexander] McDougal and [John] Lamb, for 
their followers, and in all likelihood for the merchants, artisans, and seamen elsewhere who rallied to 
the American cause, the revolution promised to give far more than it asked, and its rewards would be 
of a material as well as a spiritual sort.  Liberty was good business.”). 
208. See LOCKE, supra note 98, § 37, at 20 (“[H]e who appropriates land to himself by his la-
bour does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind.”); id. § 40, at 22 (“I think it will be 
but a very modest computation to say that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine-
tenths are the effects of labour; nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and 
cast up the several expenses about them—what in them is purely owing to nature, and what to la-
bour—we shall find in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of 
labor.”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 94 (2002) [hereinafter 
WOOD, AMERICAN REVOLUTION] (“The individual ownership of property, especially landed proper-
ty, was essential for a republic, both as a source of independence and as evidence of a permanent at-
tachment to the community.”).  “Men’s almost ubiquitous pursuit of material security and prosperity” 
was a “strong passion” for them, a driving force in their “pettier quest for material safety and afflu-
ence.”  STOURZH, supra note 123, at 82, 83. 
209. MAIER, OLD REVOLUTIONARIES, supra note 199, at 98. 
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ster, “one of the federalists’ most active publicists,”210 believed that “property 
is the basis of power” and was essential to the survival of a republic.211  “An 
equality of property, with a necessity of alienation constantly operating to de-
stroy combinations of powerful families, is the very soul of a republic.”212  
Maintain that state and “the people will inevitably possess both power and 
freedom”; lose it, and “power departs, liberty expires, and a commonwealth 
will inevitably assume some other form.”213  That is why eighteenth-century 
Americans, believed, as Yale Professor Morgan observed, that “property and 
liberty were one and inseparable, because property was the only foundation 
yet conceived for security of life and liberty: without security for his property, 
it was thought, no man could live or be free except at the mercy of anoth-
er.”214  As another scholar, Professor Phillip Reid, put it, “Americans did not 
have to be told that liberty and property were inseparable . . . .  There may 
have been no eighteenth-century educated American who did not associate de-
fense of liberty with defense of property.”215  “The conviction that private 
property was essential for self-government and political liberty,” Professor 
James Ely has noted, “was long a central tenet of Anglo-American constitu-
tionalism.”216  Liberty and property were “a unitary concept.”217  “In sum, 
 
210. BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION, supra note 125, at 262. 
211. Id. at 263; STOURZH, supra note 123, at 230 nn.104 & 107. 
212.  STOURZH, supra note 123, at 230.   
213. BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION, supra note 125, at 263.   
214. MORGAN, CHALLENGE, supra note 60, at 55. 
215. REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 82, at 32–33; see also, e.g., Hon. Loren A. 
Smith, Life, Liberty, and Whose Property?: An Essay on Property Rights, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1055, 
1056 (1996) (“While the word ‘property’ does not appear in the Preamble of the Constitution, the 
Federalist Papers make it very clear that each objective enumerated in the Preamble involved, in part, 
the protection of the citizen’s property rights.  In fact, using the Madisonian conception that property 
includes all of the fundamental aspects of the integrity of the human person, life, liberty and proper-
ty, the whole preamble is about protecting the citizen’s rights in property and property in rights.”).   
216. James W. Ely, Jr., “Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing 
Rights of Property Owners, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 40; see also, e.g., Bruchey, supra note 
164, at 1136 (“Perhaps the most important value of the Founding Fathers of the American constitu-
tional period was their belief in the necessity of securing property rights.”).   
217. Those concerns were still vibrant when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.  See, 
e.g., Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) (“The liberty, of which the deprivation without due 
process of law is forbidden, means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical 
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen 
to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and 
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avoca-
tion, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to 
his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned . . . .”); Powell v. Pennsyl-
vania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888) (“The main proposition advanced by the defendant is that his en-
joyment upon terms of equality with all others in similar circumstances of the privilege of pursuing 
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ownership of the land begat independence, independence begat virtue, and 
virtue begat republican liberty.”218 
Liberty, property, security, and the rule of law—the Framers believed that 
all those concepts were intertwined219 because “private property” was “a 
foundation of personal freedom.”220  “For Englishmen, liberty was . . . not just 
 
an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding, and selling property, is an essential part of his 
rights of liberty and property, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court assents to this 
general proposition as embodying a sound principle of constitutional law.”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 395–98 (1988) (“[I]n 1868, the concept of ‘civil rights’ of blacks—or, for that 
matter, of almost anyone—included two elements: (1) the right to equality of treatment in court trials 
and of access to the agencies of the state; and (2) a set of distinctly economic civil rights, namely, the 
right to make contracts and the right to own property. When the same Congress that drafted the 
amendment legislated under it, the legislation involved contract and property rights, not the rights of 
association or privacy or the freedoms of speech or religion. Among the rights not recognized was 
freedom from racial segregation. Congress did not have segregation in mind when it passed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, when it drafted the fourteenth amendment, or even a decade later when, contem-
plating the end of Reconstruction, it drafted the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was subsequently 
struck down by the Supreme Court. Even Radical Republicans maintained a sharp distinction among 
‘civil’ rights, ‘political’ rights, and ‘social’ rights. The fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 were designed to protect civil and political rights, but not social rights. And civil rights 
were fundamentally defined as economic rights.  [¶] Thus the fourteenth amendment was economic 
by design. The freedmen did not need the freedoms of speech or religion or even the fair administra-
tion of the criminal process so much as they needed jobs and security . . . .  [O]nce the problem of 
protecting black access to the economic system had been solved, the remaining purpose of the 
amendment was to enable the courts to define individual economic liberties against the states.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
218. MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 74–75; see SCOTT, supra note 
15, at 13 (“Land ownership provided a freeholder moral purpose, economic security, and individual 
autonomy.”); Schultz, supra note 62, at 471–72 (“John Locke’s writings were perhaps the most in-
fluential upon early America and this influence has been noted by many scholars. Locke’s Two Trea-
tises on Government were written in opposition to the abuses of the Crown and in defense of the 
principles of limited government, the natural rights of men, and the right to revolution. It was in this 
context the colonists read Locke and with which the early American conceptions of property were 
situated. The history of Locke’s theory of property, then, is primarily political, with the language of 
property used to defend the political liberty of Englishmen (including the colonies) against the 
Crown.  It is this political linkage of property to personal power that was most influential on Ameri-
ca.”) (footnotes omitted). 
219. “In the eighteenth century the concept of liberty was more than the sum of all its ele-
ments—the other sides of licentiousness and slavery, the rule of law, the security of property, and the 
principles of the constitution.”  REID, CONCEPT OF LIBERTY, supra note 175, at 98. 
220. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 124, at 352; see also ELY, supra note 7, at 17 
(“Strongly influenced by Locke, the eighteenth-century Whig political tradition stressed the rights of 
property owners as the bulwark of freedom from arbitrary government.  Property ownership was 
identified with the preservation of political liberty.”); John Trenchard, No. 68, Mar. 3, 1721, reprint-
ed in 2 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 114, at 319 (“[A]ll men are animated by the passion of acquir-
ing and defending property, because property is the best support of that independency, so passionate-
ly desired by all Men.”). 
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a condition enforced by law but the very essence of their emerging national 
identity.”221  And property was essential to liberty.  “To be free, it was neces-
sary to be secure, but you could not be free without property, and could not 
have property unless it was secure from arbitrary interference.”222  Private 
property was “the quintessential instance of individual rights as limits to gov-
ernment power,” because it “set bounds between a protected sphere of indi-
vidual freedom and the legitimate scope of governmental authority.”223 
The Americans fought England because Parliament threat-
ened the security of property.  They established state constitu-
tions with property qualifications for voting and officeholding 
in order to protect the security of property.  And when the 
state governments seemed inadequate to the task, they set up 
the federal government for the same purpose.  The economic 
motive was present in all these actions, but it was present as 
the friend of universal liberty.  Devotion to security of prop-
erty was not the attitude of a privileged few but the funda-
mental principle of the many, inseparable from everything 
that went by the name of freedom and adhered to the more 
fervently precisely because it did affect most people so inti-
mately.224 
Other members of the Founders’ generation also made that point.  As John 
Adams wrote, “[p]roperty must be secured or liberty cannot exist.”225  James 
Madison emphasized in The Federalist that “the first object of government” is 
“[t]he protection of these faculties—viz., the faculties of men, from which the 
 
221. GREENE, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, supra note 79, at 7. 
222. REID, CONCEPT OF LIBERTY, supra note 175, at 73; see also ADAMS, supra note 127, at 
192 (the Founding fathers saw “the acquisition of property” and “the pursuit of happiness” as syno-
nyms); id. at 188 (“The twin themes of threatened liberty and property therefore recurred in hundreds 
of public statements made between 1764 and 1776.”); id. at 194 (“The first state constitutions thus 
clearly emphasized the individual’s claim to legal protection of his property. The self-imposed limits 
on sovereign power that the constitutions articulated derived from a desire to guarantee not only 
freedom of expression and of religious exercise but also the freedom to acquire property.”) (1980). 
223. Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private Property, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 241 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). 
224. MORGAN, CHALLENGE, supra note 60, at 55–56; see also Underkuffler, supra note 27, at 
129 (“[P]roperty included not only external objects and people’s relationships to them, but also all of 
those human rights, liberties, powers, and immunities that are important for human well-
being . . . .”). 
225. 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 198, at 280; id. at 8–9 (“Property is surely a 
right of mankind as really as liberty. . . .  The moment the idea is admitted into society, that property 
is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, 
anarchy and tyranny commence.”); see ADAMS, supra note 127, at 154 (referring to the Massachu-
setts Constitution of 1780: “[i]n the clause that guaranteed an independent judiciary Adams used the 
classical Lockean triad in the singular version of ‘life, liberty, property.’”). 
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rights of property originate . . . .”226  Given that broad understanding of prop-
erty, it was entirely logical that the Framers’ generation treated economic op-
portunity—the ability to freely pursue a chosen profession—as a form of 
“property.”227  Other Founders such as Alexander Hamilton, John Dickinson, 
Gouverneur Morris, John Rutledge, and Rufus King echoed the opinions of 
Adams and Madison.228  As Professor Morgan has explained: 
For the colonists, as for the rest of the English, property was 
not merely a possession to be hoarded and admired; it was ra-
ther the source of life and liberty.  If one had property, if one 
had land, one had one’s own source of food and could be in-
dependent of all other men, including kings and lords.  Where 
property was concentrated in the hands of a king and aristoc-
racy, only the king and aristocracy would be free, while the 
rest of the population would be little better than slaves, vic-
tims of the eternal efforts of rulers to exploit subjects.  With-
out property, people could be starved into submission.  Hence 
liberty rested on property, and whatever threatened the securi-
ty of property threatened liberty.229 
 
226. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 201, No. 10, at 78 (James Madison). 
227. See, e.g., Allen v. Tooley, 80 Eng. Rep. 1055 (K.B. 1614) (Coke, J.) (noting that Magna 
Carta and the common law protect the right of “any man to use any trade thereby to maintain himself 
and his family”); LOCKE, supra note 98, at 15 (“[E]very man has a property in his own person; this 
nobody has any right to but himself.  The labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say 
are properly his.”); Letter of Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Mar. 4, 1801), in THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS 391 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959) (“Here every one may have land to labor for 
himself if he chuses; or, preferring the exercise of any other industry, may exact for it such compen-
sation as not only to afford a comfortable subsistence, but wherewith to provide for a cessation from 
labor in old age.”); James Madison, Property, in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 267 (1983) 
(“Nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to 
part of [the] citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which not 
only constitute their property in the general sense of the word; but are the means of acquiring proper-
ty.”); TUCKER, supra note 205, at 40 (“[B]y the laws of nature and of equality, every man has a right 
to use his faculties in an honest way, and the fruits of his [own] labor, thus acquired, are his own.”).  
Closely related is the longstanding American distaste for class-based legislation and monopolies, 
which the colonists saw as reminiscent of the special privileges that feudalism afforded to the 
wealthy and powerful.  See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 77, at 106–14. 
228. See ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 100, 104 (1965) [hereinafter 
BROWN, CRITICAL ANALYSIS]; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 201, No. 85, at 520 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (noting that the proposed Constitution would provide “additional security” for “property”); 
MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
229. MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 12, at 17; see also ADAMS, supra note 
127, at 156 (“The interdependence of liberty and law was a strong element in Anglo-American con-
stitutionalism that the colonial leaders saw no reason to give up.  For several generations liberty had 
been contrasted with licentiousness in English political debate.  In addition, defenders of republican 
government had frequently defined its essential characteristic as ‘the rule of law’ or imperium legum 
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The Colonists widely shared the Framers’ views.230  A majority of them 
were landowners and made their living from the soil.231  “This widespread 
ownership of property is perhaps the most important fact about the Americans 
of the Revolutionary period.”232  As a consequence, most Americans enjoyed 
economic and political independence—economic independence because prop-
erty ownership gave a landowner the opportunity to obtain food, clothing, and 
shelter without the sufferance of the government or landed gentry; political 
independence because property ownership was a criterion to vote or hold of-
fice in the colonies.233  The desire to protect the freedom that property guaran-
teed Americans became a leading cause of the Revolution.234  “The Revolu-
tion had begun as a dispute over the security of property, and had fed on the 
conviction that government existed for the protection of property.”235  The re-
sult is this: the nation’s earliest “history, legal traditions, and practices,”236 
demonstrate that the critical importance of private property and economic op-
portunity to the American way of life are interests “deeply rooted”237 in the 
American conscience and have been “traditionally protected” by American 
law.238 
 
non hominum, rather than as the mere absence of a king.  In Europe, the phrase had come to be used 
as a major argument against the arbitrariness of absolutist government; in America it soon was in use 
as a standard argument against the arbitrariness of the new ruler, the majority of voters.”) (footnote 
omitted); REID, CONCEPT OF LIBERTY, supra note 175, at 72 (“[P]roperty, even the concept of prop-
erty as material accumulation, was not limited to the physical in the eighteenth century.  It included 
constitutional rights that English people counted among the attributes of liberty.  In fact, a point that 
should not be forgotten is that liberty itself was property possessed.”). 
230. See MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 12, at 8, 17.  
231. See, e.g., BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION, supra note 125, at 193; MCDONALD, NOVUS 
ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 93; MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 12, at 7–8, 
95; WOOD, AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 208, at 94 (“[A]s one Carolinian wrote in 1777, ‘the 
People of America are a people of property; almost every man is a freeholder.’”); GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE IDEA OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED STATES 265 (2011) (“com-
pared to England, land [in America] was so plentiful and tenantry so rare”).  The Colonies regulated 
certain lines of work, but they did not replicate the medieval guild system because there was no need 
to create artificial barriers to entry to raise wages.  Wages were already high.  See MORISON, supra 
note 12, at 236; PERKINS, supra note 12, at 57. 
232. MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 12, at 8. 
233. See id.; see generally MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 93. 
234. MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 12, at 8. 
235. Id. at 94. 
236. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (identifying that focus as the starting 
point for “all due process cases”).  The Supreme Court declined to apply that standard in Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), however, without suggesting what the new standard would be or 
whether there will even be one.  See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Tale of Two Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 467 (2016). 
237. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721.  
238. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also, e.g., 
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The Founders’ generation also did not make the distinction between “lib-
erty” and “property” that the Supreme Court drew two hundred years later.239  
Consider this view of an anonymous contributor to the Boston Gazette: “Lib-
erty and Property are not only join’d in common discourse, but are in their 
own natures so nearly ally’d, that we cannot be said to possess the one with-
out the enjoyment of the other.”240  Contemporary historians agree that those 
beliefs were widely held in pre-Revolutionary America.  “For eighteenth-
century Americans,” Professor Morgan observed, “property and liberty were 
one and inseparable, because property was the only foundation yet conceived 
for security of life and liberty: without security for his property, it was 
thought, no man could live or be free except at the mercy of another.”241  As 
another scholar, Professor Reid, put it, “Americans did not have to be told that 
liberty and property were inseparable . . . .  There may have been no eight-
eenth-century educated American who did not associate defense of liberty 
with defense of property.”242  The conviction that private property was essen-
tial for self-government and political liberty, Professor James Ely has noted, 
 
James W. Ely, Jr., “To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation”: The Evolution of Unenumerated 
Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 917 (2006) (early state constitu-
tions protected property and economic freedom); McCormack, supra note 77, at 458–59; Sandefur, 
supra note 84, at 263–77, App. A-D.  The Declaration of Independence used the phrase “life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness” in place of Locke’s traditional formulation of “life, liberty, and proper-
ty.”  In the eighteenth century, however, that distinction made no difference.  See ADAMS, supra note 
127, at 192 (“[T]he acquisition of property and the pursuit of happiness were so closely connected 
with each other in the minds of the founding generation that naming only one sufficed to evoke 
both.”); id. (Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia constitutions each listed as an inalienable right 
and included obtaining happiness in the same sentence); LEVY, ORIGINS, supra note 172, at 251–52; 
REID, CONCEPT OF LIBERTY supra note 175, at 119 (“It is simply wrong to think that the framers of 
the Declaration of Independence, when they altered the familiar common-law trilogy from ‘life, lib-
erty, and property’ to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ were turning American law away 
from the constitutional principle of security of property.  That supposition became constitutionally 
defensible only after definitions changed and the concept of property, ceasing any longer to embrace 
liberty or rights, was relegated to the material.  The basic premise that we may easily overlook, but 
which eighteenth-century people never forgot, is that liberty in the eighteenth century was personal 
property.  Indeed, it was the concept of property that bestowed on liberty much of its substance as a 
constitutional entity and provided one of the enigmas of eighteenth-century constitutional thought—a 
puzzle for us, not for the eighteenth century.  For as everyone then appreciated, liberty existed 
through security of property and yet . . . liberty itself was the only security of property.”); SANDEFUR 
& SANDEFUR, supra note 147, at 55. 
239. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972).  
240. SANDEFUR & SANDEFUR, supra note 147, at 55 (quoting CLINTON ROSSITER, THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 175 (1963)). 
241. MORGAN, CHALLENGE, supra note 60, at 55; see also ELY, supra note 7, at 17 (“To the 
colonial mind, property and liberty were inseparable . . . .”). 
242. REID, AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS, supra note 82, at 32–33. 
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was long a central tenet of Anglo-American constitutionalism.243  “Protection 
of property from arbitrary acts of government has proved to be the material 
basis for all other civil liberties.  Intellectual freedom, experience had shown, 
presupposed economic independence.”244  Liberty and property, to the Revo-
lutionary mind, were “a unitary concept.”245 
Stanford Professor Jack Rakove has summarized the “attachment” to 
property as “a value that all Americans shared”: 
For property was one of the strongest words in the Anglo-
American political vocabulary.  Its security from unlawful 
taxation had been a dominant value of their common constitu-
tional culture since the previous century.  John Locke had 
grounded an entire theory of government—and the right to 
resist tyranny—on the concept of property in his Second 
Treatise of Government.  But Locke only gave philosophical 
rigor to a belief that already permeated Anglo-American law 
and politics. 
For Locke, as for his American readers, the concept of 
property encompassed not only the objects a person owned 
but also the ability, indeed the right, to acquire them.  Just as 
men had a right to their property, so they held a property in 
their rights.  Men did not merely claim their rights, but also 
owned them, and their title to their liberty was as sound as 
their title to the land or to the tools with which they earned 
their livelihood.  Furthermore, Americans believed that they 
truly owned these rights because their ancestors had fairly 
purchased them through the arduous work of colonization.  
Just as Locke had grounded his theory of property on the la-
bor through which men expropriate the fruits of nature for 
their personal use, making the earth more productive and thus 
fulfilling the divine injunction to preserve mankind, so the 
colonists looked back to their ancestors’ pioneering and saw 
that it was good—and legal too.  Property was a birthright, a 
legal entitlement and material legacy that one industrious 
generation transmitted to another.  That was as true for the 
 
243. Ely, supra note 216, at 43; see also, e.g., Bruchey, supra note 164, at 1136 (“Perhaps the 
most important value of the Founding Fathers of the American constitutional period was their belief 
in the necessity of securing property rights.”). 
244. ADAMS, supra note 127, at 207. 
245. Daniel Hannan, Magna Carta: Eight Centuries of Liberty, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/magna-carta-eight-centuries-of-liberty-1432912022 
[https://perma.cc/U5K3-445D] (“Liberty and property: how naturally those words tripped, as a uni-
tary concept, from the tongues of America’s Founders.”).  
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small farmers of New England, working their fifty or hundred 
acres and still fencing their fields with glacier-strewn rocks, 
as it was for the planters of the south, with their scores and 
hundreds of bondsmen, and for the merchants and land specu-
lators of Pennsylvania and New York as well.  Property, de-
fined in this way, was the vital right that Parliament would in-
fringe upon, even destroy, if it made good its claim to 
legislate for Americans “in all cases whatsoever.”246 
B. The Protection of Property in the State and Federal Constitutions 
In the years following the Declaration of Independence, Americans adopt-
ed written state constitutions as their “first-line of defense against tyranny.”247  
Americans believed that written charters, like the ones that governed the earli-
 
246. JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE INVENTION OF AMERICA 
78–79 (2010).  The Framers’ attitude toward property gives rise to the following irony regarding the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell.  In the process of endorsing a constitutional right to same-
sex marriage, Obergefell abandoned the lessons of history in favor of the Court’s own precedents 
addressing the “liberty” component of the Due Process Clause.  Had the Court stuck to the text, it 
could have pointed to the breadth of the historical meaning of “property” to justify its rulings.  As 
Professor Laura Underkuffler has written, “It is apparent that property, under this historical view, 
was broadly defined. It was tied to the notion of human beings as masters of themselves; it involved 
the maintenance of personal integrity in both a physical and nonphysical sense. It was intimately re-
lated to the development of the human personality, to the exercise of independent thought and crea-
tive powers. It was universal and reciprocal: it was that to which we, as human beings, ‘attach a value 
and have a right, and which leaves everyone else to the like advantage.’ . . . The powerful, rhetorical 
image of property, as that which gives the individual a bulwark of isolated independence from her 
fellows, has been cited as the central symbol of the antagonism between the individual and collective 
life.”  Underkuffler, supra note 27, at 138, 147 (footnotes omitted).  Perhaps, the Court relied on 
“liberty” rather than “property” because it was ignorant of the historical meaning of “property.”  Or 
perhaps the Court was aware of that history, but chose not to rely on it due to the fear that giving 
voice to the historical understanding of property would undermine the Court’s New Deal precedents 
and resurrect ghosts that the Court prefers to leave dead and buried. 
247. BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, at 92–93 (discussing 1777 Vermont and 1780 Massachusetts 
constitutions); MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 12, at 90 (“The most striking thing 
about these state governments is that they all had their wings clipped by written constitutions in 
which their powers were strictly limited and defined.  In Rhode Island and Connecticut the old colo-
nial charters continued to serve this purpose, but in each of the other states a special document was 
drafted.  The British constitution was unwritten, and in the recent disputes each side had pelted the 
other with historical precedents.  Though the colonists gave as good as they got in this fracas, they 
had had enough of it and were now unanimous in feeling that their new governments should have 
something more than tradition to limit and guide them. [¶] A written constitution, [thus], was their 
first line of defense against tyranny, and it generally contained a bill of rights defining certain liber-
ties of the people which government must not invade under any pretext; general warrants and stand-
ing armies were forbidden; freedom of the press, the right to petition, trial by jury, habeas corpus, 
and other procedures that came to be known as ‘due process of law’ were guaranteed.”); cf. PETER 
CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 20 (1998) (referring to the Massachu-
setts Laws and Liberties of 1648: “A written code of law also increased the security of property.”). 
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est settlements, were formal and more certain guarantees of liberty than an 
unwritten constitution because they could clearly define, apportion, and limit 
governmental power far better than the unwritten version that governed Eng-
land (then and today).248  The original states were “the great political labora-
tor[ies]” whose experiences taught the Framers lessons on how to implement 
the theory of republicanism.249 
Not all of those experiences were positive, however, and the negative ones 
were fresh in the minds of the Convention delegates when they gathered in 
Philadelphia. 
The Framers were aware of the general tension between promoting de-
mocracy and protecting civil liberties.250  The delegates also had certain spe-
cific fears in mind when they began their task.251  Although numerous state 
constitutions contained explicit protections for property rights,252 some states 
still followed the practice of expropriating, through bills of attainder or by 
other means, property owned by Loyalists before or during the war.253  In ad-
dition, state legislatures had enacted laws authorizing paper currency for debt 
repayment, staying execution of debts, and the like, all of which degraded the 
value of property holders.254  Another common fear was that, at some point, a 
majority of the electorate would not be propertied.255  Instead, it would either 
 
248. See generally id.  
249. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 120, at 31. 
250. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 202 (quoting Edmund Ran-
dolph of Virginia that “[o]ur chief danger arises from the democratic parts of our constitutions”); id. 
(quoting Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts that “[t]he evils we experience flow from the excess of 
democracy”). 
251. See id. at 202. 
252. See ADAMS, supra note 127, at 192 (“The first state constitutions thus clearly emphasized 
the individual’s claim to legal protection of his property.  The self-imposed limits on sovereign pow-
er that the constitutions articulated derived from a desire to guarantee not only freedom of expression 
and of religious exercise but also the freedom to acquire property.”); MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO 
SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 152 (seven states explicitly or implicitly declared a Lockean inalienable 
right to property in their first post-1776 constitutions); RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 
120, at 291 (“The ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ in the Declaration of Independence took 
a somewhat modified form in the state bills of rights, which preferred a trial of ‘enjoying and defend-
ing life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining hap-
piness and safety.’”); James W. Ely, Jr., ‘The Sacredness of Private Property:’ State Constitutional 
Law and the Protection of Economic Rights Before the Civil War, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 620, 627 
(2015) (“[T]he Northwest Ordinance, taken together with the state constitutions of the Revolutionary 
period, demonstrate that the security of private property was a keystone of the political and social 
order in the newly independent United States.”). 
253. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 90–93, 155–56. 
254. See id. at 156–57. 
255. See id. at 93–94. 
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be employed in manufacturing, trade, or finance, or be impoverished,256 but 
would use its numerical dominance to redistribute land.257  The result, accord-
ing to Professor McDonald, was that “Americans were not as secure in their 
property rights between 1776 and 1787 as they had been during the colonial 
period.”258 
 
256. See id. at 100–01 (“It was calculated in the late seventeenth century that out of a total Eng-
lish population of five and a half million people, more than a million and a quarter were ‘cottagers, 
paupers, vagrants, gypsies, thieves, beggars’; the country was plagued with an army of rootless 
workers who in times of depression or famine might, as an early mercantile writer put it, cause ‘dan-
gerous uproars.’”). 
257. Id. at 90–91 (“[I]t is true that no proposals for redistribution of the land owned by Patriots 
had been seriously considered, but what had been done in that direction was enough to inspire uneas-
iness in the bosom of every substantial landholder.  Wholesale wartime expropriation of the holdings 
of Loyalists and British subjects was still fresh in mind when the 1787 Convention met; indeed, sale 
of the property was still going on.  And though a variety of motives—avarice not least among 
them—entered into the confiscations and divestments, state after state specifically directed that the 
larger confiscated estates be sold in small parcels, so as to break up ‘dangerous monopolies of 
land.’”); see also, e.g., 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 451–52 (James Madi-
son) (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND  II]; LARKIN, supra note 7, at 156–58 (discuss-
ing Madison’s fear of the “tyranny of the majority”); MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra 
note 3, at 157 (“These attacks upon property rights were, in the eyes of many, symptomatic of the 
excesses that were inherent in democracy.  For most persons who so believed, that judgment repre-
sented a rethinking of attitudes that they had held earlier—specifically, the tendency, shared by most 
Americans who embraced the revolutionary cause, to confuse popular power with popular liberty.”); 
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 120, at 41, 314–15, 332, 335; STOURZH, supra note 123, 
at 70–71, 80–81, 83 (same, attributing that view to Alexander Hamilton). Madison was particularly 
concerned with this prospect.  See SCOTT, supra note 15, at 44–45 (“An expanding population lim-
ited to a fixed amount of land inevitably would force Americans to turn to manufacturing.  This 
would necessitate the growth of cities populated by large numbers of unstable, dependent men. Alt-
hough he agreed with Jefferson that a redistribution of land would alleviate many of the immediate 
problems of declining landholding, Madison suggested that land redistribution could never include 
everyone, and that in the long run the United States could not count on land reform to spare it from 
the trauma of class conflict and aristocratic tyranny which Madison associated with European socie-
ty. . . .  A federal republic promised to solve for Madison the problems which declining landholding 
threatened—tyranny by the unpropertied masses over the propertied minority or the despotism of the 
propertied few over the mass of the unpropertied population.  Under a federal system the unproper-
tied would be divided into as many separate groups as there were states so that they would have little 
opportunity to form themselves into an effective majority. Even if the unpropertied succeeded in 
gaining control over any one state, their power to violate individuals’ rights and to deprive the 
wealthy of their possessions would be limited by a strengthened federal government which could en-
force limitations on the powers of state governments.  At the same time, argued Madison, the great 
diversity of economic interests (such as those of slaveowners, freehold farmers, merchants, financi-
ers) and the country’s geographical differences would prevent an elite from acting in concert to im-
pose its will on the unpropertied.”). 
258. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 154; see also Gold, supra 
note 192, at 223 (“Colonial and early state governments showed very limited respect for property 
rights. Professor McDonald estimated in 1976 that $100 million worth of property was taken without 
compensation during the Revolutionary Period. During that time, Loyalist property was taken, debts 
to British subjects were canceled, and worthless bills of credit were issued.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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The Framers approached that problem from a different direction than the 
states had used.  The Framers decided to limit the power of the new national 
government rather than guarantee specific protection for property.259  The 
Framers distributed the government’s powers among three branches; they 
enumerated those powers separately vested in Congress and the President; 
they split the Congress into a bicameral legislature; they required the Con-
gress and President to cooperate in order to pass a “law”; they limited the 
terms of office held by federal officials in the legislative and executive 
branches; they required periodic elections to hold those offices; and they cre-
ated federal courts to review the work of those branches.260  All of those steps, 
the Framers concluded, protected property by limiting the authority of the new 
national government in a federalist system to which the states were partners 
and by creating a system of checks and balances that would keep each branch 
from aggrandizing its power.261 
The Framers, however, did not stop there.  They included within the Con-
stitution numerous provisions that would directly protect private property 
rights by limiting the powers of the federal and state governments.  The 
Commerce Clause262 is the best-known protection.  It expressly empowers 
Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and, as the Supreme 
Court has construed it, it implicitly forbids the states from discriminating 
against or burdening interstate commerce.263  Among the other property-
protecting provisions are the Uniformity Clause,264 the Federal Coinage 
 
259. See ELY, supra note 7, at 47–48. 
260. U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III.  
261. See ELY, supra note 7, at 47; SCOTT, supra note 15, at 44 (“The only hope [to avoid class 
conflict] lay in organizing government in such a way that even in the absence of widespread land-
holding popular control could be retained without endangering personal liberty or property.  The time 
to act, Madison wrote Jefferson, ‘is at the first forming of the constitution and in the present state of 
population when the bulk of the people have a sufficient interest in possession or its prospect to be 
attached to the rights of property, without being insufficiently attached to the rights of persons.’”).  
There appears to have been widespread support for this goal.  See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE 
ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 15, 83 n.7 (1981); Richard A. Epstein, History Lean: The Reconcilia-
tion of Private Property and Representative Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 598 (1995) [here-
inafter Epstein, History Lean] (“[A]s Herbert Storing has pointed out, for all their differences both 
the Federalists and Antifederalists shared the belief that the protection of private property was at least 
one of the legitimate ends of government.”). 
262. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
263. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’l Quality of the State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 
99 (1994). 
264. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have the power to lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Wel-
fare of the United States; but all [Taxes,] Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout 
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Clause,265 the Direct Tax Clause,266 the Export Tax Clause,267 the Port Prefer-
ence Clause,268 the State Coinage, Bills of Credit, and Paper Money Clause,269 
the Import-Export Clause,270 the Contracts Clause,271 and the Corruption of 
Blood Clause.272  Other provisions, such as the Bill of Attainder273 and Elec-
tions Clauses274 (at least in that day), implicitly accomplished the same result. 
 
the United States . . . .”). 
265. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (“Congress shall have power . . . [t]o coin Money, regu-
late the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin . . . .”). 
266. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless 
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”). 
267. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from 
any State.”). 
268. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (“No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of 
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or 
from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.”). 
269. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; 
[or] make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts . . . .”); cf. MCDONALD, 
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 271. 
270. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, 
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for exe-
cuting it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Im-
ports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be 
subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.”). 
271. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . .  Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”). 
272. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to declare the Pun-
ishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except 
during the Life of the Person attainted.”). 
273. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . . .”); cf. 
MAIER, OLD REVOLUTIONARIES, supra note 199. 
274. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each 
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature.”); id. amend. XVII (adopting the same criterion for the election of Senators); Arizona v. 
Inter Tribal Council of Arizona Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257–59 (2013) (noting that while Congress 
has the power to fix the “time, place, and manner” of federal elections, the states have the authority 
to define the qualifications to vote for federal office).  That allocation of authority is important be-
cause the colonies required property holding as a qualification for voting.  See, e.g., Harper v. Virgin-
ia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Property qualifications and 
poll taxes have been a traditional part of our political structure. In the Colonies the franchise was 
generally a restricted one. . . .  Most of the early Colonies had [property qualifications for voting]; 
many of the States have had them during much of their histories . . . .”) (footnotes omitted); ADAMS, 
supra note 127, at 195–96, 315–31 (discussing and listing property qualifications for the suffrage); 
BROWN, CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 228, at 62–66 (state-by-state discussion of property quali-
fications for suffrage or holding office); FARRAND II, supra note 257, at 203 (James Madison) (“In 
several of the States a freehold was now the qualification [to vote].  Viewing the subject in its merits 
alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty.”). Prop-
erty qualifications were defended on several grounds, such as ensuring independence of mind and 
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Together, those provisions manifest a deep commitment to the protection of 
private property rights.275 
The proposed Constitution, however, contained only a few of the rights 
that the new Americans had enjoyed as Colonists, such as the right to a jury 
trial and protections against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.276  The 
Anti-Federalists seized on those omissions to oppose ratification, and their ab-
sence troubled participants in the state ratifying debates.277  State constitutions 
adopted since 1776 strongly protected the right of property,278 and the lack of 
any comparable specific protection in the proposed federal Constitution trou-
bled some participants in the state ratifying conventions.  The Virginia ratify-
ing convention, as an example, proposed amendments to the Constitution to 
protect various historic guarantees of English liberty, one of which was a ver-
sion of what became the protection for “life, liberty, and property” found in 
the Due Process Clause.279 
 
commitment to the community.  See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 127, at 207–15; BROWN, CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS, supra note 228, at 54 (noting that most adult male colonials owned property and could 
vote); FARRAND II, supra note 257, at 203 (James Madison) (“Whether the Constitutional qualifica-
tion ought to be a freehold, would with him depend much on the probable reception such a change 
would meet with in States where the right was now exercised by every description of people. In sev-
eral of the States a freehold was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the 
freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty.”). 
275. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 268–70; POLE, supra note 
110, at 87 (“I think we can regard the Constitution as a defensive instrument of government, embody-
ing the protective concept of property that was felt to be under such dangerous attack by legislative 
majorities.”). 
276. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (the federal Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses); 
id. § 10, cl. 1 (the state Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (the Jury 
Trial Clause). 
277. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 285.  The Anti-Federalists 
believed that a bill of rights was necessary to prevent Congress from eliminating state-law rights un-
der the combined effect of the Necessary-and-Proper and Supremacy Clauses.  See RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 120, at 323.  That omission, however, may not have troubled Mad-
ison.  Based on his experience seeing a decade of state legislation, he believed that bills of rights 
were merely “parchment barriers.”  Id. at 316.  The Framers also saw the Bill of Rights as being 
more a reservation of natural rights than a guarantee of civil rights and therefore as less necessary in 
1787 than in 1776.  Id. at 317. 
278. See ADAMS, supra note 127, at 192 (“The first state constitutions thus clearly emphasized 
the individual’s claim to legal protection of his property.  The self-imposed limits on sovereign pow-
er that the constitutions articulated derived from a desire to guarantee not only freedom of expression 
and of religious exercise but also the freedom to acquire property.”); MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE 
REPUBLIC, supra note 12, at 90; see ZUCKERT, supra note 7, at 275–76 (early state constitutions gave 
a prominent place to protection of natural rights). 
279. Additions Proposed by the Virginia Convention: A Proposed Bill of Rights (June 27, 
1788), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
DEBATES 220 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (“9th.  That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or 
disseized of his freehold, liberties, privileges, or franchises, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner 
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The Framers’ response to that concern was that such a list was both un-
necessary and hazardous.  Unnecessary, because the Constitution authorized 
the new government to exercise only certain specified powers to prevent the 
national government from interfering with the liberties won by the Colonists 
in battle.280  Hazardous, because no such list could be exhaustive, and the 
omission of any right could be read as a rejection of its importance.281  Inter-
estingly, Madison did not believe that the express limitation on the federal 
government’s powers or the inclusion of a list of rights would adequately 
safeguard property.282  His experience observing a decade of state legislation 
 
destroyed or deprived of his . . . property, but by the law of the land.”). First on the list was a declara-
tion that would have affirmed “[t]hat there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a 
social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity[,]” rights that included “the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property . . . .”).  
280. See BROWN, CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 228, at 108 (“That the Constitution did not 
confer on Congress the power to make direct attacks on property is not to be wondered at. . . .  Given 
the America of 1787, in which most men owned property, the reverse would have been the more 
astonishing.  A constitution which permitted an attack on property would not have received a hearing 
in a country that had fought a revolution for the preservation of life, liberty, and property.  One of the 
colonists’ chief complaints against Britain had been that the British, on whom the colonists had no 
check, were endangering the property rights of colonists.  The opponents of the Constitution were not 
opposed to the protection of property rights.  After all, were not the Anti-Federalists responsible for 
the adoption of the first ten amendments, and did not Articles [sic: Amendments] IV, V, and VII pro-
vide for additional protection of property rights which these federalists did not think the Constitution 
provided?”). 
281. See BROWN, CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 228, at 107–08; see RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS, supra note 120, at 315. 
282. “When rights of property were at stake, Madison feared, neither the enumeration nor the 
denial of specific legislative powers would provide adequate safeguards.  In this sense his solution to 
the problem of religion—denying government any authority to legislate—could never wholly apply 
to economic regulation and public finance.  His clearest statement on this point appears in Federalist 
10.  He closed his famous passage explaining how the forms of property divided society into differ-
ent ‘interests’ by noting that ‘The regulation of these various and differing interests form the princi-
pal task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordi-
nary operations of Government.’  But then he denied that acts of economic regulation were solely 
legislative in character.  ‘What are so many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many 
judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights 
of large bodies of citizens; and what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties 
to the causes they determine?’  The examples of regulation that Madison cited reveal that he regarded 
all decisions of economic policy as implicating questions of justice and thus of private rights: laws 
relating to debtors and creditors, to the protection of foreign manufactures and the restriction of for-
eign goods, to the apportionment of taxes.  Economic rights thus differed from rights of conscience 
in a fundamental sense.  While government could safely abstain from religious matters, it could never 
avoid regulating the ‘various and interfering interests’ of a modern society; and any legislative deci-
sion would necessarily affect the rights of one class of property holders or another.  Nor was this a 
mere speculative danger.  For by 1787 a decade of state legislation enabled Madison to perceive how 
economic and financial issues could force broad coalitions across society, which could actively ma-
nipulate the legislature to secure their desired ends.”  RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 
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under the Articles of Confederation had persuaded him that no legal or politi-
cal restraints could defeat a legislature bent on expanding its powers.283  
Nonetheless, after a sufficient number of states had ratified the Constitution 
and the First Congress had been convened, Madison drafted, and both houses 
of Congress approved, the series of amendments today known as the Bill of 
Rights.284  The Bill of Rights added three additional safeguards for property, 
the Third Amendment ban on the quartering of soldiers in homes during 
peacetime285 and the Fifth Amendment Due Process286 and Takings Claus-
es.287 
 
120, at 314–15 (footnote omitted). 
283. “This strikingly modern perception of what legislatures could do reflected not only dis-
content with the sheer busyness of American lawmaking but a recognition of ‘the impossibility of 
dividing powers of legislation, in such a manner, as to be free from different constructions, by differ-
ent interests, or even from ambiguity in the judgment of the impartial.’  In the realm of economic 
legislation, the interests to be regulated were so complex, the ends and means of legislation so inter-
twined, that no simple formula could defeat the ‘infinitude of legislative expedient’ that artful law-
makers could always deploy.  By its very nature, legislative power was too supple and plastic to be 
neatly confined.  Moreover, the legislature possessed other advantages than the plasticity of its pow-
er.  Its superiority was political as well as legal, a function of its greater intimacy with, and influence 
over, its constituents.”  Id. at 315 (footnote omitted). 
284. Neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights addressed in much detail the federal gov-
ernment’s authority to engage in what today is known as land use regulation.  The Constitution gave 
the federal government authority to govern what is now known as the District of Columbia.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (the Seat of Government Clause) (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o 
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles 
square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of 
the Government of the United States . . . .”).  Otherwise, the Constitution did not empower the na-
tional government to seize or regulate the use of land. Perhaps, the Framers assumed that the federal 
government would govern whatever land ceded by England to the victorious Colonies after the Revo-
lution that was not within the original thirteen states and would purchase whatever other land within 
a colony that it needed.  See id. (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to exercise like Authority over 
all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the 
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .”); id. art. IV, § 
3, cls. 1 & 2 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union[.] . . .  The Congress 
shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory 
or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .”).  The Takings Clause did make sure that the 
new federal government could not take property from its owners unless they were paid “just compen-
sation” and the property was put to a “public use,” however strict or loose a reading that term might 
receive.  See id. amend. V.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has effectively read the Public Use 
Clause out of the Constitution.  See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 77; SOMIN, supra note 53. 
285. See U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”). 
286. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). 
287. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”); EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 77, at 29 (“It is very clear that the founders 
shared Locke’s and Blackstone’s affection for private property, which is why they inserted the emi-
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Those amendments did not limit the states’ power to regulate property be-
cause they applied only to the federal government.288  Although the Framers 
had been concerned with state-law threats to property, and the Constitution 
did contain some provisions safeguarding it, as noted above, the Framers 
largely left to the states the responsibility of protecting property rights against 
state action.289  The Framers could interfere with the states’ lawmaking power 
only so much, and state law did offer some protections for property.  Besides, 
eighteenth century state constitutions protected property rights;290 the states 
could establish the qualifications to hold state office;291 and they could define 
the qualifications to vote in state (or federal292) elections, which often includ-
ed property ownership.293  The Framers may have stopped short of protecting 
 
nent domain provision in the Bill of Rights.”). 
288. See ELY, supra note 7. 
289. Id. at 47–48. 
290. See Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795) (Patterson, J.) (“[I]t 
is evident . . . that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of 
the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man.  . . .  The preservation of property then is a pri-
mary object of the social compact, and, by the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a funda-
mental law.”); Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 5, 6–7 (2012) (quoting property rights protections in late 18th century constitutions in 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Vermont). 
291. The Constitution defines the criteria to hold federal, not state, office.  See, e.g., U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (ruling that the Constitution establishes the exclusive 
requirements to hold office as a Representative, a Senator, or a President). 
292. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257–59 (2013) (not-
ing that while Congress has the power to fix the “time, place, and manner” of federal elections, the 
states have the authority to define the qualifications to vote for federal office).   
293. Property qualifications to vote for members of Parliament had long existed in England, 
and they were widespread throughout the Colonies.  See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, 
supra note 3, at 153.  In 1787, 97 percent of the Colonists lived outside cities, and most of them 
owned land.  See BROWN, CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 228, at 54, 67.  “There had been no sig-
nificant opposition to property qualifications in the colonies before 1776.  If they were not imposed 
in the form of instructions to the governors, the colonial assemblies had adopted ones of their own 
accord.”  ADAMS, supra note 127, at 195.  Vermont later allowed every adult male to vote; else-
where, property qualifications for voting were taken for granted.  Id. at 197.  Scholars disagree about 
the extent to which property qualifications limited the number of voters and therefore could have pro-
tected property rights.  Compare, e.g., ROBERT E. BROWN, MIDDLE-CLASS DEMOCRACY AND THE 
REVOLUTION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1691–1780 (1955) (concluding that Massachusetts was a pre-
dominantly middle-class society, that most men owned property, and that most men could vote); 
MORGAN, BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 12, at 8 (noting that the widespread ownership of 
property gave Americans economic and political independence because property ownership was a 
requirement to vote or hold office); ADAMS, supra note 127, at 195 (noting estimates of one-quarter 
to one-half of adult males excluded from suffrage).  Nonetheless, the Framers did not adopt a proper-
ty qualification in the Constitution.  The Framers did not oppose a standard in principle, but they 
could not agree on one, given differences among the states.  Plus, the Framers knew that some states 
allowed non-property holders to vote and that the residents in those states would not want to lose the 
suffrage.  See BROWN, CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 228, at 39, 102–06; SCOTT, supra note 15, at 
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property rights against state invasion because they believed that they were 
leaving property in relatively good hands, because they decided that they 
could go no further, or for some other reason.294  Whatever the reason may 
have been, the Framers believed that they had protected property rights from 
expropriation or dilution by the new national government. 
C. The Role of History 
There are two questions that should be considered at this point.  The first 
is to what extent the historical sources discussed above can be said to accu-
rately describe the status that property enjoyed in the minds of the Framers.  
In her recently published book Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitutional 
Convention,295 Professor Mary Sarah Bilder argues that one of the principal 
sources for the Framers’ understanding of the meaning of the Constitution, 
Madison’s Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, does not reli-
ably describe the content of that discussion.296  Madison took notes as the 
Framers thrashed out the Constitution and revised them later in his life, but 
Madison’s Notes was not published until four years after his death, 1840, 
when there were no other surviving members of the Convention.297  After fo-
rensically analyzing Madison’s Notes, Professor Bilder concludes that he ma-
terially revised at least some of the discussion, including his own comments, 
to bring his views into line with those of Thomas Jefferson—the nation’s third 
President and Madison’s personal confidant, who was in Paris during the 
Convention as the American representative to France—regarding the need for 
a strong chief executive.298  Madison also hoped to alter the record and to ap-
pear to have been on the right side of history when the nation finally ended 
slavery.299  If Professor Bilder is correct, Madison’s Notes may no longer be 
able to serve as an accurate recount of what the Convention’s members said 
and did in Philadelphia that summer.  The consequence would be not only to 
weaken the authoritative effect that courts should attribute to Madison’s Notes 
for constitutional law purposes, but also to raise some doubts about the weight 
that should be given to other accounts of what other members of the Framers’ 
 
47–48. 
294. Such as the inability to eliminate slavery without dissuading the Southern states from en-
dorsing the Constitution.  See ELY, supra note 7, at 47–51. 
295. MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (2015) [hereinafter BILDER].  
296. Id. at 1–2. 
297. Id. at 1–4. 
298. Id. at 3–4. 
299. Id. at 188–89. 
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generation said. 
The second question is whether contemporary historians have overstated 
the value that the Founding generation placed on private property.300  Political 
considerations can lead an elected official to “fudge” the likely adverse effect 
of a proposed law to see to its passage.301  That is but one of the reasons why 
it always is difficult to divine the intent of any collegial body even when a re-
porter accurately transcribes the discussion.302  Different decisionmakers may 
 
300. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 17 (2005) (“Alt-
hough some modern readers have tried to stress property protection rather than popular sovereignty 
as the Constitution’s bedrock idea, the words ‘private property’ did not appear in the Preamble, or 
anywhere in the document for that matter.  The word ‘property’ surfaced only once, and this in an 
Article IV clause referring to government property.  Above and beyond the Constitution’s plain text, 
its clear commitment to people over property shone through in its direct act:  As we have seen, the 
Founders generally set aside ordinary property qualifications in administering the special elections 
for ratification-convention delegates.”).   
301. See, e.g., Paul F. Larkin, Jr., Essay: Philemon, Marbury, and the Passive-Aggressive As-
sertion of Legal Authority, 29 BYU J. PUB. L. 241, 260–62 (2014) (“Consider the repeated statements 
that President Obama made before and after passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act that the law would cause no one to lose insurance coverage. . . .  Yet, as insured parties began to 
lose their health care plans in 2012 and 2013, it became undeniable that the President’s assurances, to 
be polite, were fibs.  The public likely shares that conclusion, even if most people believe that it is an 
impolitic point to make out loud.  In fact, after dissembling at first even President Obama eventually 
admitted—in what was surely the understatement of 2013—that Obamacare has not worked out pre-
cisely in the manner that he repeatedly assured the public it would.  In President Obama’s own 
words, ‘[t]here is no doubt that the way I put that forward unequivocally ended up not being accu-
rate.’ The response from most of the public likely was, ‘Tell me something I don’t know.’”) (foot-
notes omitted). 
302. The best summary why this inquiry is a hazardous one can be seen in Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing): 
[T]he difficulty of knowing what vitiating purpose one is looking for is as noth-
ing compared with the difficulty of knowing how or where to find it.  For while 
it is possible to discern the objective “purpose” of a statute (i.e., the public good 
at which its provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal motivation for 
a statute where that is explicitly set forth (as it was, to no avail, here), discerning 
the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost 
always an impossible task.  The number of possible motivations, to begin with, 
is not binary, or indeed even finite. In the present case, for example, a particular 
legislator need not have voted for the Act either because he wanted to foster re-
ligion or because he wanted to improve education. He may have thought the bill 
would provide jobs for his district, or may have wanted to make amends with a 
faction of his party he had alienated on another vote, or he may have been a 
close friend of the bill’s sponsor, or he may have been repaying a favor he owed 
the majority leader, or he may have hoped the Governor would appreciate his 
vote and make a fundraising appearance for him, or he may have been pressured 
to vote for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor or by a flood of constituent 
mail, or he may have been seeking favorable publicity, or he may have been re-
luctant to hurt the feelings of a loyal staff member who worked on the bill, or he 
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have different interests, motives, and designs, not all of which they may ex-
press, some of which can change over time, perhaps considerably, possibly in 
response to the publicly or privately expressed views of colleagues or constit-
uents.303  Those interpretive difficulties do not disappear even if a deliberative 
body endorses a formal document, such as a constitution or judicial opinion, 
as its statement of shared conclusions.304  Numerous parties may contribute to 
 
may have been settling an old score with a legislator who opposed the bill, or he 
may have been mad at his wife who opposed the bill, or he may have been in-
toxicated and utterly unmotivated when the vote was called, or he may have ac-
cidentally voted “yes” instead of “no,” or, of course, he may have had (and very 
likely did have) a combination of some of the above and many other motiva-
tions. To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look 
for something that does not exist. 
Putting that problem aside, however, where ought we to look for the indi-
vidual legislator’s purpose?  We cannot of course assume that every member 
present (if, as is unlikely, we know who or even how many they were) agreed 
with the motivation expressed in a particular legislator’s pre-enactment floor or 
committee statement.  Quite obviously, “[w]hat motivates one legislator to 
make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others 
to enact it.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968).  Can we as-
sume, then, that they all agree with the motivation expressed in the staff-
prepared committee reports they might have read—even though we are unwill-
ing to assume that they agreed with the motivation expressed in the very statute 
that they voted for?  Should we consider postenactment floor statements?  Or 
postenactment testimony from legislators, obtained expressly for the lawsuit?  
Should we consider media reports on the realities of the legislative bargaining?  
All of these sources, of course, are eminently manipulable. Legislative histories 
can be contrived and sanitized, favorable media coverage orchestrated, and 
postenactment recollections conveniently distorted.  Perhaps most valuable of 
all would be more objective indications—for example, evidence regarding the 
individual legislators’ religious affiliations.  And if that, why not evidence re-
garding the fervor or tepidity of their beliefs?” 
303. Consider what Professor McDonald had to say about the delegates to the Convention of 
1787.  After surveying the principles and interests of the delegates before they arrived in Philadelph-
ia, he concluded, with respect to their avowed purposes on arrival, that “it is meaningless to say that 
the Framers intended this or that the Framers intended that: their positions were diverse and, in many 
particulars, incompatible.  Some had firm, well-rounded plans, some had strong convictions on only 
a few points, some had self-contradictory ideas, some were guided only by vague ideals.  Some of 
their differences were subject to compromise; others were not.”  MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO 
SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 224.   
304. Consider again Professor McDonald’s comments on the Convention of 1787: “Drafting 
the Constitution, as Madison wrote long afterward, was ‘the work of many heads and many hands.’  
Some delegates, to be sure, were more active and influential than others, and some were engaged in 
artful backstage manipulations; but no delegate or coalition of like-minded delegates was able to 
dominate the convention except for brief periods and on specific issues.  The diversity of interests 
and points of view among the delegates made for alignments that shifted with circumstances and ne-
cessitated repeated compromises.”  MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 225 
(footnote omitted). 
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the drafting of a written decision,305 and factors such as the order in which de-
cisions are made or shifts in voting coalitions may disguise the views of a ma-
jority of decisionmakers.306 
Then, there is the problem of attempting to divine the intent of a body that 
deliberated more than two centuries ago.  Historians have concluded that the 
Framers attributed a value to property that varies considerably from the one 
lawyers are familiar with today.  The contemporary legal culture does not 
treat property with the same respect afforded liberty; far from it.  Nor does it 
see the two concepts as interrelated, let alone so enmeshed that each one is 
necessary for the enjoyment of the other.  Twenty-first century constitutional 
law also does not deem the concept of property as a repository of legal rights 
beyond freedom from unjust imprisonment.  Supreme Court case law treats a 
discrete and limited number of interests—land, personalty, currency, patents, 
copyrights, trade secrets, and perhaps a few other comparable matters—as 
property.307  The remaining protected interests are treated as aspects of liber-
ty.308  The change between what is said to have been the view of the founding 
generation toward property and what is today’s generation’s view of property 
is quite stark, so divergent that is possible that contemporary historians (or 
 
305. An example is the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  The 
Court heard oral argument on November 10, 1975, and delivered an unsigned 100-plus-page per cu-
riam majority decision on January 30, 1976, with five justices also issuing separate opinions.  The 
Buckley opinion was a team effort. 
306. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (3d ed. 2012); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).  The classic ex-
ample could be the Supreme Court’s decision in Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 
U.S. 582 (1949).  Tidewater Transfer involved the constitutionality of an act of Congress authorizing 
district courts to adjudicate disputes between residents of the District of Columbia and citizens of a 
state under the diversity jurisdiction of Article III.  Three justices concluded that the District of Co-
lumbia is not a “State” for Article III purposes, so federal courts lack diversity jurisdiction over law-
suits brought by or against District of Columbia residents, but Congress may, pursuant to Article I, 
grant Article III courts some jurisdiction not authorized by that provision.  Id. at 583–604 (plurality 
opinion of Jackson, J.).  Two justices disagreed with the plurality on both points, concluding that 
Congress cannot add to Article III jurisdiction by relying on Article I, but District residents are resi-
dents of a “State” for Article III purposes.  Id. at 604–26 (Rutledge & Murphy, JJ., concurring in the 
judgment).  Four justices concluded that the plurality and concurring opinions were each half-right.  
In their view, District residents are not citizens of a “State” for purposes of Article III jurisdiction, 
and Congress cannot add to the jurisdiction of Article III courts.  Id. at 626–46 (Vinson, C.J., & 
Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 646–55 (Frankfurter & Reed, JJ., dissenting).  The result was that, ac-
cording to separate majorities of the Court, District residents are not citizens of a state for purposes 
of diversity jurisdiction, and, because Congress cannot add to Article III jurisdiction, Congress can-
not direct the federal courts to treat District residents as if they are state residents, but Article III 
courts can adjudicate disputes between residents of the District and a state.   
307. Supra notes 24 and 26 and accompanying text. 
308. Id.  
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contemporary lawyers reviewing their work product309) are mistaken.310 
Those questions are daunting.  Most lawyers are not trained historians, 
and any lawyer discussing the history of any era risks missing nuances that a 
historian could see or overestimating the importance that a particular event (or 
train of events), debate, or doctrine had on the development of the law.311  In 
fact, even professional historians disagree amongst themselves over the mean-
ing of events and concepts.312  Accordingly, lawyers should tread lightly when 
they act as amateur historians. 
Yet, in this case there is good reason to be confident that American histo-
rians have accurately captured the opinions of the founding generation regard-
ing property.  To start with, Professor Bilder does not say that Madison fabri-
cated or revised his views on property, which is the focus of this Article.313  
 
309. There is, of course, the question whether I have misconstrued what historians said about 
the value of property during that period.  That question is for the reader to decide. 
310. A related question is whether historians have understated the depth of the founding gener-
ation’s veneration for property.  That is, was the Framers’ principal (if not exclusive) motivation for 
adopting the Constitution the protection of private property?  Early in the twentieth century Charles 
Beard made just that argument.  In 1912, Beard famously argued that the Framers were principally 
motivated by economic self-interest and that their primary goal in creating the new republic was to 
safeguard the wealth of the landed, mercantile, and manufacturing classes by creating a republic that 
protected their property interests, particularly personalty, against encroachment by others.  See 
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 65–71, 161, 168 (Do-
ver ed. 2004) (1913).  That controversial theory has attracted numerous then-contemporary and mod-
ern-day defenders and adversaries.  See, e.g., BROWN, CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 228; Robert 
E. Brown, The Beard Thesis Attacked: A Political Approach, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 88 (Leonard Levy ed., 1969) [hereinafter LEVY, ESSAYS]; Forrest McDonald, The 
Beard Thesis Attacked, II: A Political-Economic Approach, in LEVY, ESSAYS, supra, at 113; Jackson 
T. Main, The Beard Thesis Defended, in LEVY, ESSAYS, supra, at 144; FORREST MCDONALD, WE 
THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1992); ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO 
FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: A NEW ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION (2003).  Supporters described his thesis as “authoritative and scholarly.”  BROWN, 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 228, at 8 (referring to Henry Steele Commager and Samuel Eliot 
Morrison).  Critics (at least the more colorful ones) described his book as “inspired either by Marx 
or, by inference, the Devil.”  Id. at 8 (referring to former President and Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft and Edward S. Corwin).  Whoever Beard’s muse may have been, An Economic Interpretation of 
the Constitution of the United States does not pose a problem today.  As explained in the text, no one 
denies that the protection of property was at least one of the Framers’ concerns.  
311. See ELY, supra note 60, at 56 (“Now I know lawyers are a cocky lot: the fact that our pro-
fession brings us into contact with many disciplines often generates the delusion that we have mas-
tered them all.”); Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 525 (1995) (“[C]onstitutional discourse is replete with historical assertions that 
are at best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers.”).   
312. See, e.g., BAILYN, FACES OF REVOLUTION, supra note 125, at 188–89. 
313. The principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus need not apply here.  Madison may have 
reworked his comments regarding slavery to improve his standing throughout history, but neither he 
nor anyone else at the time envisioned that history would eventually treat property on a par with hu-
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Also, esteemed scholars of early American history—Bernard Bailyn, James 
Ely, Jack Greene, Forrest McDonald, Edmund Morgan, Jennifer Nedelsky, 
and Jack Rakove among others—have all concluded that the Founding gen-
eration believed that private property was indispensable to a free republic.314  
None of them relied exclusively or primarily on Madison’s Notes.  In fact, 
Locke strongly believed that the purpose of government was to protect the 
life, liberty, and property of the citizenry, and he wrote his treatise a century 
before Madison took or revised his Notes on the debates in the Convention of 
1787.315  Trenchard and Gordon argued in Cato’s Letters, also published be-
fore the Convention of 1787, that property was important to the success of a 
government.316  Numerous Framers other than Madison—such as John Ad-
ams, John Dickinson, Alexander Hamilton, and Noah Webster—expressed the 
same view as Madison regarding the importance of property, as did Thomas 
Jefferson, who believed that individual landowners were the backbone to the 
health of the republic.317  A large number of different historical figures in 
American legal history therefore supports the conclusion that eighteenth-
century Americans believed in the instrumental and inherent importance of 
property.318 
As for the question whether American historians have overestimated the 
Framers’ views: We can safely leave that debate to historians.  Scholars are 
unanimous that the English emigrated to America at least in part to obtain 
land to become economically independent, that the majority of them obtained 
and lived off their own land, and that the preservation of their local political 
systems and the way of life that had grown up under them was a cause of the 
decision to become independent from England.  It is not necessary to accept 
or reject the thesis that protection of private property was the sole concern of 
the Framers to conclude that it was at least one of the Framers’ goals.319  The 
 
man chattel slavery. See BILDER, supra note 295, at 2. 
314. There is a disagreement among scholars whether the Framers believed in natural rights or 
rights guaranteed by the unwritten English constitution.  See ZUCKERT, supra note 7, at 276–77 (de-
scribing the disagreement).  For the purposes of this Article, that difference does not matter. 
315. LOCKE, supra note 98, at vii (Introduction by J.W. Hough). 
316. Trenchard, supra note 316, at 245 
317. See ELY, supra note 7, at 29. 
318. That history also gives the Framers’ concern for property a far longer and more distin-
guished pedigree than enjoyed by any of the sexual privacy interests that the Court has sheltered 
since the 1960s. 
319. As one of Beard’s critics put it:  “[I]t seems clear that whatever future research does to 
clarify the issues surrounding the Constitution and its ratification, we cannot assume, as we have in 
the past, that the Constitution was adopted undemocratically in an undemocratic society and that it 
was put over on the people as a sort of coup d’état or conspiracy by holders of personal property.  
For good or bad, America in 1787 was a country in which most men were middle-class property 
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historians noted above prove that point, and that is all that is necessary.  Their 
work demonstrates that the Framers believed that every man had a natural 
right to property, that protecting property was critical to nourish the type of 
political society they sought to adopt in America, and that this protection 
should be enshrined in the new republic’s charter.320 
We may not always or often be able to know how the Framers would have 
resolved an issue that could not have arisen in their lifetimes.  (Would Madi-
son have thought that reading the contents of a cell phone was a “search”?)  
But we may be able to narrow down the range of permissible answers by con-
sidering how they resolved the questions before them or how much weight 
they gave to competing values.  That is possible here.  Whatever may be true 
in other instances, the then-contemporary treatises, pamphlets, debates, dis-
cussions, and the like concerning property are not “almost as enigmatic as the 
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.”321  The available ev-
idence reveals a consistent belief in the importance of property for economic 
and political independence. 
IV. THE STATUS OF PROPERTY UNDER AMERICAN GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE 
FOR REGULATION 
We are not yet done.  One more critical question remains.  Did the Fram-
ers’ generation deem the natural right to property as absolute, as always and 
everywhere trumping the government’s authority to regulate individuals, their 
land, and their businesses for the good of society?  Between 1750 and the 
1770s, the French “physiocrats,” the first group to label themselves “econo-
mists,” coined the term laissez-faire and devised the theory that there were 
 
owners, especially the owners of real estate, and because they were property owners, they were also 
qualified voters.  Having fought the Revolution to preserve a society based on the natural rights of 
life, liberty, and property, it is not at all surprising that they would adopt a Constitution which pro-
vided for the protection of property.  In fact, had the people suspected that the Constitution would not 
protect property, I doubt that it would have had the slightest chance of adoption.  And certain it is 
that if the common people had opposed, there would have been no Constitution.”  Robert E. Brown, 
The Beard Thesis Attacked: A Political Approach, in LEVY, ESSAYS, supra note 310, at 88, 112; see 
also BROWN, CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 228, at 198 (“Naturally the delegates [to the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787] recognized that the protection of property was important under govern-
ment, but they also recognized that personal rights were equally important.  In fact, persons and 
property were usually bracketed together as the chief objects of government protection.”).   
320. See ADAMS, supra note 127, at 191; BROWN, CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 228, at 111 
(“To say that the Constitution was designed in part to protect property is true; to say that it was de-
signed only to protect property is false; and to say that it was designed only to protect personalty is 
preposterous.”). 
321. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J. concur-
ring in the judgment). 
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natural economic laws that, if followed, would increase the productive capaci-
ty and wealth of any society.322  That theory influenced the work of Bernard 
Mandeville in The Fable of the Bees,323 which greatly influenced Adam 
Smith’s 1776 magnum opus An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations,324 which, in turn, was influential in some quarters in the 
early days of the new republic.325 
The question therefore is this: Did the Framers value property so highly 
that they foresaw no circumstances in which representative government could 
restrain or regulate its use for the public benefit?  The Framers’ rhetoric 
would suggest that the value that they attributed to property would have out-
weighed any benefit that could be accomplished by legislation, rendering 
property virtually untouchable by the democratic process.326  If so, we could 
expect to find proof of that attitude in the absence in the eighteenth century 
code books of colonial, state, or local regulation of land, its fruits, or com-
merce.  It turns out, however, that there was “a gap between political rhetoric 
and institutional practice.”327  History, as seen in the practice of government, 
does not manifest an unquestioning adherence to laissez-faire capitalism.328  
The practical and political demands of governance, bolstered by the general 
historical acceptance of English mercantilism and the theoretical support of 
jurists like Blackstone, gave rise to widespread local, albeit shallow, forms of 
regulation of property in the public interest.329  As explained below, the an-
 
322. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 106–07. 
323. BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK 
BENEFITS (Phillip Harth ed., Penguin Books 1989) (1714). 
324. SMITH, supra note 112. 
325. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 128 (“[Adam] Smith, who 
had already established a great reputation with his Theory of Moral Sentiments, created a sensation 
with the Wealth of Nations.  Most public men in America acquired at least a passing acquaintance 
with the work, almost all praised it, and many gave it thorough study.  Hamilton worked arguments 
derived from it into several of his public papers.  Madison was said to have quoted from it almost 
unconsciously, without attribution, in his speeches, and some in his audiences recognized the 
words.”) (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., id. at 108–09, 123–25, 128–31.  At the same time, it is 
unlikely that Smith’s Wealth of Nations was widely available in early America.  The book was pub-
lished in England in 1776, but was not published in the United States until 1789. FRANK BOURGIN, 
THE GREAT CHALLENGE: THE MYTH OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 23–24, 37 (1989) 
[hereinafter BOURGIN, GREAT CHALLENGE]. 
326. Schultz, supra note 62, at 476–77 (“Clearly there were many early Americans who de-
scribed property as the end of society, as absolute, as linked to important political rights, or as natu-
ral.  Conversely, threats to property were considered destructive to freedom and republican govern-
ment.”) (footnotes omitted). 
327. Id. at 491. 
328. BOURGIN, GREAT CHALLENGE, supra note 325, at 22–23.  
329. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40–45 (1989); 
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swer to the question phrased at the outset of this section quite clearly is “No.” 
Start with Locke’s natural rights theory.  The theory rests on a tradeoff be-
tween private and government protection of property rights.  The theory posits 
that each person has certain rights, some of which are alienable, some of 
which are not, to life, liberty, and property.330  In a theoretical state of nature, 
individuals are free to join together to create an independent state by agreeing 
to delegate certain rights to government because, through the combined power 
of each contracting member, the state can better protect everyone’s remaining 
rights than any one person could alone.331  No one may alienate certain rights, 
such as the right not to be subjected to slavery, but each party is free to trade 
others as he sees fit for his own betterment.  People therefore can exchange 
some of their property rights for the greater protection that the government 
can provide for the ones that remain.332 
Move to Blackstone, whose views were very influential.333  Blackstone 
believed that the purpose of government was not to protect property, but to 
 
Schultz, supra note 62, at 487–95.  Frank Bourgin argues that “[t]he kind of government the Found-
ing Fathers were trying to set up was the opposite of that obtaining under the Articles [of Confedera-
tion].  Congress under the Articles was synonymous with laissez-faire, with local popular sovereign-
ty, lackadaisical government lacking in energy.  Congress had no real powers, and for its purposes, 
needed none.  But the Constitution involved an altogether different conception: a close-knit Union, 
endowed with large comprehensive powers that its makers wanted to be used toward promoting na-
tional economic development.” BOURGIN, GREAT CHALLENGE, supra note 325, at 50. 
330. See ANDREWS, supra note 130, at 201–02 (“Whatever ‘the law of nature’ may mean to us 
to-day, to the thoughtful colonist of that period it certainly meant justice, equity, and good con-
science, or, as Hobbes puts it in the Leviathan, ‘every man’s natural liberty to use his power to his 
own advantage.’”) (citation omitted). 
331. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment: How Does 
Lockean Legal Theory Assist in Interpretation?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 1, 13–15 (2010). 
332. See SCOTT, supra note 15, at 29 (“Even as Locke insisted that the right of property derived 
from God, he always allowed that the liberty to exercise the right derived from social order—an or-
der established and determined by society.”); ZUCKERT, supra note 7, at 283 (“The securing of natu-
ral rights is altogether the end or purpose of legitimate government. . . .  The very fact of legitimate 
government proves that the various rights cannot be ‘absolutes.’  As Jefferson said in 1802, ‘Man . . . 
has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.’  The law can properly limit rights and can in-
trude into the basic sphere of immunities of the individual, but this may be done only when justified; 
as a provision of the American Constitution later stated, ‘no person may be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law.’  Law correctly limits rights not only on behalf of the specific 
rights of others but also in pursuit of ‘the public good.’”).  Moreover, the market does not deal well 
with problems like free riders and externalities, for example, so individuals may grant the state cer-
tain powers that they could otherwise exercise on their own to increase the likelihood that they will 
maximize their welfare at the lowest cost.  Some degree of state market governance is effective and 
efficient and therefore salutary. 
333. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 
69 (1904); Schultz, supra note 62, at 484. 
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address “the wants and fears of individuals,”334 a proposition that lends itself 
to democratic government.  Blackstone believed in Parliamentary supremacy, 
which legitimized the actions of republican government.  He believed in the 
importance of private property, but nonetheless saw it as subject to “the laws 
of the land,” which in his era, meant the common law of nuisance and the 
edicts of Parliament.335  “Blackstone’s influence would suggest a legalistic 
reading of property that would make it subject to numerous regulations and 
restrictions.”336 
History also supports that conclusion.  The English common law and Par-
liament both regulated the market.337  At common law, there were three of-
fenses against public trade: Forestalling, acquiring goods en route to the mar-
ket; regrating, buying large quantities of a good at market and reselling them 
at higher price in the same market; and engrossing, purchasing large quanti-
ties of foodstuffs for resale.338  The Crown granted monopolies to particular, 
favored parties and reserved land, including mineral rights, for the sover-
eign.339  England had price controls, usury laws, and sumptuary laws—viz., 
provisions forbidding certain types of immoral conduct, such as excessive 
spending, gambling, and prostitution.340  England also imposed the mercantile 
 
334. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *47. 
335. See Schultz, supra note 62, at 486 (“Blackstone’s Commentaries also had a tremendous 
influence in how American law depicted property.  Blackstone’s views on property were known to 
many Americans and were often cited.  Unlike Locke’s views which may not have had an immediate 
impact on property law, Blackstone’s were more direct and discernable.  Specifically, contra Locke, 
and despite the fact that at times Blackstone appears to be echoing him, Blackstone argued that the 
‘only true and natural foundations of society are the wants and fears of individuals,’ not the protec-
tion of property.  While property is noted as an absolute right of Englishman, this right is tempered 
by ‘the laws of the land.’  For Blackstone, property was subject to numerous regulations and volume 
II of the Commentaries noted in detail these restrictions on use and ownership. [¶] In sum, the lan-
guage of Blackstone was important to the legal discourse in America, especially in regards to proper-
ty. Blackstone’s influence would suggest a legalistic reading of property that would make it subject 
to numerous regulations and restrictions.  If Blackstone and the language of law were more important 
than Locke’s when it came to treating property as an institution, one would see property rights as far 
from absolute from 1776–1800.”) (footnotes omitted); Wood, supra note 82, at 248. 
336. Schultz, supra note 62, at 486; see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) (“When one 
becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an indi-
vidual not affected by his relations to others, he might retain.  ‘A body politic,’ as aptly defined in the 
preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, ‘is a social compact by which the whole people cove-
nants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain 
laws for the common good.’”).  
337. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 13–20. 
338. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *154–59; MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO 
SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 14 & n.8. 
339. MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 17–19. 
340. Id. at 14–16; LARKIN, supra note 7, at 18. 
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system on the Colonies to benefit the Mother Country.341  The seventeenth 
and eighteenth century economies in England could not be described as lais-
sez-faire. 
Anglo-American legal history accepted the regulation of property.342  The 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 established the constitutional principle of Par-
liamentary supremacy in England;343 England used that authority to regulate 
colonial trade; and, prior to 1763, the Colonists accepted Parliament’s sover-
eignty “with a reasonable [degree] of equanimity.”344  England regulated 
America’s macroeconomy through imposition of the mercantile system, and 
the Colonies did not object to English governance of international trade, even 
when it affected home grown products, until 1764, when Parliament began to 
impose direct taxes on items such as sugar and stamps.345  In fact, some colo-
nies, such as Maryland and Virginia, enacted their own export controls over 
staples, such as tobacco, to maintain their reputation for quality and to in-
 
341. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *108, *154–59; MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO 
SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 14 & n.8. 
342. See, e.g., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 at 398–99 (1856) (“However difficult it may 
be to define, with accuracy and precision, the line of separation, there is a broad and perfectly intelli-
gible distinction between what is plainly regulation on the one side, and what is plainly prohibition 
on the other. . . .  It is certain that the legislature cannot totally annihilate commerce in any species of 
property, and so condemn the property itself to extinction. It is equally certain that the legislature can 
regulate trade in property of all kinds. Neither of these propositions is denied; but they necessarily 
lead to another—that between regulation and destruction there is somewhere, however difficult to 
define with precision, a line of separation.”) (Opinion of Comstock, J.). 
343. See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 3, 43 (Cornell Univ. Press 1961) (1923); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwrit-
ten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 
856–57 (1978) (“The ideas of fundamental law, so dominant in 17th-century England, were subtly 
undermined in that country by the course of political history.  The events of the Cromwellian period, 
the Restoration and the Revolution of 1688, and finally the evolution of the system of ministerial 
government under the Hanoverian Kings, all tended to create a practical legal supremacy in Parlia-
ment.  Whig theory and practice made royal authority subordinate to Parliament, and Godden v. 
Hales [89 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1686)] in 1686 represented the court’s last imposition of a constitu-
tional limit on parliamentary authority in the name of the royal prerogative.  The constitution came to 
be seen less as a body of principles limiting governmental power, and more as a set of institutions 
headed by a Parliament that possessed ultimate authority to change customary arrangements by legis-
lation.”) (footnotes omitted).  There were dissenters to that view, including William Pitt, the greatest 
English statesman of the age, but they were in the minority.  Grey, supra at 857–59. 
344. ANDREWS, supra note 130, at 61. 
345. See id. at 7–9, 51–53, 61; ELY, supra note 7, at 18–19; EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. 
MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION (1995); PERKINS, supra note 12, at 
21 (English trade restrictions on the colonies played only a negligible role in American revolutionary 
sentiments).  Some did disagree with English control.  See Katz, supra note 164, at 476 (noting Jef-
ferson’s disagreement).  Some states imposed their own mercantile system after independence, but 
exempted the other states.  MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 18. 
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crease the price.346  Sometimes, they even embargoed foodstuffs to benefit lo-
cal consumers at the expense of local farmers.347  Some colonies even regulat-
ed or taxed intercolonial trade.348  Every state adopted some form of mercan-
tilism after winning independence.349 
Colonial and early state governments also adopted various different poli-
cies to regulate markets or promote specific business.350  “Regulation of busi-
 
346. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 40 (“Colonial government made a constant effort, not 
always effective, to keep its staple crops under some kind of quality control. . . .  Twentieth-century 
farm schemes were foreshadowed in old Maryland and Virginia: quality control, inspection laws, 
regulation of the size of containers, subsidies for planting preferred kinds of crop, public warehous-
ing, export controls.”); see also ELY, supra note 7, at 21; FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 40–41 (de-
scribing similar regulatory programs in Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania). 
347. ELY, supra note 7, at 21. 
348. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 18. 
349. POLE, supra note 110, at 77 (“[T]he early American state governments were as mercantil-
ist and as interventionist—in intention if not always in power—as the royal government they had 
overthrown.”).  For example, Massachusetts’ “mercantilistic program was a complex one, involving 
bounties on exports, protective duties on imports, inspection laws, and, above all, the promotion of 
manufactures through a combination of what might be styled state capitalism and a partnership be-
tween governmental and private economic endeavor. . . .  In New York, which produced a large 
quantity of wheat and flour as well as manufactured goods for export, the emphasis was placed upon 
the regulation and inspection of local commodities so as to maintain a reputation for quality products 
in international markets.”  MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 102–03; see also 
id. at 103–04 (discussing the inducements offered by legislatures in Virginia and Maryland to con-
struct a fleet for carrying tobacco to England). 
350. See, e.g., BOURGIN, GREAT CHALLENGE, supra note 325, at 90 (“[Alexander Hamilton] 
never believed in laissez-faire so far as the promotion of trade and industry [were] concerned.  His 
new official position [as Treasury Secretary] gave him an opportunity to make his views those of the 
Washington administration.”); HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 20, at 25 (“Until about the 1740s, the 
single most important function of the incorporated town was to provide ‘the commercial communi-
ty . . . the service of trade and industry.  It established and regulated the marketplace.”); id. at 41 (“To 
ensure the success of their markets, town officials oversaw the quality and price of goods and ser-
vices.”); SCOTT, supra note 15, at 11; Schultz, supra note 62, at 489 (“Bourgin, Schlesinger, and oth-
er historians have noted the extensive regulation of the economy and market that occurred not just in 
early 19th century America but even during the colonial and revolutionary era.  State regulation of 
the economy included the promotion of manufacturing, and the confiscation of property for numer-
ous public projects was common. Price fixing and as well as other forms of property regulation were 
important. Regulation of monopolies, dormant land, urban land, and other economic policies were 
also employed.  Hamilton’s creation of a national bank as well as advocacy to support and regulate 
commerce are other examples of federal efforts to subordinate individual property interests to secure 
the public good.”) (footnotes omitted); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the 
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 788–89 (1995) [hereinafter 
Treanor] (“Although colonies clearly limited the ways in which individuals could use property, no 
colonial charter mandated compensation when regulations affected the value of property. Further-
more, courts did not direct compensation for such regulations. Land use was subject to extensive reg-
ulations.  In colonial Virginia, for example, various statutes barred overplanting of tobacco and re-
quired the growing of crops other than tobacco.  Boston had zoning regulations governing the 
location of bakeries, slaughterhouses, stills, and tallowchandlers, and violators were subject to prose-
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ness was primitive by modern standards,” but “in some ways, it was fairly 
pervasive.”351  As Professor William Nelson has noted, “Colonial government 
regulated its subjects’ lives in pervasive detail; government in the Age of 
Mercantilism sought to insure not only the physical and economic, but the 
moral and social well-being of its subjects as well.”352  Reluctant to trust free 
markets, colonies supervised public markets and, for example, prohibited 
forestalling because it would have allowed wholesalers to evade public market 
regulation.353  Laws regulated the weight, quality, and price of bread and re-
quired bakers to brand their products for identification.354  The shortage of 
 
cution.  New York City and Charlestown enacted ordinances barring further operation of slaughter-
houses within city limits.  [¶] Colonial governments regulated not only land use, but also business 
operations and economic decisionmaking.  For example, fee schedules for ferries were imposed, 
peddlers had to obtain licenses and pay duties, and pork, beef, flour, tar, pitch, and turpentine were 
subject to inspection for compliance with statutory standards prior to sale or export.  Taverns were 
licensed, based on need and a determination of whether the tavern would impair public morals, and 
licensing fees were charged.  Bread prices were regulated.  Various colonies experimented with 
sumptuary legislation, restricting expenditures on clothing and jewelry.  Laws barred speculation in 
commodities, including such practices as forestalling (purchase of goods while in transit to the mar-
ket), engrossing (purchase of large quantities of commodities for resale), and regrating (purchase of 
goods in a market for resale in the same market).”) (footnotes omitted); Wood, supra note 82, at 253 
(“Not only did the state government of New York distribute its largesse to individual businessmen 
and groups in the form of bounties, subsidies, stock ownership, loans, corporate grants and fran-
chises, but it also assumed direct responsibility for some economic activities, including building the 
Erie Canal.”); id. (“Between 1780 and 1814, the Massachusetts legislature . . . enacted a multitude of 
laws regulating the marketing of a variety of products—everything from lumber, fish, tobacco, and 
shoes to bread, butter, nails, and firearms.”); see also, e.g., CARL BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN THE 
WILDERNESS: THE FIRST CENTURY OF URBAN LIFE IN AMERICA, 1625–1742 (1964); ELY, supra 
note 7, at 17–22; HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 20, at 25, 41–50; GEORGE L. HASKINS, LAW AND 
AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 66–84 (1960); MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, su-
pra note 3, at 14–21; 2 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE 
MIDDLE COLONIES AND THE CAROLINAS, 1660–1730, at 21–23, 56 (2013). 
351. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 38 (“The settlements depended on roads, ferries, bridges, 
and gristmills for transport, communication, and the basic food supply.  These businesses were pri-
vately owned; but the public had a deep interest in how they were run; and there were rules and regu-
lations that expressed colonial policy. . . .  Government also regulated markets, road building, and the 
quality of essential commodities.”). 
352. William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s Constitution-
al Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 903 (1978) [hereinafter Nelson, Eighteenth-Century]; see 
also, e.g., id. at 903 n.62 (“Nine of the thirteen colonies established state religions and all the colo-
nies prosecuted immorality in such varying forms as fornication, drunkenness, profanity, and dese-
cration of the Sabbath.”); Wood, supra note 82, at 253 (“The states never lost their inherited respon-
sibility for the safety, economy, morality, and health of their societies.”). 
353. ELY, supra note 7, at 20; FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 39 (“From England, the colonies 
copied laws about public markets.  These laws laid down rules about where and when key products 
could be sold.  A scattered market is difficult to control or to regulate.  When all sellers of wood, or 
hay, or grain meet at one place and time, regulation can be cheap and effective.”). 
354. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 39. 
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manual labor led assemblies to experiment with codes of labor and wage lim-
its.355  Usury laws fixed a ceiling for interest rates.356  The Colonies and states 
also regulated ferries, innkeepers, lawyers, leather merchants, peddlers, and 
anyone who did business with Indian tribes.357  Mills were seen as public utili-
ties, with the requirement that everyone be served at a fixed price.358  Locali-
ties licensed taverns, and county courts fixed the price for food, board, and 
drink, or barred alcohol altogether.359  Congestion in urban areas not only 
multiplied sanitation problems, but also posed special problems due to the risk 
of fires.  The result was building ordinances that required brick or stone for 
construction and prohibited straw roofs, wooden chimneys, and the storage of 
straw or gunpowder.360  The government could exercise its “police power”—
viz., originally, the state’s power “to enforce public and private rights against 
private infringement”; eventually, the general authority to regulate a person’s 
liberty and property in pursuit of communal betterment361—not only to pre-
vent common law nuisances,362 but also to further the public welfare, and 
 
355. Id. at 43 (“In the early days of colonial life, it was a common rule, both North and South, 
that every able-bodied man had a duty to work.”); id. at 42–49 (describing indentured servitude, 
slavery, and other economic regulatory efforts). 
356. MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 110; ELY, supra note 7, at 21. 
357. See, e.g., MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 18; FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 16, at 41, 125.  
358. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 18; FRIEDMAN, supra note 
16, at 38. 
359. See, e.g., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 409–23 (1856). 
360. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, at 83; see generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 127. 
361. JAMES L. HUFFMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION: STATE POWERS, 
PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC LIBERTIES 7 (2013); see William J. Novak, Common Regulation: 
Legal Origins of State Power in America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1074 n.39 (1994) (“The police 
power entailed the imposition of direct and explicit limitations on private behavior not found in taxa-
tion or land policies.  Furthermore, police restraints and compulsions operated on conventional and 
legitimate behavior rather than the ‘intrinsically vicious’ or evil acts regulated by criminal justice.”).  
The old and modern understandings of the police power are quite different.  Originally, it was seen as 
the state’s power to protect public and private rights in the public interest.  Today it has become the 
state’s power to redefine public and private rights in the public interest.  See HUFFMAN, supra, at 7–
9, 17–19, 116–17, 129–30; compare Novak, supra, at 1084 (“‘Police’ [in Europe in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries] in this sense stood for something much grander than a municipal security 
force.  It referred to the growing sense that the state had an obligation not merely to maintain order 
and administer justice, but to aggressively foster ‘the productive energies of society and provide the 
appropriate institutional framework for it.’”) with id. at 1085 (“In America, ‘police’ stood for new 
efforts on behalf of a dynamic state to marshal resources and promote a well-ordered community de-
voted to the public happiness and public good.”). 
362. See, e.g., Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137, 139–40 (Ala. 1841) (“Doubtless, under the form of 
government, which exists in this and the other States of this Union, the enjoyment of all the rights of 
property, and the utmost freedom of action which may consist with the public welfare, is guaranteed 
to every man, and no restraint can be lawfully imposed by the Legislature in relation thereto, which 
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could do so without compensating a property owner.363  According to one his-
torian, the period from 1781 to 1801 witnessed “a deluge of state and local 
legislation regulating economic and social life.”364  The authority to regulate 
 
the paramount claims of the community do not demand, or which does not operate alike on all.  Free 
government does not imply unrestrained liberty on the part of the citizen, but the privilege of being 
governed by laws which operate alike on all. It is not therefore, to be supposed, that in any country, 
however free, individual action cannot be restrained, or the mode, or manner of enjoying property, 
regulated.”); Whitney v. Bartholomew, 21 Conn. 213, 218–19 (1851) (“[T]he erection of a building 
on one’s own land, with a purpose of its being so used that its use will probably result in an injury to 
others, is, of itself, a wrongful act.  And whether such would be the effect, must depend much upon 
the nature of the business there done, and of its proximity to the residences and property of others.  
And therefore, it has been uniformly holden, that the placing of a swine-stye, slaughter-house, tan-
nery, tallow-furnace, steam-engine, smith’s forge, or other erection, which, in its use, will infect the 
atmosphere, produce unhealthy vapours, or offensive smells or noises, so near the dwellings of others 
as to materially affect them, and render them either unhealthy or uncomfortable, as residences, is un-
lawful and wrong, and constitutes such erections, nuisances, although upon the builder’s own land.  
And from this it results, that of trades which are lawful, some may be nuisances in cities, which are 
harmless in the country.”). 
363. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 62 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84–85 (1851) (“We think it is a 
settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil society, that every holder of proper-
ty . . . holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be in-
jurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor 
injurious to the rights of the community.  All property in this commonwealth . . . is derived directly 
or indirectly from the government, and held subject to those regulations, which are necessary to the 
common good and general welfare.  Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, 
are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injuri-
ous, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the 
governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedi-
ent.”); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 57 (1846) (“All property is acquired 
and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others, or 
to destroy or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community . . . .”); Treanor, supra 
note 350, at 791–94.  Nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions also recognized that proposition.  
See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662–63 (1887); cf. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551 
(1870) (“That provision [the Takings Clause] has always been understood as referring only to a direct 
appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has 
never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss 
to individuals.”).  The distinction between a valid exercise of the police power and a taking of private 
property survived until Justice Holmes smudged it in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922).  See HUFFMAN, supra note 361, at 7–9, 17–19, 116–17, 129–30.  He agreed that 
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are 
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.” Pennsylvania Coal, 260 
U.S. at 413.  He added, however, that “[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”  Id. at 415.  The 
result was to turn a categorical difference into one of degree.   
364. Novak, supra note 361, at 1076 (emphasis omitted); Wood, supra note 82, at 242 (“In-
deed, as Madison complained in 1786, the states passed more laws in the decade following 
[i]ndependence than they had in the entire colonial period.  And these laws had less and less to do 
with private matters—with moral and religious issues—and more and more to do with public mat-
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the economy became an accepted part of what was known as a state’s “police 
power.”365 
Those are just examples of economic regulation during the colonial and 
early history of the nation.  Those periods also witnessed various forms of 
what we now term land use regulation.366  For instance, as conditions of ob-
taining or retaining title, the colonies and young states required new landown-
 
ters—economic development and commercial convenience.”).   
 Consider New York.  “[T]he New York legislature passed special laws regulating lotteries; 
hawkers and peddlers; the firing of guns; usury; frauds; the buying and selling of offices; beggars and 
disorderly persons; rents and leases; firing woods; the destruction of deer; stray cattle and sheep; 
mines; ferries; apprentices and servants; bastards; idiots and lunatics; counselors, attorneys and solic-
itors; travel, labor, or play on Sunday; cursing and swearing; drunkenness; the exportation of flax-
seed; gaming; the inspection of lumber; dogs; the culling of staves and heading; debtors and credi-
tors; the quarantining of ships; sales by public auction; stock jobbing; fisheries; the inspection of 
flour and meal; the practice of physic and surgery; the packing and inspection of beef and pork; sole 
leather; strong liquors, inns, and taverns; pot and pearl ashes; poor relief; highways; and quit 
rents. . . . This regulatory pattern continued well into the nineteenth century.”  Novak, supra note 
361, at 1076–77.  And was just regulation at the state level.  The state legislature granted municipali-
ties, such as Albany, their own police powers. “An 1826 statute haphazardly lumps together some of 
the regulatory powers of the common council for the ‘more effectual suppression of vice and immo-
rality’ and ‘for preserving peace and good order.’  Included are hundreds of regulatable offenses, ac-
tions, professions, and economic interests: forestalling; regrating; disorderly and gaming houses; bil-
liard tables; combustible and dangerous materials; the use of lights and candles in livery or other 
stables; the construction of fireplaces, hearths, chimneys, stoves, and any other apparatus capable of 
causing fires; the gauging of all casks of liquids and liquors; the place and manner of selling hay, 
pickled and other fish; the forestalling of poultry, butter, and eggs; the purchase of wheat, corn, every 
kind of grain, and other articles of country produce, by ‘runners’; the running of dogs; weights and 
measures; buildings; chimneys and chimney sweeps; roads; wharves and docks; the weighing and 
measuring of hay, fish, iron, cord wood, coal, grain, lime, and salt; markets; cartmen and porters; 
fires; highways and bridges; roof guards and railings; the selling of cakes and fruit; the paving or 
flagging of sidewalks; the assize and quality of bread; the running-at-large of horses, cows, or cattle; 
and vagrants, common mendicants, or street beggars.  In addition, the legislature authorized Albany’s 
common council ‘to make all rules, by-laws, and regulations for the good order and government of 
the said city.’”  Id. at 1078–79 (footnotes omitted).  Colonial assemblies also subsidized some indus-
tries, such as ironworks, to encourage economic development.  Moreover, even the Framers’ genera-
tion may have subordinated its concerns for property in this world to its desire for a secure home-
stead in the next one.  See NELSON, supra note 120, at 54 (“[P]roperty law in the 1760s still promoted 
ethical living in preference to the unrestrained pursuit of wealth.”); Wood, supra note 82, at 242. 
365. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876) (“From this it is apparent that, down to the 
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not supposed that statutes regulating the 
use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily deprived an owner of his property 
without due process of law.  Under some circumstances they may, but not under all. The amendment 
does not change the law in this particular: it simply prevents the States from doing that which will 
operate as such a deprivation.”).   
366. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of 
the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1099 (2000) [hereinafter Hart, Early Republic Land Use]; 
John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 1252 (1996) [hereinafter Hart, Colonial Land Use]. 
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ers to inhabit, clear, cultivate, and improve their land; to fence agricultural 
land to corral animals; to operate mines; to drain wetlands for agricultural use; 
to devote riparian properties to use as mills; and so forth.367  Some land use 
restrictions, such as ones governing the choice of building materials to prevent 
the spread of fire,368 could be described as efforts to prevent harms to neigh-
boring landowners or nuisances.369  Others, such as regulations governing the 
siting of residences or the uniform tracting of land,370 could be said to be early 
instances of what today is known as urban planning or stewardship.371  The 
same type of rules applied in the new territories as well.372 
 
367. Hart, Early Republic Land Use, supra note 366, at 1107–31; Hart, Colonial Land Use, 
supra note 366, at 1273–82. 
368. BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, at 83, 86; Hart, Colonial Land Use, supra note 366, at 1273 
(discussing New England requirements that landowners destroy all “barberry bushes” on their prop-
erty to prevent them from spreading a blight to neighboring wheat); id. (same, building materials re-
strictions adopted for fire-preventing purposes). 
369. BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, at 83 (“Other measures, similar to present zoning ordinanc-
es, sought to locate certain noxious uses in such a manner as would render them least offensive to the 
local citizenry.”; offering the example that some localities limited the location of slaughterhouses and 
denied compensation for property destroyed to prevent the spread of a fire); Hart, Colonial Land Use, 
supra note 366, at 1281; see Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (rejecting due process challenge 
to Virginia statute permitting the uncompensated destruction of red cedar trees to prevent an infec-
tious plant disease from spreading to nearby apple orchards, regardless of whether the disease ren-
dered the cedar trees a common law nuisance); Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1879) (“At 
the common law every one had the right to destroy real and personal property, in cases of actual ne-
cessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire, and there was no responsibility on the part of such destroy-
er, and no remedy for the owner. . . .  In these cases the common law adopts the principle of the natu-
ral law, and finds the right and the justification in the same imperative necessity.”). 
370. Hart, Colonial Land Use, supra note 366, at 1275–79. 
371. Id. at 1281–82; see also Hart, Early Republic Land Use, supra note 366, at 1102 (“The 
same variety of public welfare objectives is observable for these years [1776–1789] as for the coloni-
al period.  Aesthetic regulation of town buildings was common. Riparian land was subordinated to 
the policy of promoting economic development that would benefit the public.  Farmers who owned 
wetlands were obliged by local majorities of their neighbors to have their lands drained and to con-
tribute to the costs of drainage. Other farmers were obliged to participate in coercive fencing pro-
jects.  The public interest in the development of mines and metal production was given precedence 
over the wishes of affected landowners.  Some landowners were prohibited from selling their inter-
ests in land. And legislatures sometimes enacted statutes declaring that owners of unimproved land 
must improve or occupy such lands or forfeit their title.”) (footnotes omitted). 
372. Hart, Early Republic Land Use, supra note 366, at 1149–50 (“[D]uring that period [from 
1776 to 1789] landowners were sometimes required to build urban buildings in accordance with aes-
thetic requirements, or to allow their land to be used for water power or mining, or to submit to inva-
sive projects of drainage or fencing, or to face the threat of forfeiting unimproved land if they did not 
occupy it or cultivate it.  Thus landowners’ use rights were subordinated to a number of different 
public policies between the founding of the state governments and the adoption of the Bill of Rights.  
Plainly, the ‘police power’ at the time of the Constitution was not confined to the ‘fundamental prin-
ciple that every one shall so use his own as not to wrong and injure another.’  Madison and his con-
temporaries, like earlier lawmakers, conceived of the public welfare as including much more than the 
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To be sure, “we have to remember that nineteenth-century government”—
let alone the eighteenth century version—“was certainly in no way a levia-
than.”373  The federal government did not regulate local businesses opera-
tions—no one imagined the expansion of Congress’s Commerce Clause pow-
er during the twentieth century or the growth of the post-New Deal federal 
administrative state374—and at least some state or local regulations were mere-
ly paper restraints.  “Two pillars of the modern state were missing: a strong 
tax base and a trained civil service,”375 and the universal guarantee of a trial 
by jury, which, at that time, could decide both questions of fact and law, en-
sured that the community could refuse to convict for conduct that the commu-
nity did not consider against its mores.376  Atop that, the public was not will-
ing to help the government take its tax dollars or regulate its property, and the 
Colonies adopted a more “free market” approach to governance beginning in 
the eighteenth century.377  The laws regulating economic opportunity and 
property rights may have been written in local codes, but also may have been 
only a shadow as far as their implementation is concerned. 
The law books indicated that “colonial society often placed the interests of 
the community above the economic rights of individuals.”378  Sumptuary laws 
 
supposedly classical concern for public health, safety, and morals.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 1143–
47 
373. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 127.  Nonetheless, that some instances of regulation are 
permissible does not prove that the state can always subordinate property to communal needs.  See 
Epstein, History Lean, supra note 261, at 596 (noting that even an expansive view of the Takings 
Clause permits the government to regulate monopolies and common carriers). 
374. That is not to say that no federal administrative state existed early in our history.  One did, 
just not today’s Brobdingnagian version.  See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). 
375. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 127; id. at 128 (“State action, then, was pinched for pennies.  
It had to find substitutes for the tax dollars it simply did not have.  Hence there was heavy use of the 
fee system.  Wherever possible, the costs of state services were shifted to users. . . .  There was no 
trained civil service in the modern sense.  Government was not run by experts, even experts in run-
ning a government.  Politics was a way to make money or use power.  . . .  In general, then, admin-
istration was weak and limited.  Regulation tended to be local, self-sustaining—as in the fee sys-
tem—and conservative in the use of staff.”).  State and local regulatory programs were even weaker 
in the Western states and territories.  Id. at 129; see HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 20, at 41 (“Colo-
nial economic regulation, although pervasive, was limited by the resources available to enforce com-
pliance.  It was most effective at the local level.”). 
376. See SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 48, 59 (1990). 
377. See, e.g., id. at 39, 120–25; 2 NELSON, supra note 350, at 56. 
378. ELY, supra note 7, at 22; see FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 125–27 (discussing state or 
local regulations imposed to ensure food quality; to conserve fish and foodstuffs; and to protect the 
public health through quarantines, nuisance abatements, and fire suppression). 
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were only one example.379  Reasonable regulations were permitted before the 
eighteenth century drew to a close.380  “In these days, long before anybody 
had heard of ‘free enterprise,’ the proprietors, squires, and magistrates of 
America certainly did not hold to the mantra that the best government was the 
one that governed least.”381 
The bottom line, as David Schultz has noted, was that “while property was 
important it was not so important that it could not be regulated.”382  There was 
a difference between what the Colonists said in defense of their decision to 
break with England, or what the Framers said when discussing the principles 
that underlay the new government they sought to charter, and what the Colo-
nists and Framers actually did when their hands were on the wheel.  They did 
not translate in its entirety and without modification their philosophical and 
rhetorical understanding of property into the legal institution of property gov-
erned by the former colonial or new federal political institutions.  Whether for 
reasons of economic or social necessity or practical political reality, late 
eighteenth-century Americans did not immunize property rights from govern-
ance.383 
 
379. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 88–89. 
380. Id. at 97–142; WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 120, at 291 
(“The exercise of rights of property was subject to the supervisory authority of the state, which regu-
lated markets, enacted sumptuary laws, granted monopoly privileges, and imposed various forms of 
takings through forfeiture, eminent domain, and taxation.”); BILDER, supra note 298.  The courts also 
upheld reasonable regulations in the nineteenth century and later.  See, e.g., Middleton v. Texas Pow-
er & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 157–63 (1919) (upholding state workers’ compensation statute); id. at 
160–61 (collecting cases to that effect); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917) (up-
holding a no-fault state workers’ compensation law); Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 
50–51 (1912) (upholding congressional repeal of the fellow-servant rule); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & 
S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 295–96 (1908) (upholding a railroad safety requirement); Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding over a due process challenge a state compulso-
ry smallpox vaccination requirement); Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 428–29 (1902) (same, a state 
ban on futures contracts); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885) (“The power of 
the State to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its statutory requirements is coeval with 
government; and the mode in which they shall be enforced, whether at the suit of a private party, or 
at the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts collected, are merely mat-
ters of legislative discretion.”). 
381. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 39. 
382. Schultz, supra note 62, at 479. 
383. Id. at 490 (“Property rights, then, while important, were not viewed as inviolable and their 
defense, John Locke’s assertion notwithstanding, was not the singular end of government. Property 
was viewed as a means to an end, despite Lockean rhetoric to the contrary, and property claims were 
sacrificed to support republican principles and the public good. Concrete experiences of British 
common law, colonial and early American regulatory policies, and case law all sustained significant 
limits on property rights that contrasted dramatically with the political rhetoric of property during 
this era.”) (footnote omitted). 
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Madison is well known for his discussion of competing “factions” in The 
Federalist,384 but he was not the only person aware of the difficulties posed by 
contending economic interests.  The Framers were savvy individuals, well 
aware of the economic rivalries present in late eighteenth-century America.385  
Those rivalries took place along various axes: coastal versus interior cities; 
landed and agricultural versus commercial interests; local manufacturers and 
artisans versus importers; and, of course, debtors versus creditors.386  Discus-
sions about how to reconcile the pursuit of individual self-interest with the 
search for the “common good” were common in the run-up to the Declaration 
of Independence as well as the adoption and ratification of the Constitution.387 
Implicit in those discussions was an unavoidable conclusion that Madison 
himself drew in the period before the Constitutional Convention: Government 
had the responsibility to protect property rights, but popularly elected republi-
can government could never fully achieve that goal.388  The reason is two-
fold: (1) The majority could use its numerical superiority to transfer property 
from the rich to the poor, and (2) unlike religion, property and its regulation is 
an unavoidable component of governance in any political community.389  A 
state can avoid violating a person’s free exercise rights by abandoning the 
field to self-regulation by the members of individual faiths.  That had not been 
the case in England or the Colonies, where the Anglican Church had been an 
integral part of the government ever since Henry VIII renounced serving as a 
vassal of the leader of the Church of Rome and established himself as the titu-
lar leader of the Church of England.390  That combination of religion and gov-
ernance, and the favoritism and discrimination it inevitably produces, was one 
of the reasons the English emigrated to the Colonies.391  America, however, 
divorced the federal government from religion, eliminating the possibility that 
the government would be obliged to govern by sectarian principles or to pre-
 
384. See MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 165. 
385. See id. at 187 (the Framers were “hard-nosed and tough-minded . . . practical men of expe-
rience and talent”). 
386. See ADAMS, supra note 127, at 222–23. 
387. Id. at 222. 
388. See RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 120, at 315–16, 332, 335; Katz, supra 
note 164, at 484–85. 
389. See FARRAND II, supra note 257, at 203–04; Katz, supra note 164, at 485; Madison’s Ob-
servations on Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in 6 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
308, 310 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1952). 
390. See Katz, supra note 164, at 472 (noting that the Anglican Church had been established by 
law in Virginia and residents were required to attend Anglican services and contribute to the church). 
391. See id.  
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fer one group of citizens over another on the basis of their faith.392  To use a 
modern term, the new federal government “privatized” religion. 
That option was not available to the federal government in the realm of 
economic policy.  It was not possible to leave to debtors and creditors, or to 
local manufacturers and importers, for example, the responsibility to sort out 
their own affairs.  The refusal to pick sides in that dispute would have had the 
effect of leaving to each state the responsibility to develop its own bankruptcy 
and trade laws, a chore that each state would gladly have exercised as long as 
it could favor its own residents over everyone else.  Yet, the state economic 
wars waged under the Articles of Confederation was one of the major reasons 
the Articles had failed to consolidate the states into one nation and one of the 
principal justifications for revising or, as the Framers ultimately decided, 
abolishing that compact in favor of an new one.393  The Framers knew that 
they could not leave those decisions to the states.394  Responsible governance 
demanded that the new national government possess the authority to displace 
the states and regulate for the nation in those fields.  Hence, were born the 
Commerce, Coinage, Bankruptcy, and Supremacy Clauses.395 
In sum, the Colonists and new Americans certainly believed that property 
was essential to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but they did not also 
assume that property was impervious to regulation. The claim that Americans 
in the new nation sought to install a laissez-faire economy—and the ancillary 
claim that the Supreme Court sought to do the same early in the twentieth cen-
tury via the Constitution—cannot be reconciled with seventeenth and eight-
eenth American history.  The Colonies and states saw no inconsistency be-
tween the value that should be afforded to property and the need for 
reasonable regulation.  Accordingly, there is no merit to the argument that the 
young nation treated all forms of regulation as an anathema.  The Americans 
of that era placed a high value on property, and there were instances in which 
as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes later put it, “regulation goes too far” and 
results in a “taking,”396 even though title remained in the property-owner’s 
 
392. The Constitution achieved that goal through three provisions: The Religious Test Clause 
of Article VI bars use of any religious test as a prerequisite for holding federal office, and the First 
Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses forbid the federal government from establish-
ing a national religion or penalizing an individual’s choice of faith.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 
(“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the 
United States.”); id. amend I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
393. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979).  
394. Id.  
395. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3–5; id. art. VI. 
396. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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hands.397 Nonetheless, the government could regulate property for the benefit 
of the public when the community’s needs demanded it.398 
Part of the reason why early Americans could reconcile those principles 
was their belief that, to be valid, regulation had to be in the public interest.399  
The Framers believed that government officials should manifest the Roman 
sense of civic virtue when exercising governmental authority.400  Corruption 
was a “rotting of positive ideals of civic virtue and public integrity.”401  In 
their view, any use of government power to advance the ends of a small fac-
tion rather than to “promote the general Welfare”402 was a corrupt exercise of 
that authority.403  To them, the law was not a device for rewarding a favored 
interest group.  It was a mechanism for protecting individual rights and for 
 
397. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1549 (2003); Gold, supra note 192; Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: 
Setting the Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211 (1996).   
398. See Schultz, supra note 62, at 494 (“When it comes to studying early American legal his-
tory, we need to see the political discourse as creating a climate of opinion, yet the Lockean and Re-
publican rhetoric must be viewed through the perspective of Blackstone and the law.  More im-
portantly, the rhetoric of property may even be part of the community concensus that helped define 
the law.  According to Jack Greene, the law during the Founding era was more than simply enact-
ments from a political superior to an inferior: ‘On the contrary, in the context of British and Ameri-
can legal traditions, law in the 1760s and 1770s was still thought of as being “as much custom and 
community consensus as sovereign command.’” . . .  What we have in the end then is a view of prop-
erty in early America that is different depending not simply on whose rhetoric is examined.  These 
differences are rooted in the difference between how property is approached as either a political con-
cept or a legal institution.”) (footnote omitted).  
399. “The end of government being the good of mankind, points out its great duties: It is above 
all things to provide for the security, the quiet, and happy enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.  
There is no one act which a government can have a right to make that does not tend to the advance-
ment of the security, tranquility, and prosperity of the people.”  ADAMS, supra note 127, at 217 
(quoting JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE ENGLISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 10–11 
(1764)); see also, e.g., Ellis v. Marshall, 2 Mass. 269, 276 (1807) (distinguishing between a “public 
act, predicated upon a view to the general good” and a “private act, obtained at the solicitation of in-
dividuals, for their private emolument, or for the improvement of their estates,” with only the former 
being constitutional); Nelson, Eighteenth-Century, supra note 352, at 951.  That is not to say that the 
Framers’ generation did not realize that there are conflicting interests in any society.  They did.  They 
believed that a representative democracy could reconcile conflicting interests for the nation’s benefit.  
ADAMS, supra note 127, at 227. 
400. See SCOTT, supra note 15, at 25 (according to James Harrington, a seventeenth-century 
English political theorist, “a virtuous polity must . . . govern in the interest of [the] entire citizenry.  
A society that allowed class or personal interest to determine public policy lacked virtue and suffered 
from corruption.”); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S 
SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 32–38 (2014). 
401. TEACHOUT, supra note 402, at 39. 
402. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
403. See TEACHOUT, supra note 402, at 38. 
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enhancing the well-being of the community.404  “The idea that laws should be 
general rather than special, and oriented toward public rather than private in-
terests, was central to the eighteenth-century Founders’ conception of valid 
laws as equal laws.”405  That belief undergirded the colonial and early Ameri-
can rules governing economic relations and property rights.406  Accordingly, 
 
404. See WOOD, supra note 190, at 53 (“The sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good 
of the whole formed the essence of republicanism and comprehended for Americans the idealistic 
goal of their Revolution.  From this goal flowed all of the Americans’ exhortatory literature and all 
that made their ideology truly revolutionary.”); see Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early 
American  Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 334, 334–35 (1982) (noting that “Americans be-
lieved that what made republics great or ultimately destroyed them was not the force of arms but the 
character and spirit of the people,” that “[p]ublic virtue, as the essential prerequisite for good gov-
ernment, was all-important,” and that “furthering the public good—the exclusive purpose of republi-
can government—required the constant sacrifice of individual interests to the greater needs of the 
whole, the people”).  Of course, people being people, there were exceptions.  See MCDONALD, 
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 175 (“[Rhode Islanders] did nothing to enhance their rep-
utation by their unorthodox views toward government, which held that government existed to facili-
tate (by fraudulent means if necessary) the business activities of its citizens, or by their business eth-
ics, in which the only limits upon trickery, deception, and sharp trading were those required by a 
regard for future trading. [¶]  All these doings earned the state the opprobrious sobriquet of Rogue’s 
Island . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
405. Jeffrey Rosen, Class Legislation, Public Choice, and the Structural Constitution, 21 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 182 (1997).  Professor Rosen adds that “Congress and the States have 
the power to regulate economic liberties in the public interest, but regulations that benefit private in-
terests are ultra vires and unconstitutional.  This suspicion of economic ‘class legislation’ was of 
such pressing concern to the Framers and ratifiers of the original Constitution and the Civil War 
amendments that it is reflected throughout the text, in power-granting provisions as well as rights-
reserving ones, including the Taxation Clause of Article I, Section 8; the Contracts Clause of Article 
I, Section 10; the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses of the Fifth Amendment; and the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 181.  For that reason, it was settled law that the government could not take 
property from A for its or the public’s use without paying A compensation for his loss, see Rosen, 
supra, at 184–85, and no government could not take property from A and give it to B regardless of 
whether B was compensated for the loss, see, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) 
(Chase, J.) (“An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first princi-
ples of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.  The ob-
ligation of a law in governments established on express compact, and on republican principles, must 
be determined by the nature of the power, on which it is founded.  A few instances will suffice to 
explain what I mean . . . .  [A] law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens; a 
law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to 
B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, 
therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.”). See also 1 JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, 
THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITICAL LAW 45–47 (5th ed. T. Nugent trans., 1807); 2 HUGO 
GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 385 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925); 2 SAMUEL VON 
PUFENDORF, ON THE LAWS OF NATURE AND NATIONS 1070 (James Brown Scott ed., Oldfather & 
Oldfather trans., 1964) (1688); THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 399, 453–54 
(2d Amer. ed., 1832); EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 19 (James Brown Scott ed., C. Fen-
wick trans., 1916) (1758). 
406. See Hart, Colonial Land Use, supra note 366, at 1291 (“[T]he colonial experience of land 
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as Professors Kermit Hall and Peter Karsten have explained: 
Economic development harmonized with a central tenet of 
republican theory, the idea of the public interest.  Antebellum 
Americans did not embrace “a dogmatic laissez-faire 
faith. . . .”  The idea of mixed economic activity . . . in which 
government intervenes in the private marketplace to serve the 
public good, better captures the law’s impact on the antebel-
lum economy than does the term “laissez-faire.”407 
To be sure, over time the nation’s attitude toward property began to di-
verge from the one held by the Framers.  To them as to Locke, there was a 
strong theoretical and practical linkage between liberty and property; each one 
was necessary fully to enjoy the other.  Beginning in the eighteenth century, 
however, property came to be seen simply as a commodity.  An important 
commodity because it still supplied income, but no longer an essential feature 
of liberty and independence.  As Gordon Wood, one of the deans of early 
American history, has noted, “property as a source of independence and au-
thority gave way to an entrepreneurial idea of property, as a commodity to be 
exchanged in the marketplace . . . .”408  It therefore may be that, as Willi Paul 
Adams has concluded, “[t]he idea that property is a natural 
right . . . triumphed in the Glorious, the American, and the French bourgeois 
revolutions,” only to lose its “self-evident and unquestioned character in the 
course of the Revolution” and, certainly, in the decades afterwards.409 
Perhaps that transition was inevitable.  Underneath the Lockean relation-
 
use regulation cannot fairly be confined within the imagined boundary of nuisance control.  The 
preferences of landowners were regularly subordinated to a vision of the public good that embraced 
many objectives beyond protecting health and safety.  In regulating land use, the government sought 
benefits for the public, not just avoidance of harm.  The government often acted simply to encourage 
a publicly preferred use of private land—to rationalize or optimize private land use.  The power to 
regulate private land seems to have been regarded simply as part of civil government’s power to leg-
islate for the common welfare.”) (footnote omitted). 
407. See HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 20, at 93 (footnote and internal punctuation omitted); 
accord JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956) (“not the jealous limitation of the power of the state, but the re-
lease of individual creative energy was the dominant value.  Where legal regulation or compulsion 
might promote the greater release of individual or group energies, we had no hesitancy in making 
affirmative use of the law.”). 
408. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 
330 (2009); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 172; HORWITZ, supra note 120, at 31 (“As the spirit 
of economic development began to take hold of American society in the early years of the nineteenth 
century, . . . the idea of property underwent a fundamental transformation—from a static agrarian 
conception entitling an owner to undisturbed enjoyment to a dynamic, instrumental, and more ab-
stract view of property that emphasized the newly paramount virtues of productive use and develop-
ment.”); see also id. 31–62. 
409. ADAMS, supra note 127, at 187. 
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ship between property and liberty was an undercurrent of tension, a tension 
that began to emerge during the debates leading up to the Revolution and Rat-
ification, a tension that reflected the need to address and resolve the inevitable 
conflict between a republic that was perfectly democratic and a nation that af-
forded private property absolute protection from the government.  As a gen-
eral matter, the Framers, as Montesquieu had warned, were troubled by the 
prospect that only a small republic could survive the inevitable clashes among 
factions for different portions of the economic pie, particularly a conflict be-
tween the haves and have-nots.410  Classically educated men, the Framers 
knew from scholars such as David Hume that past republics had been riven by 
conflicts among factions.411  Intensely practical men, the Framers also knew 
that demagogues—such as George Clinton in New York, John Hancock in 
Massachusetts, Samuel Chase in Maryland, and Patrick Henry in Virginia—
had risen to power in numerous states.412  The Framers’ fear that a numerical-
ly superior landless majority would eventually redistribute property fueled the 
debates over the qualifications for suffrage and office holding and over the 
possible formulas and factors that could be used for the apportionment of rep-
resentatives.413  Madison and the other delegates hoped that three features of 
the new national government would “minimize the mischiefs” that factions 
could achieve.414  The large size of the republic would make it difficult for 
factions to co-opt the Congress.  The Supremacy Clause would help scuttle 
some unreasonable state laws.415  And the states could be trusted to regulate 
the suffrage to prevent expropriation.  Nonetheless, despite the view often ex-
pressed from the run-up to the Revolution and through Ratification of the 
Constitution that property rights must be protected, the Framers likely knew 
that they had not eliminated the tension between property and democracy and 
had merely kicked that can down the road to the new federal government, the 
 
410. See id. at 166. 
411. “James Madison and various others focused upon a feature of republics that had always 
been troublesome, namely, the tendency of men to divide into factions or parties and to put the inter-
ests of the parties ahead of those of the public.” MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 
3, at 162; see also id. at 162–63. 
412. See id. at 164. 
413. Such as whether that number should reflect the number of taxpayers in a district (or the 
amount of taxes they contributed) rather than the total population.  See ADAMS, supra note 127, at 
158–59. 
414. MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM, supra note 3, at 165–66. 
415. See id. at 165.  Madison had hoped to achieve that result by granting Congress a veto 
power over unwise state legislation, id. at 206, but the other delegates were unwilling to grant Con-
gress a power that broad.  The compromise result was to adopt the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, 
which requires the states to comply with federal law and deems invalid state laws that conflict with 
or frustrate the purposes of federal law.  See id. at 275–76. 
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states, and the people.416 
* * * * * 
Where does that leave us?  With this. 
History reveals that the Framers venerated property both for its own sake 
and as a means of guaranteeing personal independence.  Property was not 
simply realty or personalty, but was one with liberty.  The Framers’ genera-
tion was familiar with local, small-scale regulation of markets and goods for 
the public benefit, and those members accepted the need for such regulation to 
serve that goal.  Later generations gradually attributed far less importance to 
the acquisition, ownership, and use of property as a legitimate goal for indi-
viduals and as the ideal and principal means of promoting social welfare, and 
far greater importance to the need for regulation to protect the public.  Wheth-
er property should have fallen as far as it has, however, is a different matter, 
one that deserves its own separate treatment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court treats “property” as “a poor relation,”417 deserving of 
far less protection than “life” or “liberty” receive.  The Framers, however, did 
not see it that way.  They believed that neither liberty nor property could exist 
without the other.  That belief, moreover, was nothing new to any eighteenth-
century English subject, whether he lived in London or Williamsburg.  Anglo-
American traditions, customs, and law held that property was an essential in-
gredient of the liberty that the Colonists had come to enjoy from Massachu-
setts through Georgia and must be protected against arbitrary governmental 
interference.  The Supreme Court has forgotten the status that property had for 
the Framers.  Reminding the Court may help lift property out of the basement 
to which it has been relegated. 
 
 
 
416. See ADAMS, supra note 127, at 158–59. 
417. Dolan v. Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994). 
 
